

## TRANSCENDENT PRINCIPLES OF *MA'AD* IN THE QUR'AN

Hasyim Adnani\*

Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Sadra, Indonesia; [hasyimadnani@sadra.ac.id](mailto:hasyimadnani@sadra.ac.id)

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**Abstract:** *This article explains the various principles and discourses in understanding ma'ad, depending on the point of view of the school of thought, whether theological, rationalist or transcendental theosophy (al-hikmah al-muta'aliyah). Each point of view will give rise to different meanings and implications as a result and consequence of that view. Resurrection is not only a matter of ideology but is a discussion studied by philosophers to explore its philosophical values. The verses of the Koran also confirm the existence of the day of resurrection. However, in practice, scholars and intellectuals differ in interpreting the aspect of resurrection referred to in these verses of the Qur'an. Spiritual awakening or physical resurrection is a dialogue that is often discussed in the context of understanding the day of resurrection. Through qualitative research and a philosophical approach, the author tries to juxtapose the principles of transcendental theosophy as an analytical tool for understanding the concept of ma'ad. Apart from being able to apply the transcendent theosophical principle to understand transcendent ma'ad, this principle also accommodates the basic principles contained in theological, philosophical, 'irfan and Sufism thought. So, the results obtained from this research are that the concept of ma'ad needs to be understood through the principles of Islamic philosophy so that a complete understanding will be created in understanding the concept of ma'ad. In the context of Islamic philosophy, especially transcendental theosophy (al-hikmah al-muta'aliyah), various theories are very relevant in explaining the concept of ma'ad, especially in understanding the context of the day of resurrection in the Qur'an.*

**Keywords:** *Ma'ad, 'Irfan, Philosophy, Sufism, Theosophy, Transcendent.*

**Abstrak:** Tulisan ini menjelaskan adanya beragam prinsip dan diskursus dalam memahami *ma'ad*, tergantung dari sudut pandang aliran pemikirannya, baik yang bercorak teologis, rasionalis, maupun teosofi transenden (*al-hikmah al-muta'aliyah*). Masing-masing sudut pandang akan melahirkan pemaknaan dan implikasi yang berbeda sebagai akibat dan konsekuensi dari pandangan tersebut. Kebangkitan tidak hanya menjadi persoalan ideologi semata, akan tetapi menjadi pembahasan yang dikaji oleh para filsuf untuk digali nilai-nilai filosofisnya. Ayat-ayat Al-Qur'an pun menegaskan adanya hari kebangkitan. Meski dalam praktiknya para ulama maupun cendekiawan berbeda dalam memaknai aspek kebangkitan yang dimaksud dalam ayat-ayat Al-Qur'an tersebut. Kebangkitan ruhani atau kebangkitan fisik menjadi dialog yang kerap diperbincangkan dalam konteks untuk memahami hari kebangkitan. Melalui penelitian kualitatif dan pendekatan filosofis, penulis mencoba untuk menyandingkan prinsip-prinsip teosofi transenden sebagai pisau analisis dalam memahami konsep *ma'ad*. Prinsip teosofi transenden ini selain dapat diterapkan untuk memahami

\* Corresponding Author

*ma'ād* bersifat transenden, prinsip ini juga mengakomodir dasar-dasar prinsip yang tertera dalam pemikiran teologi, filsafat, *'irfān*, dan tasawuf. Sehingga hasil yang didapatkan dari penelitian ini adalah konsep *ma'ād* perlu dipahami melalui prinsip-prinsip filsafat Islam sehingga akan tercipta pemahaman yang utuh dalam memahami konsep *ma'ād*. Dalam konteks filsafat Islam terutama teosofi transenden (*al-hikmah al-muta'āliyah*), beragam teori sangat relevan dalam menjelaskan konsep *ma'ād* terutama dalam memahami konteks hari kebangkitan di dalam Al-Qur'an.

**Kata-kata Kunci:** *Filsafat, 'Irfān, Ma'ād, Tasawuf, Teosofi, Transenden.*

## Introduction

The discussion about *ma'ād* is often understood in theological terms with a focus solely on life after death. However, by observing the scope of the discourse on *ma'ād* as part of the soul's journey, we will discover a collective awareness that is not limited to the afterlife but has started since our time in the world. Self-awareness is one of the unique and fundamental characteristics of a person, such as the ability to recognize feelings, as an embodiment of identity, serving as a realistic measure of self-ability, and the ability of humans to observe themselves. It is from here that one can contemplate and need self-awareness about the principle of *ma'ād*.

The topic of *ma'ād* in research is not a new one, as there have been numerous studies exploring or addressing the concept of *ma'ād* about eschatology, as well as its connections to the soul and body, death, and the day of judgment.<sup>1</sup>

There are various principles in understanding *ma'ād*, depending on the point of view of the school of thought, whether theological, rationalist, or transcendent

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1 Amsal Bakhtiar, 'Eskatologi: Perspektif Agama dan Filsafat', *Refleksi* 1, no. 3 (1999): 35–42, <https://doi.org/10.15408/ref.v1i3.14298>; Safaruddin Safaruddin, 'Eskatologi', *Al-Hikmah* 14, no. 1 (13 June 2013): 56–64; Sukron Abdilah, 'Eskatologi Kematian dan Kemenjadian Manusia', *Jaqqi: Jurnal Aqidah dan Filsafat Islam* 1, no. 1 (30 October 2016): 121–34, <https://doi.org/10.15575/jaqqi.v1i1.1691>; Andy Hadiyanto and Umi Khumairoh, 'Makna Simbolik Ayat-Ayat Tentang Kiamat dan Kebangkitan dalam Al-Qur'an', *Hayula: Indonesian Journal of Multidisciplinary Islamic Studies* 2, no. 2 (31 July 2018): 187–212, <https://doi.org/10.21009/hayula.002.2.06>; Ruyatul Fauziah, 'Kebangkitan Manusia di Akhirat Menurut Al-Ghazali dan Ibnu Rusyd', *Aqlania* 9, no. 2 (23 December 2018): 193–221, <https://doi.org/10.32678/aqlania.v9i02.2066>; Rizki Rizki Supriatna, 'Eskatologi Mullā Sadra: Kebangkitan setelah Kematian', *Jaqqi: Jurnal Aqidah dan Filsafat Islam* 5, no. 1 (23 April 2020): 101–20, <https://doi.org/10.15575/jaqqi.v5i1.6329>; Indriawati Indriawati, 'Itibar Al-Quran: Peran Tulang Ekor dalam Proses Penciptaan dan Kebangkitan Manusia', *MISYKAT: Jurnal Ilmu-ilmu Al-Quran Hadits Syari'ah dan Tarbiyah* 6, no. 1 (30 June 2021): 121–36, <https://doi.org/10.33511/misykat.v6n1.121-136>; Abdur Rohman, 'Konsep Ayat-Ayat Eskatologi Perspektif Fazlur Rahman', *AL-IFKAR: Jurnal Pengembangan Ilmu Keislaman* 16, no. 02 (30 September 2021): 4–17; Fitria Rika Susanti and Surma Hayani, 'Pemikiran Filosofis Ibnu Rusyd Tentang Eskatologi (Kajian Tentang Kehidupan di Akhirat)', *Jurnal Ilmiah Ilmu Ushuluddin* 20, no. 1 (30 June 2021): 15–29, <https://doi.org/10.18592/jiiu.v20i1.3448>; Jamiatussoraya Jamiatussoraya, 'Interpretasi Narasi Ayat-Ayat Eskatologis dalam Juz 'Amma', *AlifLam Journal of Islamic Studies and Humanities* 3, no. 1 (10 July 2022): 37–54, <https://doi.org/10.51700/aliflam.v3i1.433>; Lufi Nurfadhilah, 'Kondisi Tubuh dan Jiwa Setelah Kematian dalam Filsafat Mullā Shadra dan Al-Ghazali', *Jurnal Penelitian Ilmu Ushuluddin* 2, no. 3 (26 April 2022): 399–412, <https://doi.org/10.15575/jpiu.13672>.

theosophy (*al-ḥikmah al-muta'āliyah*).<sup>2</sup> Each perspective will give rise to different interpretations and implications. However, in this chapter, the author attempts to use the principles of transcendental theosophy in understanding *ma'ād*. These principles of transcendent theosophy, in addition to being able to be applied to understand the transcendent nature of *ma'ād*, can accommodate the basic principles stated in theology, philosophy, *'irfān*, and Sufism. To understand the meaning of transcendental principles, the author lists several principles to serve as a foundation for comprehending *ma'ād*. These principles encompass several discussions, namely: The concept of transcendence, the fundamentality of existence (*aṣālah al-wujūd*), the gradation of existence (*tashkīk al-wujūd*) and motion of substance (*al-ḥarākah al-jawhariyah*).

After understanding the meaning of the transcendent along with its correlation with *ma'ād*, let's delve further into the transcendent principles, including the fundamentality of existence (*aṣālah al-wujūd*), gradation of existence (*tashkīk al-wujūd*) and substantial motion (*al-ḥarākah al-jawhariyah*). These principles are used by Mullā Ṣadrā to prove the perfection of the soul as the core identity of human beings.<sup>3</sup> In a comprehensive elaboration, transcendent philosophy offers distinctive thoughts about causality (*al-'illiyah*), no repetition in nothingness (*al-ma'dūm la yu'ad*), immortality of the soul (*baqā' al-nafs*), ascending and descending bows (*qawsh shu'ūd* and *qawsh nuzūl*). These ideas will serve as the rational basis for explaining the transcendent *ma'ād*.

### Fundamentality Existence (*Aṣālah al-Wujūd*)

The concepts of existence and quiddity (*mābiyah*) are not purely intellectual constructs and are independent of sensory preconditions, but they are the results of sensory perception of external objects.<sup>4</sup> The two concepts are acquired from the senses and then the intellect abstracts them into universal concepts that produce a concept of existence. However, Muslim philosophers differ in their views on how the process of knowledge is obtained. Some view that the cause of the effects of

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2 The term transcendent theosophy (*al-ḥikmah al-muta'āliyah*) has been used by Sufi scholars like Qaysari long before Mullā Ṣadrā adopted it. This term even appeared in the works of some Peripatetic philosophers, such as Qutbuddin Shirazi. However, in its earlier usage, the intended meaning was not the same as what we encountered in the works of Mullā Ṣadrā and his disciples. They provided a more precise meaning for this term and identified it as a symbol of the new metaphysical and philosophical synthesis by Mullā Ṣadrā. See Seyyed Hussein Nasr, *Al-Hikmat al-Muta'aliyah Mullā Sadra: Sebuah Trobosan dalam Filsafat Islam*, trans. Mustamin al-Mandary (Jakarta: Sadra Press, 2017), 87.

3 Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, *Al-Ḥikmah al-Muta'āliyah fī al-Asfār al-'Aqliyah al-Arba'ah*, vol. 1 (Beirut: Dār Iḥyā' Turāth al-'Arabi, 1999), 67.

4 Kholid Al-Walid, *Epistemologi Mullā Shadra: Ittibad al-'Aqil wa al-Ma'quI* (Bandung: IAIN Sunan Gunung Jati, 2004), 102; Muhsin Labib, *Pemikiran Filsafat Ayatullah Taqi Mizbah Yazdi* (Jakarta: Sadra Press, 2011), 197; Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi, *Buku Daras Filsafat Islam: Orientasi ke Filsafat Islam Kontemporer*, trans. Musa Kazhim and Saleh Bagir (Jakarta: Shadra Press, 2010), 155.

knowledge lies in existence, while others consider *mābiyah*.<sup>5</sup> The different views of Muslim philosophers above are the reason why Mullā Ṣadrā questioned this fundamental debate in particular.<sup>6</sup>

### The Meaning of *Aṣālah* and *I'tibār*

The word *aṣālah* is derived from the word '*aṣl*' which means foundation and principle. Its opposite is *far'ū* which means branch. Based on this meaning, *aṣālah* signifies fundamentality in contrast to *far'iyyah*, which means being secondary or branching off.<sup>7</sup> *Aṣālah* is also understood as the true reality from which the initial external effects arise existentially.<sup>8</sup>

Ṣadrā mentioned that the debates among previous Muslim philosophers revolved around determining fundamentality (*aṣālah*) and constructiveness or assumption (*i'tibār*) of existence.<sup>9</sup>

### Arguments for the Fundamentality of Existence (*Aṣālah al-Wujūd*)

Mullā Ṣadrā, after explaining that the concept of existence is self-evident (*badīhī*) and doesn't require proof, proceeds to elaborate on the fundamentality of existence. He argues that existence comes into existence by itself, whereas everything other than existence exists because of existence.<sup>10</sup> Mullā Ṣadrā's argument is subsequently elaborated in more detail by Ṭabāṭabā'ī, the proponent of *al-ḥikmah al-muta'āliyah*). Ṭabāṭabā'ī presents three arguments to explain the fundamentality of existence:

*The first argument* is Ṭabāṭabā'ī tries to answer the views of those who reject the principle of *aṣālah al-wujūd*. For example, the view that essence or quiddity comes out of its state of indifference to the position of fundamentality (*aṣālah*) and it has an effect in the external world because it is connected to the creator. It is not true because if the state of quiddity after being connected to the creator remains the same and has no change at all, there has been a reversal of facts. After all, it was previously assumed that the quiddity has come into existence and has effects. Therefore, it is impossible and rejected. But, if the quiddity that has been connected to the creator is different, then the difference is connected to existence even though it is said that the connection is to the creator.<sup>11</sup>

5 Labib, 155.

6 Labib, *Pemikiran Filsafat Ayatullah Taqi Mizbah Yazdi*, 197.

7 Mohsen Gharawiyān, *Pengantar Memahami Buku Daras Filsafat Islam: Penjelasan untuk Mendekati Analisis Teori Filsafat Islam*, trans. Muhammad Nur Djabir (Jakarta: Sadra Press, 2011), 91.

8 'Abd al-Jabbār al-Rifā'ī, *Mabādī' al-Falsafah al-Islāmiyyah*, vol. 1 (Beirut: Dār al-Hādī li al-Ṭabā'ah wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawzī', 2001), 202.

9 Henri Kawrbin, 'Maqām Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī fī al-Falsafah al-Īrāniyyah', in *Rakā'iz Falsafah Ṣadr al-Muta'ālihīn*, by Majmū'ah min al-Bāḥithīn (Beirut: Dār al-Ma'ārif al-Ḥakīmah, 2008), 120.

10 Shīrāzī, *Al-Ḥikmah al-Muta'āliyah fī al-Asfār al-'Aqliyah al-Arba'ah*, 1:69.

11 See the detailed explanation in Muḥammad Mahdī al-Mu'min, *Sharḥ Bidāyah al-Ḥikmah* (Qūm: Manthūrāt Dhawi al-Qurba, 2001), 39.

If examined carefully, the concept of *mābiyah*, such as ‘human’ for example, can be negated (as if humans do not exist). Then if we establish its existence, we do not necessarily face a contradiction. Thus, the concept of ‘human’ and the concept of ‘non-existence’ are not contradictory, just as the concept of ‘human’ does not necessarily necessitate the concept of ‘existence’.<sup>12</sup>

*The second argument* quidity, when viewed in terms of propositions, necessitates the existence of a predication that is necessary (There is a correspondence in the subject and predicate that refers to reality). Thus, the occurrence of a prediction is a necessity. For example, it is wrong to say that humans are stones because humans with the identity of stones do not exist in external reality.<sup>13</sup>

To explain external reality, we must use propositions that have the concept of existence. If we do not predicate the concept of existence on *mābiyah*—like human beings—we are not essentially talking about external reality. This is another proof that it is the existence that explains external objective reality. External reality is the substantial *misdāq* of existence. As the great philosopher Bahmaniyar explains in his book *al-Taḥṣīl*, how can existence not have an objective reality while the content of ‘objective reality’ is existence itself?<sup>14</sup>

### Gradation of Existence (*Tashkīk al-Wujūd*)

Gradation of Existence is a further discussion of *aṣālah al-wujūd*, which is caused by different views of philosophers who believe in the fundamentality of existence like Ibn Sīnā and Mullā Ṣadrā, and the philosophers who believe in the fundamentality of *mābiyah* like Suhrawardi.<sup>15</sup>

Ibn Sīnā in the concept of *aṣālah al-wujūd* views that the existence of all entities is rooted in existence.<sup>16</sup> Ibn Sīnā’s view implies that existence is diverse, and its actualization is different in reality.<sup>17</sup>

However, Mullā Ṣadrā views that existence is not diverse and has a singular reality (*baqīqah al-wāhidah musyaqqah*), but it does have diverse qualities of existence for entities in reality.<sup>18</sup> The error of the peripatetic philosophers, in Mullā Ṣadrā’s view, lies in their understanding of reality as ‘diverse’ and ‘singular’ within each external existence. Whereas Mullā Ṣadrā distinguishes these through the concepts of univocally (*ishtirak ma‘nawī*) and equivocality (*ishtirak lafẓī*) in order to address the issues of the peripatetic philosophers regarding the concept of

12 Gharawiyān, *Pengantar Memahami Buku Daras Filsafat Islam: Penjelasan untuk Mendekati Analisis Teori Filsafat Islam*, 96.

13 ‘Alī Ḥasan Maṭar, *Al-Khulāsah al-Falsafiyah* (Qūm: Mu’assasah Dhawi al-Jannāh, 2003 H), 192–93.

14 Gharawiyān, *Pengantar Memahami Buku Daras Filsafat Islam: Penjelasan untuk Mendekati Analisis Teori Filsafat Islam*, 97.

15 M. Saeed Sheikh, *Islamic Philosophy* (London: Octagon Press, 1980), 73.

16 Khadimi Khadimi, *Mullā Sadra’s Illuminations and Mystical Ideas Concerning the Origination of the Many from the One* (Tehran: SIPRI, 1999), 98.

17 Ṣadrā, *Al-Hikmah al-Muta‘āliyah fī al-Asfār al-Aqliyah al-Arba‘ah*, 1:30.

18 Kawrbin, ‘Maqām Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī fī al-Falsafah al-Īrāniyyah’, 119.

fundamentality of existence,<sup>19</sup> such as the whiteness of a garment and the whiteness of chalk, the brightness of sunlight and the brightness of the moon.<sup>20</sup>

### Arguments for Gradation of Existence (*Tashkīk Al-Wujūd*)

We often witness differences in every diverse object of reality, such as strength and weakness, priority and posteriority, and perfection and imperfection. These differences return to the existence of each object of reality rather than to its quiddities. Hence, existence becomes the one that unites all these differences, and this is what is referred to as univocal (*isbtirak ma'navi*)

### Substantial Motion (*Al-Ḥarākah Al-Jawhariyyah*)

Substantial motion is one of the important discussions in Islamic philosophy. This discussion is started by *aṣālah al-wujūd* philosophers who believe in change or motion for every entity. The concept of substantial motion is also influenced by Aristotle's idea of the ten categories.<sup>21</sup> However, *aṣālah al-wujūd* philosophers have two differences in dividing Aristotle's ten categories, which are divided into nine categories of accidents and one category of substance. *The first view* believes in four of Aristotle's ten categories. This view is dominated by peripatetic philosophers such as Ibn Sīnā who holds that the change, movement, or motion of entities is affected by the categories of quantity, quality, place, and position.<sup>22</sup> Based on the four categories it is understood that 'place' is the most obvious accident that moves and changes from one position to another, such as the movement of a car from one position to another.<sup>23</sup>

Other categories, such as 'quantity', can be recognized through the quantitative growth of a human being from the child phase to the adolescent phase.<sup>24</sup> This growth shows the quantitative movement of the human form. In another case, the change in colour from a young green apple to a ripe pink apple and from tasteless to sweet is called qualitative motion in philosophical terms. Peripatetic philosophers view motion and movement in terms of position and quality as occurring only in the aspects of accidents.<sup>25</sup>

Motion is the nature of matter, as the matter is identical to change. Something that does not change cannot be called matter. Therefore, matter, which is always changing, is identical to the absence of knowledge, which is covered by dimensions. The upper side does not know the lower side. The right side does not know the left side. However, Mullā Ṣadrā with his philosophy proves that material change

19 Ṣadrā, *Al-Hikmah al-Muta'aliyah fi al-Asfār al-'Aqliyah al-Arba'ah*, 1:30.

20 Ṣadrā, 1:30.

21 Syirazi, *Al-Hikmah al-Muta'aliyah fi al-Asfār al-'Aqliyah al-Arba'ah*, 1:67.

22 Syirazi, 1:67.

23 Yanis Eshots, "Substantial Motion" and "New Creation" in Comparative Context', *Journal of Islamic Philosophy* 6 (1 July 2010): 81, <https://doi.org/10.5840/islamicphil201065>.

24 Muhammad Kamal, *Mullā Sadra's Transcendent Philosophy* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005), 73.

25 Aḥmad bin Zayn al-Dīn al-'Ahsā'i, *Sharah al-'Arshiyah* (Beirut: Mu'assasah Sham Hajar, 2005), 163.

occurs incidentally and substantially at the same time so that the weakness of the nature of matter has the potential to change to perfect substantially.

Mullā Ṣadrā offers a specific argument to prove substantial motion. He argued that if the substance does not experience movement, then there can't be a change in accidents, i.e. status, due to the dependence of the accidents on the substance. The accidents experience movement in reality.<sup>26</sup> The movement of substance and accident is caused by their relationship to achieve perfection. The substance acts as a cause and the accident acts as an effect in reality.<sup>27</sup> This view of Mullā Ṣadrā is not in line with Ibn Sīnā's explanation of motion. According to Ibn Sīnā, all motion only occurs in accidents, not in the substance.<sup>28</sup>

Ibn Sīnā strongly rejects motion in substance by considering if the changes occur in substance, then each substance changes its identity to another identity.<sup>29</sup> He views that the change of the previous identity to the new identity must be proven to justify motion occurring in substance. For example, if the substance of the 'chair' moves then its substance will change into another substance other than the chair. However, the change in the substance of the chair into another substance cannot be proven in reality. The change only occurs in the quality of wood from strong to fragile.<sup>30</sup> Based on this, Ibn Sīnā views motion as occurring only in accidents. Mullā Ṣadrā then criticized Ibn Sīnā's view by providing three arguments for the motion in substance, including:

*The first argument* is that the existence of accidents, such as quality, quantity, place, and time depends on the substance in reality.<sup>31</sup> Therefore, the substance is seen as the source of motion for the existence of an accident in reality.

*The second argument* is that the substance is eternal, while the accidents are limited. Mullā Ṣadrā examines the issue of substance and accidents through the approach of occurrence and destruction (*kawn wa al-fasad*).<sup>32</sup> The resurrection describes the term 'becoming', meaning the process of perfection and eternity of an existent continuously.<sup>33</sup>

As for accidents, they will experience destruction because they are limited. All that is limited shows imperfections and shortcomings in its existence. Based on Mullā Ṣadrā's *ḥarākah al-jawhariyah*, it is clear that humans have an immaterial substance that is understood as the soul. The human soul is potential, so humans

26 Kamal, *Mullā Sadra's Transcendent Philosophy*, 75.

27 Muhammad 'Abdul Haq, 'Mullā Ṣadrā's Concept of Substantial Motion', *Islamic Studies* 11, no. 2 (June 1972), 81.

28 Haq, 81.

29 Mohammad Khamenei, *Mullā Sadra's Transcendent Philosophy* (Tehran: Sadra Islamic Philosophy Research Institute (SIPRI), 2004), 67.

30 Riḍā Akbariyan, 'Ḥarakat Jawhari wa Natayij Falsafi Ān', *Kheradnameh Sadra* 19, no. 5 (2000):176.

31 Haq, 'Mullā Ṣadrā's Concept of Substantial Motion', 75.

32 Muhammad Kamal, 'Rethinking Being: Suhrawardi to Mullā Ṣadrā', *Journal of Shi'a Islamic Studies* 2, no. 4 (2009):423–36.

33 Kamāl al-Haydarī, *Durūs fī al-Ḥikmah Muta'āliyah: Sharḥ Kitāb Bidāyah al-Ḥikmah* (Qūm: Mu'assasah al-Imām al-Jawād li Fikr wa al-Thaqāfah, 2006), 300.

must actualize their souls to obtain perfection in reality. The perfection of the soul is gradual, allowing humans to actualize the perfection of their soul after the material world. If man can achieve the perfection of the soul, he can improve his existence in reality.<sup>34</sup> Thus, man must realize the soul is the substance of his perfection.

The principle of substantial motion is not a new issue discussed by Mullā Ṣadrā. This view has been put forward by some figures such as Heraclitus and Ibn Arabi. However, they still have differences in looking at substantial motion. For example, according to Heraclitus, when a person observes an event of motion, he doesn't move. The one that moves is the observed object. Meanwhile, Mullā Ṣadrā views that both the observer and the observed object are both moving. While Ibn Arabi in his theory of *tajaddud amthāl* states that there is no continuous continuity between the changes before and after because he interprets movement as a renewal of existence and then leaving the previous existence.

### The Nature of the Soul

The soul<sup>35</sup> is the first perfection of the natural body<sup>36</sup> that functions as a tool that has potential life.<sup>37</sup> What is meant by the first perfection according to Sabzawārī has two meanings, namely: first, something potential by which it becomes actual; second, something that becomes actual spontaneously. The former is not spontaneously actual, while the latter is spontaneously actual.<sup>38</sup>

*Jisim* (body) refers to the ones that have motion in them such as fire, plants, and air. The term *Jisim* in the definition of soul means immaterial genus (*jins*) or something natural without any material elements in it. In addition, the soul is also understood as an immaterial substance whose essence is not material, but its actuality is together with matter.<sup>39</sup> From this, we can understand that the soul is not material, but the actualization of its perfection requires a material locus, which is different from inanimate objects (*jisim jamād*) that have no life.

34 Khamenei, *Mullā Sadra's Transcendent Philosophy*, 71.

35 In the Islamic tradition there are at least two terms that refer to the concept of the soul, namely the terms *nafs* and *rūḥ*. Al-Qāshānī in *Iṣṭilāḥāt al-Ṣūfiyyah* explains that *nafs* is the substance of *al-jawhar al-bukhārī* which is soft, has the potential for life, love, motion, and will. While philosophers name *nafs* with animal spirit (*al-rūḥ al-ḥaywaniyyah*) which mediates between the heart which is referred to as the rational soul and between the body which in the Qur'an is termed the Olive tree. Whereas *rūḥ* is an immaterial human existence. Philosophers do not differentiate between the heart (*al-qalb*) and the spirit (*al-rūḥ*) they define the latter as the rational soul (*al-nafs al-nātiqah*). See 'Abd al-Razzāq al-Qāshānī, *Iṣṭilāḥāt al-Ṣūfiyyah* (Mesir: Dār al-Manār, 1992), 32 and 82.

36 'Abdullah al-As'adi, *Buḥūth fī 'Ilm al-Nafs al-Falsafi* (Qūm: Dār Farāqid li al-Ṭaba'ah wa al-Nashr, 2005), 27.

37 Ḥasan Ḥasan Zādeh Āmulī, *Uyūn Masā'il al-Nafs* (Tehrān: Mu'assasah Intishārāt Amīr Kabīr, 2006), 93.

38 Āmulī, 96; As'adi, *Buḥūth fī 'Ilm al-Nafs al-Falsafi*, 23.

39 Mahbubah 'Abdullahi, *Shenokh Nafs wa Tazkiye Ōn Jibate Wuṣūl Behadrat Ḥaq', Zabān wa Adabe Fārsī* 168, no. 41 (1998), 137.



Meanwhile, the definition of the soul in general is the first perfection for the body (*kamāl al-awwal li jism*). The soul is what makes humans able to move. The body is the second perfection as a tool that has a function to carry out activities. So the soul and body are two different and interrelated things. However, Ibn Sīnā's view of this 'perfection' is different from Aristotle's. Aristotle understood this perfection as form (*ṣūrah*) that is not separate from matter (*maddah*). Ibn Sīnā argues in *al-Syifa* that although form (*ṣūrah*) is perfection for the body, it does not mean that every perfection is *ṣūrah*. For him, the soul is an independent substance (*jawhar qā'imun bi dhātih*).<sup>40</sup>

Like a ship, it consists of materials and the form of the ship itself. But the perfection of the ship is when there is a captain who controls it. Likewise, if there is a city that has materials and the form of the city itself, then the perfection of the city is the existence of a mayor/governor who governs the city. Thus, Ibn Sīnā rejected Aristotle's view that "perfection" is the form (*ṣūrah*).<sup>41</sup> Ibn Sīnā put forward several arguments to prove the existence of the soul and its independence from the body:

*First*, Ibn Sīnā said, "Reflect, O reasonable person, that on this day, you are within yourself and with it, you spend ages, so that you remember many events that happened to you. Thus, there is no doubt that your soul remains in such a state, whereas your body and its parts are not fixed, but are always shrinking and diminishing."<sup>42</sup> So, if the soul is an accident of the body, then over time our memory of past events will also disappear because our present body is not our former body. Our previous body has disappeared due to the regeneration power of the body.

*The second argument* is that if a man pays attention to an issue, he presents his substance and says, "I have done such and such". In such a state, he no longer remembers all the limbs. It is clear that what he has done he has not forgotten. Therefore, man's substance is different from his body.<sup>43</sup> It is clear that when we say we have done something attributing it to our self (ego), then at that moment we are referring to our self, not our body. Thus, the soul is different from the body.

*The third argument* is that we often perceive things, see things, hear things, judge things, and so on. We know that within us there is something that gathers all perceptions and activities. We know with certainty that it is not the body that holds it together, but rather something beyond the body. For Ibn Sīnā, human identity is not determined by the body, because the body is constantly changing and deteriorating. So it must be the identity of the human being, that which lies beyond the body, as a single spiritual substance. Ibn Sīnā quoted the verse:

فَإِذَا سَوَّيْتَهُ وَنَفَخْتَ فِيهِ مِنْ رُوحِي فَقَعُوا لَهُ سَاجِدِينَ

40 Syah Reza, 'Konsep Nafs Menurut Ibnu Sina', *Kalimah: Jurnal Studi Agama dan Pemikiran Islam* 12, no. 2 (15 September 2014): 266, <https://doi.org/10.21111/klm.v12i2.239>.

41 Ibn Sina, *Psikologi Ibn Sina*, trans. Irwan Kurniawan (Bandung: Pustaka Hidayah, 2009), 59.


42 Sina, 183.

43 Sina, 183–84.

“So when I have perfected his (man’s) creation and have breathed into him My spirit...” (Q.S. Al-Ĥijr [15]:29). The word “perfecting” here means perfecting all the elements of humanity by adding the spirit to his soul.<sup>44</sup>

Ibn Sīnā does not distinguish between the spirit and the *nafs*, but the spirit and the *nafs* are two levels of one entity called the *nafs*. The spirit is at a pure transcendental level, having nothing to do with the body. Whereas when the spirit enters the body at the phenomenal level and becomes the driving force for the body, then it is called the *nafs*. If the *nafs* of the spirit are included in the discussion of metaphysics, then the phenomenal *nafs* are included in the discussion of physics.<sup>45</sup> Therefore in the book of *al-Ishārāt* the soul is in the physics section.

Ibn Sīnā divided the power of the soul into three faculties, namely the vegetable soul, animal soul, and rational soul. The vegetable soul is the active faculty that works with compulsion and diversity of direction and species, consisting of the power of eating, growing, and reproduction. The animal soul is the faculty that works with a distinct purpose and self-choice that causes differences in the actions that occur to it, consisting of the forces of movement and perception. Perception is divided into two, external (five senses) and internal (shared senses, imagination, estimation, and memory). The rational soul is an active faculty that works with a purpose and choice of its own in unity of direction and purpose, consisting of the practical and theoretical faculties. Practical is morality and theoretical is thinking.<sup>46</sup>



**Table 1** Faculties of the Soul According to Ibn Sīnā

In the relationship between the soul and the body, Ibn Sīnā says that there is a subtle form formed from air and smoke in which material potentialities (*al-mījāz*) are stored. The soul acts as a controller for the form when doing perception, but does not merge with the form, because it will cause reincarnation. This *al-mijaz* or subtle form is the soul in the first level associated with the vapour (*bukhar*) and smoke of *rūḥ al-Bukhārī*. However, this opinion is refuted by Mullā Ṣadrā, because it is very clear that the physical vapor is born from some elements that are separated through a lower cause. If no substance maintains its integrity so that it remains in the control of the soul, then it remains in substance as part of plants and animals because it is the locus of imaginative perception. This would lead to

44 Sina, *Psikologi Ibn Sina*, 184–85.

45 Reza, ‘Konsep Nafs Menurut Ibnu Sina’, 267.

46 Sina, *Psikologi Ibn Sina*, 73–76.

reincarnation.<sup>47</sup> The advancement in explaining the relationship of the soul to the body is found in the thought of Mullā Ṣadrā.

### Faculties of the Soul in the Qur'an

Apart from the levels of the soul that have been explained by Muslim philosophers, the Qur'an also describes the faculties of the soul consisting of *al-nafs al-amārah bi al-sū'*, *al-nafs al-lawwāmah*, *al-nafs al-muṭma'innah wa ṭuma'ninah*.<sup>48</sup> The explanation of the three faculties of the soul is as follows:

*First, al-nafs al-amārah bi al-sū'*. *Al-nafs al-amārah* is the soul that is dominant in commanding. As found in Surah Yūsuf: 53. In moral and *'irfān* terms, many definitions are expressed,<sup>49</sup> as follows: *First*, Human soul that is dominated by its animalistic power, and always commands humans to do evil, is called *al-nafs al-amārah*. *Second*, the soul that inclined towards satisfying bodily needs, leading the heart into the abyss of disgrace, and ugliness, and becomes a source of reprehensible morals.

*Al-nafs al-amārah* means to incite or influence (commanding). *Al-nafs al-amārah* often entices the human mind of the human mind to fantasize, typically with something so enticing such as food, drink, sleep,<sup>50</sup> and so forth. *Al-nafs al-amārah* is the ego of desire, the driving force that does not distinguish good or bad.<sup>51</sup>

So, from these two definitions, it can be concluded that *al-nafs al-amārah* is a soul that always encourages humans to do bad things and deviate from truth and morals, causing humans to fall into the abyss of real misguidance and keep humans away from the reality of *al-Ḥaqq*.

*Second, al-nafs al-lawwāmah*. *Al-nafs al-lawwāmah* etymologically is a reproachful soul and as found in Surah Al-Qiyāmah: 2 "I swear by the soul that reproaches itself." Regarding *al-nafs al-lawwāmah* Ahmad Katabi offers two definitions, namely: The soul that severely reproaches itself for its inclination towards sin and guides the human heart towards righteousness and makes the human soul reach the souls of the righteous and the lovers of God and the soul of a faithful servant whose days are filled with loss, so that he reproaches himself for his shortcomings and negligence, and warns himself with a sense of humiliation in looking at himself.<sup>52</sup>

*Al-nafs al-lawwāmah* is constantly changing. It often turns around, shifting

47 Kholid Al-Walid, *Perjalanan Jiwa Menuju Akhīrat: Filsafat Eskatologi Mullā Ṣadrā* (Jakarta: Sadra Press, 2014), 131.

48 'Alī Muḥammad 'Abdullah, *Al-Insān Bayna al-Jism al-Najmī wa Al-Hālah* (Yordania: Al-Manhāl, 2017), 18.

49 Aḥmad Katābī, 'Mafāhīm Nafs Amārah, Nafs Lawwāmah, Nafs Muṭma'innah Dar Andishe Hāye Mawlawī', *Ayeeneh-ye Miras* 5 no. 2 (2007), 16.

50 M. Yusni Amru Ghazali et al., eds., *Ensiklopedia Al-Qur'an dan Hadits Per Tema* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2019), 146.

51 Budhi Setianto, *Glosarium: Kamus Ringkas* (Jakarta: H&B PERKI, 2021), 55.

52 Katābī, 'Mafāhīm Nafs Amārah, Nafs Lawwāmah, Nafs Muṭma'innah Dar Andishe Hāye Mawlawī', 16–17.

its colours. Sometimes it remembers, sometimes it forgets. At times, it becomes conscious, while at others, it turns away. Sometimes it loves and sometimes it hates. It fluctuates between joy and sadness. It oscillates between contentment and anger,<sup>53</sup> and so on. *Al-nafs al-lawwāmah* is inherently egocentric, yet it is the only soul that can shift its polarization towards ego-neutral as a resilience to suffering and a source of physical strength.<sup>54</sup> So, *al-nafs al-lawwāmah* is a positive aspect of the soul that is capable of correcting all forms of negligence and deficiencies within itself on the journey towards *al-Ḥaqq* as its goal. Consequently, *al-nafs al-lawwāmah* is a negative soul that, if left unchecked, would dominate all other's souls, thereby preventing *al-nafs al-lawwāmah* from fulfilling its role as an advisor and critic to *al-nafs al-lawwāmah*.

*Third, al-nafs al-muṭma'innah wa ṭuma'nīnah. Al-nafs al-muṭma'innah* is the tranquil soul. This soul is tranquil due to its rest in the belief of Allah.<sup>55</sup> The term *al-nafs al-muṭma'innah* has several definitions, including<sup>56</sup> A soul that arises from self-purification efforts (*riyāḍah*) and behavioural training to overcome worldly anxieties, free from the reproach and deviations of *al-nafs al-lawwāmah*, and acts by moral considerations. It is a soul that transcends ignoble traits, embodying praiseworthy qualities and achieving closeness to the Divine, thus attaining tranquillity. This is why it is referred to as *al-nafs al-muṭmainnah*, as mentioned in Surah al-Fajr: 27 "O tranquil soul!".

From the two explanations, it can be concluded that *al-nafs al-muṭmainnah* is the highest level of the soul, following *al-nafs al-amārah* and *al-nafs al-lawwāmah*, achieved through efforts of self-purification (*riyāḍah*), encompassing both rational and spiritual dimensions and it consistently embodies the attributes and behaviours of the Divine its life.

### **Bodily Newness and Immortality of Soul/Spirit (*Jasmāniyyah al-Ḥudūth wa Rūḥāniyyah al-Baqā'*)**

The doctrine of soul and body is one of the fundamental debates among Muslim philosophers, Sufis, and theologians. How could it not be, as they are faced with a problem based on the process of human creation and human resurrection after death? So, it is not uncommon to find their statements suggesting that human identity, which consists of soul and body, will both be resurrected after death in eternity. However, this view has received a lot of criticism, especially from some Muslim philosophers who say that how can a body that has been destroyed be resurrected as before, while the actualization of the body is its destruction?

The bodily newness and the immortality of the soul (*jasmāniyyah al-budūth wa rūḥāniyyah al-baqā'*) is a process in which a new and freshly originated

53 Ghazali et al., *Ensiklopedia Al-Qur'an dan Hadits Per Tema*, 146.

54 Setianto, *Glosarium: Kamus Ringkas*, 53.

55 Muhammad Izzuddin Taufik, *Dalil Afaq Al-Qur'an dan Alam Semesta: Memahami Ayat-Ayat Penciptaan dan Syubhat* (Solo: Tiga Serangkai, 2006), 206.

56 Katābī, 'Mafāhīm Nafs Amārah, Nafs Lawwāmah, Nafs Muṭma'innah Dar Andishe Hāye Mawlawī', 18.

soul arises from the physical or material, subsequently undergoing a process of perfection through substantial motion, and ultimately evolving into a spiritual state that remains eternal in that condition.<sup>57</sup> As for the newness of the body (*jasmāniyyah al-ḥudūth*) at its inception, it is material (*mādiyah*)<sup>58</sup> in nature and continuously undergoes renewal until it reaches its destruction. On the other hand, the immortality of the soul (*rūḥāniyyah al-baqā'*) is understood as a process of perfection that culminates in a spiritual immateriality. Why is this so? Because Mullā Ṣadrā's explanation of the soul is rooted in his fundamental doctrine of "emergence" or "substantial change" (*istihālah al-jawhariyyah*). Therefore, He (Mullā Ṣadrā) asserts that the soul, from its inception, is both physical and spiritual in its perpetuity (*jasmāniyyah al-ḥudūth wa rūḥāniyyah al-baqā'*)<sup>59</sup> within the perfection of human being.

So, it can be justified that the human soul is a bodily newness and its tendency is spiritual immortality.<sup>60</sup> This is because the soul in its stages before experiencing renewal is physical which takes place in its beginning and as a physical reality, then undergoes a change in the movement of potential substance towards immaterial and spiritual reality<sup>61</sup> and its eternal in it.

If the soul is physical in its newness, and appearance, and was created as such, then the immaterial soul is in its eternity and there is no change (for it) with the change of the body (*jasmāniyyah al-ḥudūth wa rūḥāniyyah al-baqā'*).<sup>62</sup> This is so because the perfection of the physical body is its destruction, while the soul that is with it will perfect into the spiritual without being bound to matter, so it does not experience destruction as happens with matter.

Regarding this issue, there are different views in constructing arguments against it. As the soul is a being before the existence of the body—Plato's view—and there is no spiritual novelty, it is a being and its existence in time with the body—Ibn Sīnā's view—however, Mullā Ṣadrā later criticized it and stated that the being and something that covers it is its soul which then goes to the level of the materiality of something because of the motion of the substance that moves from a neutral state (potential) to its actuality.

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57 Walid, *Perjalanan Jiwa Menuju Akhirat: Filsafat Eskatologi Mullā Shadra*, 81.

58 As'adi, *Buḥūth fī 'Ilm al-Nafs al-Falsafī*, 75.

59 Fazlur Rahman, *Filsafat Shadra*, trans. Munir A. Muin (Bandung: Pustaka, 2000), 266.

60 Husaynī Ḥaydar, *Al-'Ishq fī Al-Basā'it al-Dhātīyyah* (Qūm: Mu'assasah al-Asfār li Nashr wa al-Tawzī', 2008), 43.

61 'Abd al-Rasūl 'Ubūdiyyat, *Al-Niẓām al-Falsafī li Madrasah al-Hikmah al-Muta'aliyah*, vol. 3 (Beirūt: Markaz al-Ḥaḍārah li Tanmiyah al-Fikr al-Islāmī, 2016), 342.

62 Aḥmad Wā'izī, *Al-Insān min Manẓūr Al-Islām*, trans. 'Abdullah al-Bawghbīsh (Beirūt: Markaz al-Ḥaḍārah li Tanmiyah al-Fikr al-Islāmī, 2016), 46.

materiality of something because of the movement of substance<sup>63</sup> that moves from a neutral state (potential) to its actuality.

Regarding the stages of the movement of substance that Mullā Ṣadrā refers to in explaining *jasmāniyyah al-ḥudūth wa rūḥāniyyah al-baqā'*, it is stated that the existence of the human soul has numerous levels and degrees. It starts from the beginning of its creation until it reaches its final destination (perfection). Therefore, the source of its essence and the existence of its levels in its attachment is the physical substance and then undergoes a process of transformation. So, something in the form of potentiality and its levels will occupy its essential position and detach from a state of itself in the world to the hereafter. Then it will return to its Lord in corporeality *al-ḥudūth wa rūḥāniyyah al-baqā'*.<sup>64</sup>

This movement of substance occurs within the prime matter and will end towards its perfection, which is spiritual and transcendental. This prime matter is several movements originating from the existing form (matter), because the prime matter is nothing but potentiality itself, and there is no actuality to it but its actualization with potentiality.<sup>65</sup>

The potentiality is passive<sup>66</sup>—and can change according to the will of the subject—in terms of its existence. These potentialities reside in the soul which includes form and matter in the division of substance, through which the soul will be actualized towards its perfection.

It should be noted that the body in its definition refers to a three-dimensional object<sup>67</sup> that possesses spatial dimensions, and its phenomena can be observed through its accidents, such as its colours and forms<sup>68</sup> which occupy simple form and matter. Therefore, through the body, they will coexist in their actuality, yet will ultimately perfect into the spiritual in their highest state. This is what can be understood from the principle of *jasmāniyyah al-ḥudūth wa rūḥāniyyah al-baqā'*.

### **Qaws Ṣu'ūd and Qaws Nuzūl (Descending and Ascending Arcs)**

In the study of *'irfān* and Islamic philosophy, a complete cycle of the human life journey passes through two arcs that form a full circle: the descending arc (*qaws nuzūl*) from Allah to the realm of creation, and the ascending arc (*qaws ṣu'ūd*) from the realm of creation back to Allah. This is akin to His saying regarding the proximity or distance between Himself and His creatures, symbolized through the

63 'Alī Naqī Khudāyārī, ed, *'Ain al-Hikmah: al-'Aql fī Tārīkh al-Fikr al-Islāmī*, trans. 'Abbās Jawād (Beirut: Markaz al-Ḥaḍārah li Tanmiyah al-Fikr al-Islāmī, 2015), 245.

64 Ḍārī Maẓhar Ṣāleh, *Al-Rūḥ al-Ṣūfī: Jamāliyyah al-Shaykh fī Zaman al-Tih*, vol. 1 (Damaskus: Dār al-Zamān lil Ṭabā'ah wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawzī', 2012), 188.

65 Rifā'i, *Durūs fī al-Falsafah al-Islāmīyah: Sharḥ Tawḍīh li Kitāb Bidāyah al-Hikmah*, 575.

66 Rifā'i, 592.

67 Muḥammad Taqī Miṣbāḥ Yazdī, *Al-Manhaj al-Jadīd fī Ta'lim al-Falsafah*, vol. 2 (Beirut: Dār al-Ta'ārif lil Maṭbū'āt, 2007), 126.

68 Gharawīyan, *Pengantar Memahami Buku Daras Filsafat Islam: Penjelasan untuk Mendekati Analisis Teori Filsafat Islam*, 178.

journey of Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, during the *mi'raj*:

ثُمَّ دَنَا فَتَدَلَّى فَكَانَ قَابَ قَوْسَيْنِ أَوْ أَدْنَىٰ

“He then approached (to the Prophet Muhammad), so that the distance was (about) two arcs or nearer.” (Q.S. An-Najm [52]: 8–9).

These two arcs are two halves of one whole circle. Because it's a circle, we don't know where to start and where to arrive. We can depart from any point, and arrive at any point. At the same time, the departure point can also be the arrival point. They both become one.<sup>69</sup>




Diagram 1 *Qaws Ṣu'ūd* and *Qaws Nuzūl*

In this sense, *qaws ṣu'ūd* represents an ascending and transcendent journey of the human soul's creation. Whereas *qaws nuzūl* signifies a descending and transcendent journey for the human soul. Thus, “sometimes the human being is connected to something high and absolute that is above all things that are integrated in it. And this is what is meant by *qaws ṣu'ūd*. However, if the connection with the material world or external reality is based on the actualization of man according to his will, then this is referred to as *qaws nuzūl*”<sup>70</sup> in man's journey.

This is as stated by Mullā Ṣadrā that:

Know that Allah is the Ruler of His creatures by bringing them out of the realm of possibility (*mumkin al-imbān*) to the realm of souls. Then, He sends them down from the realm of souls to the realm of *ashbāh* (the realm of sharia, matter) through the highest and lowest kingdoms (*malakūt*) of the souls of heaven and earth, through orbits, stars, ether, air, water, and earth until they reach the lowest place and the hell of darkness-then, then, there is a return to the door of humanity with the helping pull of the Divine Presence where there is a process of descent through the places of transit and *maqām-maqām* until reaching *insān kāmil* which is the spirit of the universe, the place of God's self-appearance, and His *khalifah*.<sup>71</sup>

Certainly, the discussion of *qaws ṣu'ūd* and *qaws nuzūl* (ascending arc and descending arc) is an attempt to frame the journey of the human soul. In this sense, *qaws nuzūl* is understood as the arc of the journey of creation that begins with the Prophet Muhammad and ends with the journey of the entities of creation towards the human journey. Whereas *qaws ṣu'ūd* begins with the journey of the prime

69 Haidar Bagir, *Islam Risalah Cinta dan Kebahagiaan* (Jakarta: Noura, 2019), 70–71.

70 'Abd al-Laṭīf al-Ḥurz, *Min al-'Irfān Ila al-Dawlah* (Beirut: Dār al-Fārābī, 2011), 182.

71 Mullā Ṣadrā, *Teosofi Islam: Manifestasi-Manifestasi Ilahi*, trans. Irwan Kurniawan (Bandung: Pustaka Hidayah, 2005), 107.

matter called potentiality (*al-hayūlā*) which is received in the form of potentiality without any prior actualization and ends at the perfect human being (*al-insān al-kāmil*)<sup>72</sup> as the highest level of human being.

Meanwhile, among the levels of the human being, there is a final journey in the form of *qaws nuzūl* and a beginning in the form of *qaws šu'ūd*, which differ in their highest positions. The *qaws šu'ūd* from its beginning to its end signifies levels of spirituality. Or the *qaws nuzūl* starts from the originality of the self (*ibdā'*), while the *qaws šu'ūd* from the actualization (*ikbtirā'*)<sup>73</sup> experienced by the human soul. Of course, a perfectly actualized soul will occupy the highest position of the human rank. On the other hand, a soul that is not perfectly actualized will be at the level of its actualization.

In this context of actualization, the human soul, within the domains of *qaws šu'ūd* and *qaws nuzūl*, occupies material and immaterial levels or exoteric and esoteric. These levels of the realm are traversed by the journey of the human soul, both when the soul is still with the body and after death. This indicates that every potential possessed by the soul will reach its highest essence, depending on the process and conditions of its actuality.

## Conclusion

*Ma'ād*, existence becomes the main locus in the journey towards God, because God is the source of manifestation for all existing realities. In *ma'ād*, the human soul will pass through various levels of realms, from the lowest to the highest.

The movement of substance is a fundamental principle in *ma'ād*. So, the soul with the movement of substance within it, has the potential for perfection. This allows the perfection of the soul to no longer be affected by the constraints of space and time within the material world's dimensions. As a result, the actualization of the soul's perfection can transcend the boundaries of the material world. For instance, a human soul that is still within the material world when its perfection has been actualized can penetrate the horizon dimension of the realm above it, so that it can witness reality as it should be from external phenomena. However, the view of its inner horizon is temporary because it is still bound by its inherent physical dimension, except after the extinction of its physical dimension.

The immortality of the soul is also one of the principles used as doctrine to understand the transcendent *ma'ād*. This is understood as such because the soul is not an accident that is attached to something else so that it can be lost or destroyed with the loss of the locus for its dependence. This locus is none other than the substance i.e., if it exists in the external reality, it does not need another locus. Thus, through the immortality of the soul, all reality, which is the manifestation of God, will be immortal and adjust to the stages of realms through which it passes.

72 Murtaḍa Ūyanī, *Al-Tanmiyah wa Asas al-Ḥaḍārah al-Gharbiyyah: al-Taḡaddam al-Iqtišādī am al-Takāmul al-Thaqāfi* (Beirut: Markaz al-Ḥaḍārah li Tanmiyah al-Fikr al-Islāmī, 2016), 195.

73 Muḥammad Ḥasan Ismā'il, *Al-Bābiyyah wa al-Bahā'iyyah: Tārīkhan wa 'Aqīdah* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, 2009), 366.



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