

## IBN RUSHD'S RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION OF AL-GHAZĀLĪ'S CRITIQUE: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF *TAHĀFUT AL-TAHĀFUT*

**Nasirin,<sup>1</sup> Ulyan Nasri,<sup>2</sup> Muhammad Romi,<sup>3</sup> Nurdiah,<sup>4</sup> M. Mizanul Haq,<sup>5</sup>  
M. Gufran<sup>6</sup>**

<sup>1</sup> Universitas PTIQ Jakarta, Indonesia; [nasirin@mbs.ptiq.ac.id](mailto:nasirin@mbs.ptiq.ac.id)

<sup>2</sup> IAI Hamzanwadi NW Lombok Timur, Indonesia; [ulyannasri@gmail.com](mailto:ulyannasri@gmail.com)

<sup>3</sup> Universitas Nahdlatul Wathan Mataram, Indonesia; [muhammadromi797@gmail.com](mailto:muhammadromi797@gmail.com)

<sup>4</sup> Universitas Negeri Surabaya, Indonesia; [nurdiah@mbs.unesa.ac.id](mailto:nurdiah@mbs.unesa.ac.id)

<sup>5</sup> Universitas Nahdlatul Wathan Mataram, Indonesia; [izzanbilmy89@gmail.com](mailto:izzanbilmy89@gmail.com)

<sup>6</sup> Universitas Airlangga, Indonesia; [m.gufranbaramain@gmail.com](mailto:m.gufranbaramain@gmail.com)

Article History:

Received:

2 March 2026

Revised:

16 April 2026

Accepted:

5 May 2026



© 2026 by Authors. Submitted for possible open-access publication under the terms and conditions of the Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) license (<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>). DOI: <https://doi.org/10.20871/kpjjpm.v12i1.587>

**Abstract:** *This article examines *Tahāfut al-Tabāfut* by Ibn Rushd as a rational reconstruction of al-Ghazālī's critique in *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*. It analyzes how Ibn Rushd reorganizes philosophical arguments concerning the eternity of the world, God's knowledge of particulars, and the relationship between reason, revelation, and Sharia. This reconstruction operates through conceptual clarification, logical reordering, and epistemological re-grounding within a demonstrative (*burhānī*) framework, enabling Ibn Rushd to restore the coherence of philosophical doctrines and refine their methodological basis. Thus, *Tahāfut al-Tabāfut* represents not merely a rebuttal, but a reconstruction of philosophical reasoning itself. This study employs qualitative library research, examining primary texts and relevant secondary literature through a critical-comparative and philosophical-hermeneutical approach. It finds that many of al-Ghazālī's objections arise from conceptual and epistemological misinterpretations of philosophical principles. Ibn Rushd's reconstruction therefore reaffirms philosophy as a legitimate epistemic authority alongside theology. The implications are twofold. Scientifically, this study contributes to Islamic philosophy by proposing a model of reconstructive critique that integrates logical rigor with theological sensitivity. Contemporarily, it offers a framework for addressing tensions between religious authority and rational inquiry in modern Muslim societies, particularly in debates on science, interpretation of revelation, and the role of reason. The study concludes that this debate reflects a productive epistemological dialogue in which reason and revelation are complementary in attaining a comprehensive understanding of truth.*

**Keywords:** *Al-Ghazālī, Epistemology, Ibn Rushd, Islamic Philosophy, Rationality.*

\* Corresponding Author

**Abstrak:** Artikel ini mengkaji *Tabāfut al-Tabāfut* karya Ibn Rushd sebagai rekonstruksi rasional atas kritik al-Ghazālī dalam *Tabāfut al-Falāsifah*. Penelitian ini menganalisis bagaimana Ibn Rushd menata ulang argumen filosofis terkait kekekalan alam, pengetahuan Tuhan tentang partikular, serta relasi antara akal, wahyu, dan syariat. Rekonstruksi tersebut dilakukan melalui klarifikasi konseptual, penataan logika argumentasi, dan penegasan ulang landasan epistemologis dalam kerangka demonstratif (*burhānī*), sehingga mengembalikan koherensi doktrin filsafat sekaligus memperkuat metode rasionalnya. Dengan demikian, *Tabāfut al-Tabāfut* tidak hanya merupakan bantahan, tetapi juga rekonstruksi atas metode berpikir filosofis itu sendiri. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode kualitatif melalui studi kepustakaan dengan pendekatan kritis-komparatif dan hermeneutika filosofis terhadap teks primer dan literatur sekunder. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa banyak kritik al-Ghazālī bersumber dari kesalahpahaman konseptual dan epistemologis terhadap prinsip-prinsip filsafat. Oleh karena itu, rekonstruksi Ibn Rushd menegaskan kembali filsafat sebagai otoritas epistemik yang sah berdampingan dengan teologi. Implikasi penelitian ini bersifat ilmiah dan kontemporer. Secara ilmiah, studi ini menawarkan model kritik rekonstruktif yang mengintegrasikan ketelitian logis dan sensitivitas teologis dalam pengembangan filsafat Islam. Secara kontemporer, penelitian ini relevan untuk menjembatani ketegangan antara otoritas keagamaan dan rasionalitas dalam masyarakat muslim modern, khususnya dalam wacana sains, penafsiran wahyu, dan peran akal. Penelitian ini menyimpulkan bahwa akal dan wahyu bersifat komplementer dalam mencapai pemahaman kebenaran yang utuh.

**Kata-kata Kunci:** *Al-Ghazālī, Epistemologi, Ibn Rushd, Filsafat Islam, Rasionalitas.*

## Introduction

The debate between al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd represents one of the most influential intellectual episodes in the history of classical Islamic thought. Through *Tabāfut al-Falāsifah* (*The Incoherence of the Philosophers*), al-Ghazālī articulated a systematic critique of three central metaphysical issues upheld by the *falāsifah*: the eternity of the world, God’s knowledge of particulars, and bodily resurrection—each of which he regarded as contradictory to the fundamental principles of Islamic creed. His critique had a profound impact on the Islamic intellectual world and provoked a monumental response from Ibn Rushd in *Tabāfut al-Tabāfut* (*The Incoherence of the Incoherence*), a work that not only refuted al-Ghazālī’s accusations but also reestablished the foundations of philosophical rationality within the Islamic tradition (Shamsudheen et al. 2021, 553). The polemic between these two figures reflects a broader epistemological tension between Ash‘arite theology and Aristotelian rationalism, two major intellectual currents that interacted dynamically throughout Islamic intellectual history (Ibragim 2025, 183; Ibrahim and Efremova 2022b, 673–94; Kock 2011; Marzuki et al. 2023, 192–216).

Most previous studies have emphasized the issue of causality as the central focus of al-Ghazālī’s critique and Ibn Rushd’s response. Classical works such as those by Majid Fakhry and Oliver Leaman have framed the debate primarily around occasionalism and its philosophical refutation. More recent studies have continued this trajectory. For instance, Frank Griffel and Peter Adamson revisit al-Ghazālī’s critique within broader theological and philosophical contexts yet still foreground causality as a central issue. Recent empirical and analytical studies (Hasan 2013; Juwaini et al. 2024, 87–97) similarly reinforce causality as the dominant analytical lens in examining the al-Ghazālī–Ibn Rushd debate.

Despite their significant contributions, these studies tend to marginalize other equally fundamental dimensions, particularly the systematic reconstruction of philosophical arguments beyond causality. This article, therefore, shifts the analytical focus toward a relatively underexplored dimension: Ibn Rushd's rational reconstruction of al-Ghazālī's critique concerning three principal issues, namely (1) the eternity of the world, (2) God's knowledge of particulars, and (3) the relationship between reason, revelation, and the Sharia. These themes represent crucial nodes of philosophical contestation that reflect deeper epistemological divergences between Ash'arite theology and Aristotelian rationalism. By foregrounding these aspects, this study offers a novel contribution by repositioning the debate not merely as a discourse on causality, but as a broader project of epistemological reconstruction within Islamic philosophy.

This study explores how Ibn Rushd not only refuted al-Ghazālī's arguments but also undertook a rational reconstruction by rebuilding philosophical premises he considered to be misinterpreted. To avoid a merely descriptive use of the term reconstruction, this study employs analytical indicators inspired by postmodern philosophical thought, particularly the notions of deconstruction and epistemic reconfiguration as developed by Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault (Stark and Ciesielska 2019, 35).

Accordingly, Ibn Rushd's reconstruction is examined through three measurable indicators. First, conceptual deconstruction, which identifies how Ibn Rushd exposes inconsistencies in al-Ghazālī's interpretation of philosophical doctrines. Second, argumentative reconfiguration, referring to the systematic reordering of premises within a demonstrative (*burhānī*) logical framework. Third, epistemological re-legitimation, through which Ibn Rushd repositions philosophy as a valid mode of knowledge within the Islamic intellectual tradition (Rochman 2020, 572).

Through this structured analytical framework, Ibn Rushd's project is understood not merely as a rebuttal, but as a reconstructive philosophical enterprise that transforms the epistemic status of reason. This approach is consistent with his position in *Faṣl al-Maqāl*, where he asserts that philosophy and Sharia are not contradictory, but represent complementary paths toward truth. By operationalizing these indicators, the study provides a more systematic and verifiable account of rational reconstruction, thereby strengthening its analytical rigor and highlighting its novelty within contemporary Islamic philosophical studies (Ibrahim and Efremova 2022a, 695–714; Nofal 1993, 519–38; Surajiyi 2022, 118–31).

The urgency of this study lies in its contribution to the development of an Islamic epistemological model that is capable of responding to contemporary tensions between religious authority and rational inquiry. In many modern discourses, religion and rationality are often positioned in opposition, resulting in a fragmented understanding of knowledge within Muslim intellectual contexts. By examining Ibn Rushd's rational reconstruction of al-Ghazālī's critique, this study seeks to demonstrate that the classical debate between the two thinkers provides

a conceptual foundation for reconstructing a more integrative epistemological framework. Specifically, this study proposes that Ibn Rushd's approach reflects a model of Islamic epistemology grounded in the integration of demonstrative reasoning (*burhān*), theological reflection (*kalām*), and textual interpretation (*naṣṣ*). Such a model moves beyond the dichotomy of reason versus revelation by positioning both as complementary sources of knowledge within a unified epistemic structure. In this regard, the reconstruction identified in this study is not merely historical but offers a normative-analytical framework for contemporary Islamic thought.

Furthermore, this approach opens space for a more dialogical, critical, and balanced epistemology, in which rational inquiry is not subordinated to theology, nor detached from it, but operates in a dynamic and mutually reinforcing relationship. Therefore, the significance of this research lies in its effort to articulate an epistemological model that is both rooted in the Islamic intellectual tradition and relevant to current debates on science, interpretation, and the role of reason in Muslim societies. By foregrounding metaphysical issues beyond causality, this study offers a renewed perspective on the depth and contemporary relevance of the al-Ghazālī–Ibn Rushd debate within Islamic philosophy (Ibrahim and Efremova 2024, 816–32; Rozi 2020, 1–14; Saleh 2009, 97–117). Overall, this research contributes to strengthening the study of Islamic philosophy through a comparative analysis of two major figures in the Islamic intellectual tradition. By highlighting metaphysical issues beyond the question of causality, this article aims to offer a renewed perspective on the relevance and depth of the al-Ghazālī–Ibn Rushd debate within contemporary academic discourse.

This study employs a qualitative research design in the form of library research (Kalisdha 2023, 700–707; Fajri 2023, 56–67; Yasmin et al. 2024, 150–58). This approach is chosen due to the philosophical nature of the study, which requires in-depth textual exploration and analysis without reliance on empirical field data. Library research enables the researcher to conduct critical readings of primary works and supporting literature, positioning texts as the primary object of analysis and the principal source for the development of scholarly ideas (Adlini et al. 2022, 974–80).

The research adopts a philosophical–hermeneutical and comparative approach (Agrey 2014a, 188–92; Logan 2023; Ugli 2025, 603–11). The philosophical approach is used to examine the conceptual and argumentative structures of al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd, while the hermeneutical approach facilitates interpretative understanding of texts in light of their context and horizon of meaning. The comparative approach is employed to systematically identify the epistemological similarities and differences between the two thinkers. As Kaelan explains, philosophical and hermeneutical approaches enable critical analysis of arguments and textual meaning, whereas the comparative approach functions to uncover differences in intellectual frameworks (Agrey 2014b, 396–402; Wulakada 2025, 545–53).

The data sources are divided into two categories: primary and secondary

sources. Primary sources consist of the original texts of al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd, which serve as the main objects of analysis (Banerjee 2019; Steležuk and Wolanin 2023, 145–56). Secondary sources include methodological works, journal articles, dissertations, and academic studies relevant to Islamic philosophy, epistemology, and the dynamics of theology and philosophy (Church 2002, 32–45; Flowerday et al. 2026, 103026; Prayitno 2026, 102317). According to Creswell (2013), secondary sources strengthen the validity of interpretations of primary data and provide a broader conceptual framework. Data collection is conducted through systematic literature review, including identification, selection, and categorization of sources according to the research objectives. This process also involves close reading and systematic documentation of arguments, concepts, and contextual elements within the thought of both figures.

Data analysis is carried out through hermeneutical–comparative analysis, which involves interpreting texts, understanding their philosophical meanings, and critically comparing the arguments of the two thinkers (Mackey 2013; Baxter 2009; Neuendorf and Kumar 2016). Hadari Nawawi emphasizes that qualitative analysis requires deep interpretation and the construction of categories to identify relevant patterns of argumentation. Through this method, the study reveals Ibn Rushd's rational reconstruction of al-Ghazālī's critique in a comprehensive, methodologically grounded, and epistemologically robust manner (Bass and Semetko 2021; Price 2010; Tunison 2023; White and Marsh 2006, 22–45).

Building on this methodological framework, the analysis proceeds by systematically applying the hermeneutical–comparative approach to the primary texts of al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd. This transition from methodological exposition to analytical application is crucial, as it allows the study to move beyond abstract discussion of methods toward concrete interpretation of philosophical arguments. By engaging in close reading and contextual interpretation, the research identifies key conceptual patterns and reconstructs the internal logic of each thinker's position within their respective epistemological frameworks. In this context, the hermeneutical–comparative method functions not merely as a tool of interpretation, but as a bridge that connects textual analysis with philosophical evaluation. It enables the study to uncover how Ibn Rushd rearticulates and reorganizes al-Ghazālī's critiques, thereby revealing the deeper structure of rational reconstruction at work. The following analysis, therefore, focuses on specific thematic issues, demonstrating how this method yields a nuanced understanding of the debate and highlights its broader implications for Islamic epistemology.

## **Overview of the Intellectual Distance between Al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd**

To contextualize the intellectual distance between al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd, it is essential to ground their profiles in their primary works. Al-Ghazālī's intellectual project is prominently articulated in *Tabāfut al-Falāsifah*, where he systematically critiques the metaphysical claims of the philosophers, particularly on the eternity

of the world, divine knowledge of particulars, and causality. His epistemological stance is further elaborated in *al-Munqidh min al-Dalāl*, in which he emphasizes the limitations of purely rational inquiry and the necessity of spiritual and theological certainty. These works reflect his broader aim of safeguarding Sunni orthodoxy while critically engaging with philosophical traditions.

In contrast, Ibn Rushd's response is most clearly expressed in *Tabāfut al-Tabāfut*, where he defends the coherence of Aristotelian philosophy and challenges al-Ghazālī's interpretations of philosophical doctrines. His epistemological position is further developed in *Faṣl al-Maqāl*, where he argues for the harmony between philosophy and Sharia, asserting that demonstrative reasoning (*burhān*) is not only legitimate but necessary for those qualified to pursue it. Through these primary texts, Ibn Rushd constructs a systematic defense of rational inquiry as an integral component of Islamic intellectual tradition. Thus, the intellectual distance between the two thinkers is not merely historical or symbolic, but deeply rooted in their respective epistemological commitments as reflected in their foundational texts—namely the tension between theological skepticism toward philosophy and philosophical confidence in demonstrative reasoning (Lubis 2020, 1–18; Taufiqurrahman and Hambali 2021, 1–8).

Beyond their primary texts, the intellectual distance between al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd is further shaped by the broader socio-intellectual contexts in which they operated. Al-Ghazālī functioned within the Seljuk milieu, where theological contestation—particularly between Ash'arite orthodoxy and esoteric movements such as the Bāṭiniyyah—necessitated a defensive posture toward speculative philosophy. His critique of the *falāsifah* can therefore be seen not only as a philosophical intervention but also as a strategic effort to preserve doctrinal stability within Sunni Islam. In contrast, Ibn Rushd emerged in the intellectually vibrant environment of al-Andalus, where engagement with Greek philosophy, especially Aristotelianism, was institutionally supported and culturally integrated. This context enabled him to approach philosophy not as a threat, but as a legitimate and even necessary avenue for attaining truth (Flaker et al. 2017, 561).

Furthermore, the divergence between the two thinkers reflects differing assumptions about nature and function of knowledge itself. Al-Ghazālī's epistemology ultimately culminates in a synthesis that privileges spiritual intuition (*kashf*) as the highest form of certainty, thereby placing limits on the scope of rational inquiry in metaphysical matters. Ibn Rushd, however, advances a hierarchical yet integrative model of knowledge in which demonstrative reasoning occupies the highest epistemic status for those capable of it, without negating the validity of other forms of understanding (Connolly 2018, 31). This fundamental difference underscores that the distance between al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd is not merely oppositional but represents two distinct yet influential trajectories within Islamic intellectual history—one oriented toward theological safeguarding, and the other toward philosophical integration.

In addition to manuscript illuminations, later artistic renderings portray al-Ghazālī as a scholar deeply engaged in dialectical and theological debates, reflecting

his critical engagement with philosophy (Aini 2016, 91–118; Kukkonen 2025, 675–89). In addition to manuscript illuminations, later artistic renderings portray al-Ghazālī as a scholar deeply engaged in dialectical and theological debates, symbolizing his active role in critically engaging with philosophical traditions. These representations function not merely as visual depictions, but as intellectual symbols that position al-Ghazālī at the intersection of *kalām*, Sufism, and philosophy. From an analytical perspective, such imagery reinforces the understanding that his critique of philosophy is not directed against reason itself, but rather against its unrestrained use in metaphysical speculation. It reflects his effort to define the proper epistemological boundaries of reason within a theological framework, where rational inquiry remains valuable but must ultimately align with the authority of revelation.

These visual representations also play an important role in shaping the historiographical reception of al-Ghazālī within both Islamic and Western intellectual traditions. By depicting him as a figure immersed in rigorous debate and contemplative inquiry, such imagery reinforces his legacy as a mediator rather than a mere opponent of philosophy. From a critical standpoint, these portrayals suggest that al-Ghazālī's project was not to reject rationality outright, but to recalibrate its function within a broader epistemological hierarchy that integrates theology and spirituality. Consequently, the artistic tradition surrounding al-Ghazālī contributes to a more nuanced understanding of his intellectual position, highlighting the complexity of his engagement with philosophy as both a critic and a reformulator of its role within Islamic thought.

By contrast, Ibn Rushd is frequently represented in medieval Latin and Andalusian manuscript traditions as a philosopher-commentator of Aristotle, symbolizing his rationalist orientation and his role in transmitting Aristotelian thought to both the Islamic world and medieval Europe (Marmura 1965, 183–204; Masykur and Chasani 2025, 1–16). These representations not only reflect his intellectual identity as a defender of demonstrative reasoning (*burhān*) but also underscore his historical significance within the broader trajectory of cross-cultural philosophical exchange. In many manuscript traditions, particularly those circulating in Latin Christendom, Ibn Rushd appears as Averroes, often depicted alongside Aristotle, reinforcing his status as the foremost interpreter of Aristotelian philosophy in the medieval period (El-Bizri 2020, 213). Such visual and textual portrayals further highlight the contrast between Ibn Rushd's philosophical orientation and al-Ghazālī's theological concerns. While al-Ghazālī's legacy is often associated with the critique and delimitation of philosophy within a theological framework, Ibn Rushd's image embodies the continuity and expansion of rational inquiry. This divergence in representation mirrors the deeper epistemological differences between the two thinkers, situating Ibn Rushd within a tradition that emphasizes intellectual synthesis and the universality of reason as a means of accessing truth.

These representations also contribute to framing Ibn Rushd's enduring legacy as a central figure in the transmission and transformation of philosophical

knowledge across cultural and intellectual boundaries. By consistently portraying him as a commentator and interpreter of Aristotle, the manuscript tradition elevates his role beyond that of a mere defender of philosophy, positioning him instead as a key architect of intellectual continuity between the Greek, Islamic, and Latin worlds. From an analytical perspective, this imagery reinforces the perception of Ibn Rushd as a thinker committed to the universality of reason and the systematic pursuit of truth through demonstrative methods. It also underscores the extent to which his philosophical project is oriented toward synthesis rather than opposition, thereby further accentuating the epistemological contrast with al-Ghazālī while simultaneously highlighting the complementary nature of their contributions to the development of Islamic intellectual history.

Manuscript portraits associated with Ibn Rushd further highlight his identity as a jurist-philosopher working within the intellectual climate of al-Andalus, where Aristotelian logic and demonstrative reasoning were cultivated systematically (Islam 2018; Van Lit 2015, 368–413). Building on these manuscript representations, Ibn Rushd's intellectual profile can be more fully understood within the broader scholarly ecosystem of al-Andalus, where the integration of law, philosophy, and science formed a distinctive intellectual synthesis. The visual portrayal of Ibn Rushd as both jurist and philosopher reflects not only his dual expertise but also the institutional environment that supported the coexistence of Sharia scholarship and Aristotelian inquiry. This context helps explain why his engagement with philosophy is not defensive, but constructive and systematizing. In this light, the manuscript portraits serve as more than historical artifacts; they function as interpretive lenses through which Ibn Rushd's epistemological commitments can be reassessed. They underscore his role in advancing a tradition that values demonstrative reasoning as a legitimate path to truth, thereby reinforcing his broader project of harmonizing reason and revelation. The following discussion builds on this perspective to examine how such an intellectual orientation is reflected in his responses to key theological critiques.

The findings of this study indicate that the distance between al-Ghazālī (d. 1111 CE) and Ibn Rushd (d. 1198 CE) reflects not only a chronological gap but also significant methodological, epistemological, and intellectual differences. Al-Ghazālī lived in a theological milieu marked by intense sectarian debates, whereas Ibn Rushd operated within the Andalusian tradition, which was comparatively more rationalistic and philosophical (Alizadeh 2024, 23–40; Hidayat 2017, 373–88).

Historically, there is an interval of approximately 87 years between the death of al-Ghazālī and the birth of Ibn Rushd. This difference in historical context shaped their respective attitudes toward philosophy. Al-Ghazālī lived under Seljuk hegemony amid conflicts between Ash'arism and Bāṭinism, while Ibn Rushd developed within the intellectual culture of al-Andalus, which was more receptive to Greek thought, particularly Aristotelianism. The study shows that al-Ghazālī regarded spiritual intuition (*kashf*) as the highest form of knowledge, whereas Ibn Rushd considered demonstrative reason (*burhān*) to be the most valid instrument

for understanding reality. Both thinkers employed Aristotelian tools, yet with divergent epistemological aims—al-Ghazālī to critique and delimit philosophy in defense of theology, and Ibn Rushd to defend and clarify philosophy from what he saw as misunderstandings. In *Tabāfut al-Falāsifah*, al-Ghazālī attacked twenty metaphysical doctrines of the philosophers, especially those he deemed contrary to Islamic law. In contrast, in *Tabāfut al-Tabāfut*, Ibn Rushd applied Aristotelian logic to respond systematically to each of these criticisms. Al-Ghazālī’s deductive-theological approach and Ibn Rushd’s demonstrative-philosophical method reveal a sharp methodological divide between them (Brenet 2020, 1–26; Moad 2015, 429–41).

Al-Ghazālī’s primary aim was to safeguard the purity of Islamic creed from philosophical metaphysics considered deviant—particularly regarding the eternity of the world, God’s knowledge of particulars, and the denial of bodily resurrection. Conversely, Ibn Rushd sought to demonstrate that philosophy is fully compatible with religion and even constitutes a form of intellectual devotion. This divergence of purpose placed the two thinkers at opposite poles within the Islamic intellectual tradition: one as a theological corrector of philosophy, the other as a philosophical defender of rationality.

**Table 1.** Comparative Research Findings.

Aspect	Al-Ghazālī	Ibn Rushd	Form of Distance
<b>H i s t o r i c a l Context</b>	Seljuk era, theological conflict	Andalusia, rationalism	Different environments
<b>Epistemology</b>	<i>Kashf</i> , Ash‘arite theology	<i>Burbān</i> , Aristotelian	Different knowledge bases
<b>Intellectual Aim</b>	Critique of philosophy	Harmonization of religion and reason	Opposing orientations
<b>Method</b>	D e d u c t i v e - theological	D e m o n s t r a t i v e - philosophical	Different methodologies
<b>Attitude toward Philosophy</b>	Selective-critical	Affirmative-defensive	Contrasting philosophical stances
<b>Chronology</b>	d. 1111 CE	b. 1126 – d. 1198 CE	~87-year gap

Overall, the findings demonstrate that the distance between al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd is not merely temporal but paradigmatic. Al-Ghazālī stands as a critic of philosophy in defense of theology, while Ibn Rushd emerges as a defender of rationality in pursuit of harmony between religion and philosophy. Together, they constitute two major pillars that shaped the dynamics of classical Islamic intellectual history.

Building on the comparative mapping presented in Table 1, the intellectual distance between al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd can be understood as extending beyond historical separation into the realm of paradigmatic divergence. The differences

outlined—ranging from epistemological foundations to methodological approaches—indicate that each thinker operates within a distinct framework of knowledge production. Al-Ghazālī's orientation is rooted in a theological paradigm that prioritizes the safeguarding of doctrine through a selective and critical engagement with philosophy, whereas Ibn Rushd advances a rationalist paradigm that seeks to integrate philosophical reasoning with religious truth. This contrast not only reflects differing intellectual commitments but also reveals the broader tension between *kalām* and *falsafa* within the Islamic intellectual tradition. In light of this, the identified distance functions not as a barrier, but as an analytical entry point for understanding how these two paradigms interact, critique, and ultimately enrich one another.

Rather than representing mutually exclusive positions, al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd can be seen as articulating complementary responses to the same fundamental question: how to reconcile reason and revelation within a coherent epistemological system. The following discussion therefore moves beyond comparison toward deeper analysis, examining how Ibn Rushd's project of rational reconstruction engages directly with this tension and offers a framework for epistemological harmonization within Islamic philosophy.

### **Rational Reconstruction of the Eternity of the World by Ibn Rushd in Response to al-Ghazālī**

This study demonstrates that Ibn Rushd undertook a systematic rational reconstruction of al-Ghazālī's critique concerning *qidam al-'alam* (the eternity of the world). To ensure analytical clarity, this reconstruction is examined through three indicators: conceptual deconstruction, argumentative reconfiguration, and epistemological re-legitimation. First, at the level of conceptual deconstruction, Ibn Rushd challenges al-Ghazālī's understanding of eternity by distinguishing between temporal priority and ontological dependence. In *Tabāfut al-Falāsifah*, al-Ghazālī argues that the doctrine of the world's eternity contradicts *creatio ex nihilo* and undermines divine omnipotence. However, Ibn Rushd, in *Tabāfut al-Tabāfut*, clarifies that the philosophers do not deny God as the creator; rather, they conceptualize creation as an eternal dependence of the world upon God, not as a temporal beginning. This distinction reveals that al-Ghazālī's critique partly rests on a semantic and conceptual misinterpretation. Second, in terms of argumentative reconfiguration, Ibn Rushd reconstructs the logical structure of the debate by situating the notion of eternity within a demonstrative (*burhānī*) framework derived from Aristotelian metaphysics. He argues that assuming a temporal beginning of the world raises further philosophical difficulties, particularly regarding the change from non-existence to existence without a prior causal condition. By reorganizing the premises of the argument, Ibn Rushd shifts the debate from a theological assertion to a philosophical demonstration grounded in causality and necessity (Ghazālī 2000a, 57).

Third, at the level of epistemological re-legitimation, Ibn Rushd reaffirms the role of philosophy as a valid mode of knowing metaphysical reality. He maintains

that the apparent contradiction between revelation and philosophical reasoning arises not from the doctrines themselves, but from misinterpretations. Thus, the doctrine of the eternity of the world, when properly understood, does not negate divine omnipotence, but instead reflects a deeper metaphysical understanding of God as the eternal cause of all existence. Through these three dimensions, Ibn Rushd's response can be understood not merely as a rejection of al-Ghazālī's critique, but as a rational reconstruction that restores the coherence, logical structure, and epistemological legitimacy of philosophical thought within the Islamic intellectual tradition. Ibn Rushd refutes this critique by arguing that the philosophers—particularly Aristotle—did not intend to deny creation but rather understood it within the framework of an eternal causal relationship between God and the world. In *Tabāfut al-Tabāfut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence)*, he asserts that the eternity of the world does not imply that the world is uncreated; instead, it signifies that the world depends continuously upon God as the First Cause (Nasri 2019b; Nasri 2019a).

Ibn Rushd distinguishes between *qidam dhātī* (essential eternity, which belongs only to God) and *qidam zamānī* (the absence of a temporal beginning for something whose existence is perpetually dependent on its cause). This distinction is explicitly articulated in *Tabāfut al-Tabāfut*, where he argues that the philosophers do not attribute absolute eternity to the world in the same sense as God's eternity, but rather affirm its continuous dependence upon the First Cause (Ibn Rushd, *Tabāfut al-Tabāfut*). In this context, eternity does not imply independence from God, but signifies the absence of temporal origination while maintaining ontological dependence (Ghazālī 2000b, 43).

Through this conceptual clarification, Ibn Rushd constructs a bridge between Aristotelian metaphysics and the Islamic doctrine of creation. His reconstruction shows that the disagreement with al-Ghazālī does not lie in the affirmation or denial of creation per se, but in the categorization and interpretation of eternity. While al-Ghazālī equates eternity with independence from divine will, Ibn Rushd redefines it within a framework of necessary causality and perpetual dependence. Accordingly, Ibn Rushd does not reject the doctrine of creation; rather, he critiques theological premises that, in his view, misinterpret philosophical terminology. This analysis demonstrates that the debate is fundamentally epistemological and semantic, rather than purely doctrinal, reinforcing the argument that Ibn Rushd's project constitutes a rational reconstruction grounded in textual and philosophical rigor (Nasri 2023).

Building on the analysis of the eternity of the world, the discussion now shifts to another pivotal issue in the al-Ghazālī–Ibn Rushd debate: the problem of divine knowledge of particulars. While the previous section highlighted how Ibn Rushd reconstructs metaphysical concepts through distinctions in causality and eternity, the present issue moves into the domain of epistemology, where the nature and scope of God's knowledge become central. This transition is significant, as it reveals that Ibn Rushd's reconstructive method is not limited to cosmological questions, but extends consistently into theological epistemology (Lip et al. 2019, 343).

In this regard, the question of whether God knows particulars serves as a critical testing ground for Ibn Rushd's broader project of epistemological harmonization. His response does not merely defend the philosophers against al-Ghazālī's accusations but rearticulates the very framework through which divine knowledge is understood. By shifting from anthropomorphic assumptions to a causally grounded metaphysical model, Ibn Rushd continues his effort to reconcile philosophical reasoning with theological doctrine. The following section therefore examines how this reconstruction unfolds in detail, further demonstrating the coherence and scope of Ibn Rushd's integrative epistemology.

### **God's Knowledge of Particulars: Conceptual Clarification by Ibn Rushd**

Al-Ghazālī critiques the philosophers' doctrine of divine knowledge in *Tabāfut al-Falāsifah*, particularly targeting Ibn Sīnā and al-Fārābī. He argues that their claim—that God knows only universals and not particulars—undermines divine perfection, since true omniscience must encompass all entities, including changing particulars (Al-Ghazālī, *Tabāfut al-Falāsifah*). This constitutes the primary textual basis of al-Ghazālī's critique, in which he frames philosophical epistemology as incompatible with Islamic theology. In response, Ibn Rushd, in *Tabāfut al-Tabāfut*, reconstructs this critique by first correcting what he considers a misreading of the philosophers' position. He argues that divine knowledge cannot be equated with human knowledge, as God's knowledge is not subject to temporal succession or change. Rather, God knows particulars through His knowledge of their universal causes, which eternally encompass all contingent events (Ibn Rushd, *Tabāfut al-Tabāfut*). This argument represents the primary data from Ibn Rushd's text, where he redefines the epistemological framework of divine knowledge (Rushd 2001, 34).

From an analytical perspective, this study interprets Ibn Rushd's response as a form of rational reconstruction operating at both conceptual and epistemological levels. Conceptually, he clarifies that the philosophers do not deny God's knowledge of particulars but redefine its mode. Epistemologically, he shifts the framework from anthropomorphic models of knowledge to a metaphysical model grounded in causality and necessity. Secondary analyses, such as those by Nasri (2023), support this interpretation by emphasizing that Ibn Rushd's position affirms a more perfect form of divine knowledge—one that is not dependent on changing objects, but grounded in eternal causation. Thus, the disagreement between al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd lies not in whether God knows particulars, but in how such knowledge is conceptualized. This confirms that Ibn Rushd's project is not merely defensive, but reconstructive, as it rearticulates the epistemological foundations of divine knowledge within Islamic philosophy. Ibn Rushd further contends that al-Ghazālī's criticism is misdirected, because the philosophers did not portray God as an entity who does not know particulars, but rather as one whose knowledge transcends temporal categories and particularity itself. This rational reconstruction establishes a non-anthropomorphic conception of divine knowledge that remains consistent with God's absolute perfection and transcendence (Rushd 2001, 45).

Building on the preceding discussion of rational reconstruction and epistemological harmonization, the analysis now turns to a more specific domain in which this reconstructive method is clearly manifested: the problem of divine knowledge of particulars. This issue represents one of the most contested points in the debate between al-Ghazālī and the philosophers, as it directly concerns the nature of God's omniscience and its compatibility with philosophical reasoning (Eikelboom et al. 2019, 343). By examining how Ibn Rushd rearticulates this problem, the study seeks to demonstrate how his method moves beyond polemics toward a more refined conceptual clarification. In this context, the question is not simply whether God knows particulars, but how such knowledge should be understood within a coherent epistemological framework. Ibn Rushd's intervention becomes particularly significant, as it reveals a shift from a literal and anthropomorphic understanding of knowledge toward a metaphysical and causally grounded model (O'Donnell et al. 2019, 147). The following section therefore analyzes Ibn Rushd's conceptual clarification in detail, highlighting how his response reframes the debate and contributes to a more integrative understanding of divine knowledge within Islamic philosophy.

### **The Relationship between Reason, Revelation, and Sharia: Epistemological Harmonization**

In his major works, al-Ghazālī positions reason as an important instrument, yet ultimately subordinate to revelation. In *Tabāfut al-Falāsifah* and *al-Munqidh min al-Dalāl*, he criticizes philosophers who, in his view, elevate reason excessively, thereby risking the neglect of the authority of scriptural texts. These arguments constitute the primary textual basis of al-Ghazālī's position, indicating that ultimate truth is determined by revelation, while reason serves a limited, supportive role (Ghazali et al. 2024, 19). In contrast, Ibn Rushd, in *Faṣl al-Maqāl* and *Tabāfut al-Tabāfut*, develops a more integrative epistemological stance. He articulates the principle *al-ḥaqq lā yuḍādd al-ḥaqq* (truth does not contradict truth), arguing that authentic revelation cannot conflict with demonstrative reason (Ibn Rushd, *Faṣl al-Maqāl*). This constitutes the primary source foundation of his argument, in which philosophy, as a *burhānī* method, becomes a legitimate means for understanding the deeper meanings of revelation (Budur 2026, 532).

Based on these primary sources, this study argues that the fundamental difference between al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd lies not in their acceptance of reason per se, but in their underlying epistemological structures (Ferhat 2020, 203). Al-Ghazālī constructs a hierarchical model in which revelation holds epistemic primacy over reason, whereas Ibn Rushd proposes a model of epistemological harmonization that situates reason and revelation within a complementary relationship. In this framework, Ibn Rushd's rational reconstruction can be understood as an effort to integrate reason, revelation, and Sharia into a coherent system of knowledge. This interpretation is further supported by secondary scholarship, such as Hausser (2023), James Ladyman (2007), and Romero-Carazas (2024, 81–89), which emphasize the importance of integrative approaches in reconciling rationality

and religious authority. However, this study maintains primary texts as its main analytical foundation, while secondary sources function to reinforce and contextualize the argument (Hausser 2023; Ladyman 2007; Romero-Carazas 2024, 81–89).

This study further argues that Ibn Rushd’s project represents a form of epistemological harmonization that transcends the polarization between theologians and philosophers. Rather than positioning *kalām* and *falsafah* as mutually exclusive, Ibn Rushd redefines their relationship within a unified epistemic framework grounded in demonstrative reasoning (*burhān*) and scriptural interpretation (*ta’wīl*). From an analytical standpoint, this harmonization operates on two levels. First, at the methodological level, Ibn Rushd establishes a differentiation of epistemic authority based on intellectual capacity, arguing that demonstrative reasoning is obligatory for those qualified, while rhetorical and dialectical methods remain valid for broader audiences. Second, at the hermeneutical level, he introduces a principled approach to reconciling apparent contradictions between revelation and reason, asserting that any conflict must be resolved through interpretive re-reading of scriptural texts rather than the rejection of rational demonstration. In this sense, Ibn Rushd does not merely respond to al-Ghazālī’s critique, but advances a paradigmatic shift in Islamic epistemology—from a hierarchical model that subordinates reason to revelation toward an integrative model in which both function as complementary sources of truth (Casewit 2020, 156). This study interprets such a shift as a form of rational reconstruction that restructures the epistemic boundaries between theology and philosophy.

Secondary scholarship, including Michael Marmura, Hasan, and Ibrahim & Efremova, supports the view that Ibn Rushd’s thought provides a systematic framework for reconciling philosophical inquiry with religious doctrine. However, this study extends their analyses by emphasizing the reconstructive dimension of Ibn Rushd’s method as a coherent epistemological model rather than merely a defensive response to al-Ghazālī (Hasan 2013; Ibrahim and Efremova 2021; Marmura 2020).

**Table 2.** Summary of Ibn Rushd’s Rational Reconstruction.

Issue	Al-Ghazālī’s Critique	Ibn Rushd’s Reconstruction	Analytical Result
<b>Eternity of the World</b>	Eternity = no creation	Eternity = perpetual dependence on the First Cause	Difference in the definition of eternity
<b>God’s Knowledge of Particulars</b>	Philosophers: God knows only universals	God knows particulars through universal causes	Al-Ghazālī misreads philosophical texts
<b>Reason – Revelation – Sharia</b>	Reason important but subordinate	Reason and revelation harmonious, contradictory	Ibn Rushd’s integrative paradigm

The table above summarizes three major nodes of debate between al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd regarding the rational reconstruction of the criticisms presented in *Tabāfut al-Falāsifah*. Each row carries philosophical implications that reflect their differing epistemological paradigms. Taken together, the table functions not merely as a descriptive summary, but as an analytical framework that highlights the structural depth of the debate between the two thinkers. Each issue—whether concerning the eternity of the world, divine knowledge of particulars, or the relationship between reason and revelation—reveals a consistent pattern of divergence rooted in their underlying epistemological commitments. From this perspective, the table illustrates how al-Ghazālī's approach is grounded in a theologically oriented epistemology that prioritizes doctrinal coherence, while Ibn Rushd advances a demonstrative framework that seeks logical consistency and philosophical integration. As such, the comparative structure of the table underscores that their disagreement is systematic rather than incidental, reflecting two distinct yet intellectually productive models within the broader tradition of Islamic philosophy.

### **The Eternity of the World**

On the first issue, al-Ghazālī argues that the philosophers' concept of the world's eternity effectively denies the process of creation. Within the Ash'arite theological framework, all existence must originate from nothing (*ex nihilo*). However, the study shows that Ibn Rushd reinterprets eternity by distinguishing between essential eternity (which belongs only to God) and the temporal eternity of the world (Kukkonen 2025; Moad 2015, 429–41). According to him, the world's eternity means only that it is continuously connected to God in an unbroken causal relationship—not that it is uncreated. This reconstruction indicates that the disagreement concerns not the substance of doctrine, but the philosophical definition used to understand the concept.

This distinction reveals a deeper philosophical tension concerning the nature of causality and temporality in relation to divine action. Al-Ghazālī's position prioritizes a temporal framework in which creation is understood as a definitive beginning, thereby affirming God's absolute will and power over existence. Ibn Rushd, by contrast, approaches the issue through a metaphysical lens, where causality is continuous and not bound by temporal succession. In this view, God's role as the First Cause does not require a temporal starting point but is instead manifested in the perpetual dependence of the world upon Him.

From an analytical perspective, Ibn Rushd's reconstruction demonstrates that the apparent contradiction between creation and eternity arises from differing conceptual frameworks rather than substantive theological disagreement. By redefining eternity as ontological dependence rather than temporal priority, he preserves both the philosophical coherence of Aristotelian metaphysics and the theological affirmation of God as Creator. This indicates that the debate is fundamentally rooted in epistemological interpretation, reinforcing the argument that Ibn Rushd's project seeks to reconcile, rather than oppose, philosophical

reasoning and theological doctrine.

### God's Knowledge of Particulars

The second issue reveals a deep divergence in their understanding of divine epistemology. Al-Ghazālī accuses the philosophers of restricting God's knowledge to universals, thereby denying His knowledge of ever-changing particulars. Ibn Rushd corrects this accusation by formulating a comprehensive concept of divine knowledge that transcends the universal-particular dichotomy. God, according to Ibn Rushd, knows all things through His knowledge of the universal causes that generate particular phenomena. Thus, God does not fail to know particulars; rather, He knows them in a more perfect manner, independent of temporal change, unlike human knowledge. The study indicates that this reconstruction shows al-Ghazālī's critique to be directed more toward a specific interpretation than toward the philosophers' actual position (Masykur and Chasani 2025, 1–16; Van Lit 2015, 368–413).

This divergence highlights a fundamental difference in how both thinkers conceptualize the nature and perfection of divine knowledge. Al-Ghazālī's critique is grounded in a theological framework that emphasizes God's direct and comprehensive awareness of all particulars in their temporal unfolding, thereby safeguarding the doctrine of divine omniscience in a more literal sense. Ibn Rushd, however, approaches the issue through a philosophical lens, arguing that attributing temporally conditioned knowledge to God risks introducing change and multiplicity into the divine essence. By redefining divine knowledge as grounded in universal causality, he seeks to preserve God's immutability while maintaining the completeness of His knowledge.

From an analytical standpoint, Ibn Rushd's reconstruction represents a shift from a descriptive to an explanatory model of divine knowledge. Rather than focusing on how knowledge appears from a human perspective, he emphasizes the underlying metaphysical structure that makes such knowledge possible. This allows him to reconcile philosophical reasoning with theological commitments, demonstrating that the disagreement with al-Ghazālī is not about the affirmation of divine omniscience itself, but about the conceptual framework through which it is understood. Consequently, the issue of God's knowledge of particulars becomes a key example of how epistemological assumptions shape theological conclusions, reinforcing the broader argument that Ibn Rushd's project is fundamentally reconstructive rather than oppositional.

### The Relationship between Reason, Revelation, and Sharia

The third issue demonstrates that the difference between al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd extends beyond emphasis to the very foundations of their epistemologies. Al-Ghazālī accepts reason as an important tool but places it under revelation to safeguard scriptural authority. Conversely, Ibn Rushd argues that reason and revelation cannot contradict each other, since both originate from the same divine source. The principle *al-ḥaqq lā yudādd al-ḥaqq* implies that if a demonstrative

conclusion is true, it must correspond with revelation. The study finds that Ibn Rushd not only answers al-Ghazālī's criticisms but also offers a harmonizing framework in which philosophy serves as a method for understanding Sharia more deeply (Alizadeh 2024, 23–40; Kock 2011).

Overall, the table shows that these three issues represent not minor disagreements but paradigmatic differences. Al-Ghazālī proceeds from normative theology, whereas Ibn Rushd operates within Aristotelian demonstrative rationalism. Ibn Rushd's rational reconstruction seeks to free philosophy from theological misinterpretation and to affirm that religious truth and rational truth need not be opposed. In this sense, the table provides a comprehensive summary of the direction of Ibn Rushd's argumentative reconstruction in response to *Tabāfut al-Falāsifah* (Islam 2018; Marmura 1959).

The findings of this study indicate that Ibn Rushd's reconstruction of al-Ghazālī's critique is not merely a polemical response but a comprehensive effort to rebuild the structure of philosophical epistemology that he believes was misunderstood in *Tabāfut al-Falāsifah*. The theoretical framework of this research focuses on three key issues: the eternity of the world, God's knowledge of particulars, and the relationship between reason, revelation, and Sharia. These issues constitute central nodes in medieval Islamic philosophical debates, reflecting profound epistemological differences between the two thinkers. Ibn Rushd, through his *burhānī* (demonstrative) approach, maintains that philosophy is a method aimed at attaining certain knowledge (*al-'ilm al-yaqīnī*), a position he reiterates in *Faṣl al-Maqāl* (Rozi 2020, 1–14; Saleh 2009, 97–117).

Regarding the eternity of the world, al-Ghazālī accuses the philosophers of asserting that the world has no beginning and exists eternally alongside God. Ibn Rushd responds that this interpretation is inaccurate and results from al-Ghazālī's misreading of Aristotle. According to Ibn Rushd, the world indeed possesses a continuous order, but this continuity does not stem from the world possessing eternal existence like God. Rather, it derives from God's eternal will. In *Tabāfut al-Tabāfut*, Ibn Rushd argues that cosmic processes occur through the unchanging First Cause (*al-sabāb al-awwal*), making the world's eternity an eternity of causal dependence established by God. The study finds that this view integrates Aristotelian metaphysics with Islamic theology while rejecting al-Ghazālī's identification of the world's eternity with ontological parity between Creator and creation (Aini 2016; Brenet 2020, 1–26).

The second issue, concerning God's knowledge of particulars, is also central to al-Ghazālī's critique. In *Tabāfut al-Falāsifah*, he contends that philosophers deny divine knowledge of particulars because such knowledge changes with its objects. Ibn Rushd replies that God knows particulars in a higher manner (*bi-wajh a'la*), namely through His knowledge of universals that serve as the causes of particulars. In other words, God knows each particular not because He is affected by it—as humans are—but because He knows the universal laws underlying its existence. This universal character of divine knowledge does not exclude particulars, since universals encompass all possible particulars. The study suggests that Ibn Rushd

employs a form of causal universalism in which God is the source of the universal order that gives rise to all particular phenomena. Thus, al-Ghazālī's criticism is interpreted as a methodological error that equates divine knowledge with human knowledge (Ibragim 2025; Ibrahim and Efremova 2024).

The third issue—the relationship between reason, revelation, and Sharia—highlights Ibn Rushd's integrative epistemology. In *Faṣl al-Maqāl*, he asserts that truth cannot contradict truth, whether accessed through reason or revelation, since both originate from the same God. The study finds that Ibn Rushd classifies humanity into rhetorical, dialectical, and demonstrative groups, each possessing different capacities for understanding truth. Revelation serves as guidance for all people, while philosophy provides the demonstrative path for those capable of rigorous reasoning. For this reason, Ibn Rushd argues that studying philosophy is not merely permissible but obligatory for those qualified to do so. Al-Ghazālī, by contrast, maintains that reason has limits in metaphysical matters and must not transgress the boundaries set by revelation. This fundamental difference shows that Ibn Rushd develops an integrative rather than subordinative epistemological model, seeking to situate philosophy within religion rather than outside or in opposition to it. In conclusion, the study demonstrates that Ibn Rushd's reconstruction is not merely a rebuttal but a methodological effort to establish Islamic philosophy as a legitimate intellectual tradition (Alizadeh 2024, 23–40; Islam 2018). The three issues examined reveal that the divergence between Ibn Rushd and al-Ghazālī lies primarily in their epistemological methods rather than in their theological aims. For Ibn Rushd, reason is an instrument for understanding the signs of God and deepening Sharia, whereas al-Ghazālī tends to subordinate philosophy to the constraints of theological discourse (*kalām*). A renewed reading of their debate therefore offers significant insights into the relationship between reason and revelation in both classical and contemporary Islamic thought.

### **Rational Reconstruction and Epistemological Harmonization: An Analytical Synthesis**

Building upon the three issues examined above, this study identifies that Ibn Rushd's response to al-Ghazālī is best understood not merely as a refutation, but as a structured project of rational reconstruction that leads to epistemological harmonization. To ensure analytical precision, this synthesis is articulated through two main indicators: (1) reconstructive rationality and (2) integrative epistemology. First, reconstructive rationality refers to Ibn Rushd's method of reinterpreting philosophical doctrines by correcting conceptual misreadings and reorganizing their logical structure within a demonstrative (*burhānī*) framework. As demonstrated in the discussions on the eternity of the world and divine knowledge of particulars, Ibn Rushd does not reject theological concerns but reformulates them by distinguishing between levels of meaning—such as temporal versus ontological causation, and human versus divine modes of knowing. This indicates that his critique operates not at the level of doctrinal opposition, but at the level of conceptual and epistemological reconstruction.

Second, integrative epistemology refers to Ibn Rushd's effort to harmonize reason, revelation, and Sharia within a unified system of knowledge. Drawing on his argument in *Faṣl al-Maqāl*, he asserts that truth cannot contradict truth, thereby establishing a principle of epistemic compatibility between demonstrative reasoning and scriptural authority. This harmonization is not merely theoretical but structured through a differentiation of epistemic methods, rhetorical, dialectical, and demonstrative—each corresponding to different levels of human intellectual capacity. From the author's analytical perspective, these two indicators reveal that Ibn Rushd's project represents a shift from a subordinative epistemology, in which reason is limited by theology, to an integrative epistemology, in which reason functions as a legitimate and necessary instrument for understanding revelation. This study therefore argues that Ibn Rushd's rational reconstruction culminates in an epistemological model that is both internally coherent and normatively relevant for contemporary Islamic thought. Thus, the novelty of this study lies in demonstrating that the al-Ghazālī–Ibn Rushd debate is not merely a historical theological dispute, but a foundational moment in the development of an integrative Islamic epistemology—one that continues to offer a viable framework for reconciling rational inquiry and religious authority.

Building upon the three issues discussed—namely the eternity of the world, God's knowledge of particulars, and the relationship between reason, revelation, and Sharia—this study advances toward a broader analytical synthesis. Ibn Rushd's engagement with al-Ghazālī can no longer be reduced to a mere polemical rebuttal; rather, it emerges as a coherent project of rational reconstruction (Gea 2020, 103). This reconstruction operates by revisiting philosophical doctrines, correcting conceptual misinterpretations, and reorganizing them within a demonstrative (*burhānī*) framework. In this light, Ibn Rushd's response does not negate theological concerns but reframes them through more precise epistemological distinctions—such as between temporal and ontological causation, or between human and divine modes of knowledge. Consequently, the debate shifts from doctrinal opposition to a deeper level of conceptual clarification and epistemological refinement (Diener et al. 2018, 230).

From this reconstructive foundation, Ibn Rushd (Averroes) further articulates an integrative epistemology that seeks to harmonize reason, revelation, and Sharia within a unified structure of knowledge. Grounded in the principle *al-ḥaqq lā yuḍādd al-ḥaqq* (truth does not contradict truth), he establishes that demonstrative reasoning and scriptural authority are not mutually exclusive, but epistemically compatible (Benz et al. 2019, 320). This harmonization is methodologically structured through a differentiation of intellectual approaches—rhetorical, dialectical, and demonstrative—each corresponding to varying levels of human cognitive capacity. Taken together, these elements indicate a significant epistemological shift: from a subordinative model that restricts reason under theological authority, toward an integrative model in which reason serves as a legitimate means for understanding revelation. Thus, Ibn Rushd's rational reconstruction culminates in a framework that is not only internally coherent

but also normatively relevant, offering a compelling foundation for contemporary efforts to reconcile rational inquiry with religious commitment.

## Conclusion

This study demonstrates that Ibn Rushd's rational reconstruction of Al-Ghazālī's critique in *Tabāfut al-Falāsifah* constitutes a structured philosophical–methodological project rather than a merely polemical response. Addressing the main problem posed at the outset, this study finds that Ibn Rushd's reconstruction operates through three analytical forms: conceptual clarification, argumentative reconfiguration, and epistemological re-legitimation. These forms are consistently evident in the three issues examined—the eternity of the world, God's knowledge of particulars, and the relationship between reason, revelation, and Sharia—through which Ibn Rushd reformulates misunderstood philosophical doctrines and restores their logical coherence within a demonstrative (*burhānī*) framework. Furthermore, the study confirms that the core disagreement between al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd lies not in their theological commitments, but in their epistemological orientations. While al-Ghazālī evaluates philosophy within a kalām framework that prioritizes doctrinal safeguarding, Ibn Rushd advances a reconstructive approach that repositions reason as a legitimate and necessary instrument for understanding both metaphysical reality and revelation.

In terms of its broader contribution, this study demonstrates that Ibn Rushd's project culminates in an epistemological model of harmonization, in which reason, revelation, and Sharia are integrated within a coherent system of knowledge. This model transcends the dichotomy between theology and philosophy by affirming that demonstrative reasoning and scriptural truth originate from the same divine source and therefore cannot contradict one another. Accordingly, the novelty of this study lies in showing that Ibn Rushd's response is not only defensive but reconstructive, offering a systematic framework for an integrative Islamic epistemology. This finding has contemporary relevance, as it provides a conceptual foundation for addressing ongoing tensions between religious authority and rational inquiry in modern Islamic thought.

## REFERENCES

- Adlini, Miza Nina, Anisya Hanifa Dinda, Sarah Yulinda, Octavia Chotimah, and Sauda Julia Merliyana. 2022. "Metode Penelitian Kualitatif Studi Pustaka." *Edumaspul: Jurnal Pendidikan* 6 (1): 974–80. <https://doi.org/10.33487/edumaspul.v6i1.3394>.
- Agrey, Loren G. 2014a. "Opportunities and Possibilities: Philosophical Hermeneutics and the Educational Researcher." *Universal Journal of Educational Research* 2 (4): 396–402. <https://doi.org/10.13189/ujer.2014.020408>.
- Agrey, Loren G. 2014b. "Philosophical Hermeneutics: A Tradition with Promise." *Universal Journal of Educational Research* 2 (2): 188–92. <https://doi.org/10.13189/ujer.2014.020211>.
- Aini, Qurratul. 2016. "Al-Gazālī's Critique against the Muslim Philosophers in Tahāfut Al-Falāsifah." *Ulumuna* 20 (1): 91–118. <https://doi.org/10.20414/ujis.v20i1.805>.
- Alizadeh, Roohallah. 2024. "Reviewing and Criticizing Averroes's Viewpoint on Granting the People of Reasoning (Ahl al-Burhān) the Right to Interpret the Quran Esoterically." *Religious Inquiries* 13 (1): 23–40. <https://doi.org/10.22034/ri.2024.360400.1643>.
- Banerjee, Tanmoyee. 2019. "Designing a Primary Survey-Based Research." In *Research Methodology for Social Sciences*, 1st ed., edited by Rajat Acharyya and Nandan Bhattacharya. Routledge India. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780367810344-9>.
- Bass, Leeann, and Holli A. Semetko. 2021. "Content Analysis." In *Research Methods in the Social Sciences: An A-Z of Key Concepts*, edited by Jean-Frédéric Morin, Christian Olsson, and Ece Özlem Atikcan. Oxford University Press. <https://www.oxfordpoliticstrove.com/display/10.1093/hepl/9780198850298.001.0001/hepl-9780198850298-chapter-13>.
- Baxter, J. 2009. "Content Analysis." In *International Encyclopedia of Human Geography*. Elsevier. <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-008044910-4.00415-6>.
- Benz, Alexander, John Eikelboom, Salim Yusuf, et al. 2019. "Long-Term Treatment with Apixaban of Participants Following Conclusion of Averroes." *Journal of the American College of Cardiology* 73 (9): 324. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0735-1097\(19\)30932-5](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0735-1097(19)30932-5).
- Brenet, Jean-Baptiste. 2020. "Relation as Key to God's Knowledge of Particulars in the Tahāfut al-Tahāfut and the Ḍamīma: A Cross-Talk between Averroes,

al-Ġazālī and Avicenna.” *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 30 (1): 1–26. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0957423919000109>.

Budur, Taylan. 2026. “Virtue-Based Leadership and Organizational Commitment: A Study from Al-Ghazali’s Perspective.” *International Journal of Ethics and Systems* 42 (2): 533–61. <https://doi.org/10.1108/IJOES-03-2024-0081>.

Casewit, Yousef. 2020. “Al-Ghazālī’s Virtue Ethical Theory of the Divine Names: The Theological Underpinnings of the Doctrine of Takhalluq in al-Maqṣad al-Asnā.” *Journal of Islamic Ethics* 4 (1–2): 155–200. <https://doi.org/10.1163/24685542-12340042>.

Church, Russell M. 2002. “The Effective Use of Secondary Data.” *Learning and Motivation* 33 (1): 32–45. <https://doi.org/10.1006/lmot.2001.1098>.

Connolly, Sj. 2018. “Fibrillation Atriale Apixaban: AVERROES.” *Archives Des Maladies Du Coeur et Des Vaisseaux - Pratique* 2011 (197): 34. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S1261-694X\(11\)70218-8](https://doi.org/10.1016/S1261-694X(11)70218-8).

Creswell, John W. 2013. *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches*. SAGE Publications.

Diener, Hans-Christoph, John Eikelboom, Stuart J. Connolly, et al. 2018. “Apixaban versus Aspirin in Patients with Atrial Fibrillation and Previous Stroke or Transient Ischaemic Attack: A Predefined Subgroup Analysis from AVERROES, a Randomised Trial.” *The Lancet Neurology* 11 (3): 225–31. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S1474-4422\(12\)70017-0](https://doi.org/10.1016/S1474-4422(12)70017-0).

Eikelboom, John W., Martin O’Donnell, Salim Yusuf, et al. 2019. “Rationale and Design of AVERROES: Apixaban versus Acetylsalicylic Acid to Prevent Stroke in Atrial Fibrillation Patients Who Have Failed or Are Unsuitable for Vitamin K Antagonist Treatment.” *American Heart Journal* 159 (3): 348–353. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ahj.2009.08.026>.

El-Bizri, Nader. 2020. “The Groundbreaking Physics of Averroës.” *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A* 42 (1): 210–14. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2010.11.009>.

Fajri, Muhammad. 2023. “Hilirisasi Penelitian Kepustakaan dalam Pengembangan Ilmu Keislaman.” *Bidayah: Studi Ilmu-Ilmu Keislaman* 14 (1): 56–67. <https://doi.org/10.47498/bidayah.v14i1.1403>.

Ferhat, Loumia. 2020. “Al-Ghazālī’s Heart as a Medium of Light: Illumination and the Soteriological Process.” *Journal of Islamic Ethics* 4 (1–2): 201–22. <https://doi.org/10.1163/24685542-12340050>.

- Flaker, Greg C., John Eikelboom, Stuart Connolly, Salim Yusuf, Gregory Lip, and Robert Hart. 2017. "Bleeding with Aspirin and Apixaban in Patients Unsuitable for Vitamin k Antagonist Therapy: The Averroes Study." *Journal of the American College of Cardiology* 59 (13): E572. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0735-1097\(12\)60573-7](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0735-1097(12)60573-7).
- Flowerday, Stephen, Jake Mead, and Rene Moquin. 2026. "Bound to Disclosure: An Assessment of Secondary Data Use Concerns." *International Journal of Information Management* 87 (April): 103026. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijinfomgt.2025.103026>.
- Gea, Joaquim. 2020. "Averroes, Rationalism and Systematization in Medicine." *Open Respiratory Archives* 2 (3): 102–3. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.opresp.2020.06.002>.
- Ghazali, Ahmad-Kamal, Mohd Firdaus-Raih, Asqwin Uthaya Kumar, Wei-Kang Lee, Chee-Choong Hoh, and Sheila Nathan. 2024. "Correction for Ghazali et al., "Transitioning from Soil to Host: Comparative Transcriptome Analysis Reveals the *Burkholderia Pseudomallei* Response to Different Niches."" *Microbiology Spectrum* 12 (4): e00522-24. <https://doi.org/10.1128/spectrum.00522-24>.
- Ghazālī, Al-. 2000a. *Al-Munqidh Min al-Ḍalāl (Deliverance from Error)*. Translated by R. J. McCarthy. Fons Vitae.
- Ghazālī, Al-. 2000b. *Tabāfut Al-Falāsifah*. Translated by M. E. Marmura. Brigham Young University Press.
- Hasan, Ali. 2013. "Al-Ghazali and Ibn Rushd (Averroes) on Creation and the Divine Attributes." In *Models of God and Alternative Ultimate Realities*, edited by Jeanine Diller and Asa Kasher. Springer Netherlands. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5219-1\\_13](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5219-1_13).
- Hausser, Roland. 2023. "Ontology." In *Computational Cognition*, edited by Roland Hausser. Springer Nature Switzerland. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37499-9\\_1](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37499-9_1).
- Hidayat, Nurul. 2017. "Bantahan Ibnu Rusyd Terhadap Kritik Al-Ghazālī Tentang Keqadiman Alam." *Ulumuna* 11 (2): 373–88. <https://doi.org/10.20414/ujis.v11i2.407>.
- Ibragim, Taufik. 2025. "On Ghazalian Criticism of Falsafa's Teaching about the Soul." *Vostok. Afro-Aziatskie Obschestva: Istorii i Sovremennost*, no. 2: 183. <https://doi.org/10.31696/S086919080034496-2>.
- Ibrahim, T., and N. V. Efremova. 2021. "Ibn-Rushd (Averroes). The Incoherence

of the Incoherence. Part Four.” *Minbar. Islamic Studies* 14 (2): 337–69. <https://doi.org/10.31162/2618-9569-2021-14-2-337-369>.

Ibrahim, T., and N. V. Efremova. 2022a. “*Ibn-Rushd (Averroes)*. The Incoherence of the Incoherence. Part Five.” *Minbar. Islamic Studies* 15 (3): 695–714. <https://doi.org/10.31162/2618-9569-2022-15-3-695-714>.

Ibrahim, T., and N. V. Efremova. 2022b. “On the Falsafa Concept of God’s Knowledge.” *Minbar. Islamic Studies* 15 (3): 673–94. <https://doi.org/10.31162/2618-9569-2022-15-3-673-694>.

Ibrahim, T., and N. V. Efremova. 2024. “On Averroes’ Response to al-Ghazali’s Critique of Falsafa Interpretation of Bodily Resurrection.” *Minbar. Islamic Studies* 16 (4): 816–32. <https://doi.org/10.31162/2618-9569-2023-16-4-816-832>.

Islam, Sharif. 2018. “The Ibn Rushd Syndrome: In Search of Rational Muslim.” SSRN Scholarly Paper No. 3211293. Social Science Research Network, July 10. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3211293>.

Juwaini, Juwaini, Zulfan Zulfan, Mawardi Mawardi, and Cut Siska Safira. 2024. “Al-Ghazali’s Refutations of Philosophers: Examining Tahafut al-Falasifah on Eternity, Divine Knowledge, and Resurrection.” *SINTHOP: Media Kajian Pendidikan, Agama, Sosial dan Budaya* 3 (2): 87–97. <https://doi.org/10.22373/sinthop.v3i2.6470>.

Kalisdha, A. 2023. “The Future of Library Science Research: Tools and Databases.” *International Journal for Research in Applied Science and Engineering Technology* 11 (11): 700–707. <https://doi.org/10.22214/ijraset.2023.56602>.

Kock, Ilona. 2011. “The Debate About God’s Simplicity: Reason and Spirit in The Eighth Discussion of Al-Ghazali’s Tahafut Al-Falasifa and IBN Rushd’s Tahafut At-Tahafut.” In *Reason, Spirit and the Sacral in the New Enlightenment*, edited by A. T. Tymieniecka. Springer Netherlands. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9612-8\\_11](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9612-8_11).

Kukkonen, Taneli. 2025. “Al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd on the End of the World.” *Theology and Science* 23 (3): 675–89. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14746700.2025.2514315>.

Ladyman, James. 2007. “Ontological, Epistemological, and Methodological Positions.” In *General Philosophy of Science*. Elsevier. <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-044451548-3/50008-2>.

Lip, Gregory Y. H., Tereza Lanitis, Jack Mardekian, Thitima Kongnakorn, Hemant Phatak, and Paul Dorian. 2019. “Estimating the Lifetime Clinical Benefits of

- Apixaban versus Aspirin in the Low Risk Non-Valvular Atrial Fibrillation Patients in the Us: How May Results from Averroes Help Improve Patient Care?" *Journal of the American College of Cardiology* 65 (10): A347. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0735-1097\(15\)60347-3](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0735-1097(15)60347-3).
- Lit, L. W. C. van. 2015. "An Ottoman Commentary Tradition on Ghazālī's Tahāfut al-Falāsifa. Preliminary Observations\*." *Oriens* 43 (3–4): 368–413. <https://doi.org/10.1163/18778372-04303004>.
- Logan, Marianne. 2023. "The Philosophical Approach." In *Young People's Voice in School Science*, by Marianne Logan. Springer Nature Switzerland. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46162-0\\_3](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46162-0_3).
- Lubis, Ali Akhbar Abaib Mas Rabbani. 2020. "Rethinking The Book of Tahafut Al-Falasifah: Examining Al-Ghazali's Argumentative Criticism Against the Thinking of Philosophers." *Indonesian Journal of Interdisciplinary Islamic Studies* 4 (1): 1–18. <https://doi.org/10.20885/ijis.vol4.iss1.art1>.
- Mackey, David A. 2013. "Content Analysis." In *The Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice*, 1st ed., edited by Jay S. Albanese. Wiley. <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118517383.wbecj002>.
- Marmura, Michael E. 1959. "The Logical Role of The Argument from Time in The Tahafut's Second Proof for The World's Pre-Eternity." *The Muslim World* 49 (4): 306–14. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1478-1913.1959.tb02381.x>.
- Marmura, Michael E. 1965. "Ghazali and Demonstrative Science." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 3 (2): 183–204. <https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2008.1685>.
- Marmura, Michael E. 2020. "Ghazali and Demonstrative Science." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 3 (2): 183–204. <https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2008.1685>.
- Marzuki, M. Fathin Shafly, Raina Wildan, and Syamsul Rijal. 2023. "Penelusuran Epistemologi Kekadiman Alam dalam Tahafut Al-Falasifah dan Tahafut Al-Tahafut." *Jurnal Pemikiran Islam* 3 (2): 192–216. <https://doi.org/10.22373/jpi.v3i2.22541>.
- Masykur, Zein Muchamad, and Muchamad Toif Chasani. 2025. "Confirmation Bias and the Pursuit of Truth in Al-Ghazali's 'Tahafut al-Falasifah': A Critical Reflection." *Asian Journal of Philosophy and Religion* 4 (1): 1–16. <https://doi.org/10.55927/ajpr.v4i1.14321>.
- Moad, Edward Omar. 2015. "Al-Ghazali's Position on the 'Second Proof' of the 'Philosophers' for the Eternity of the World, in the First Discussion of

- the Incoherence of the Philosophers.” *Sophia* 54 (4): 429–41. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-014-0458-5>.
- Nasri, Ulyan. 2019a. *Ngaji Bareng Filosof: Sebuah Pengantar Filsafat Umum*. CV. Al-Haramain Lombok.
- Nasri, Ulyan. 2019b. *Philosophy Is Mother of Science: Pengantar Filsafat*. CV. Al-Haramain Lombok.
- Nasri, Ulyan. 2023. *Philosophy of Education*. CV. Al-Haramain Lombok.
- Neuendorf, Kimberly A., and Anup Kumar. 2016. “Content Analysis.” In *The International Encyclopedia of Political Communication*, 1st ed., edited by Gianpietro Mazzoleni. Wiley. <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118541555.wbiepc065>.
- Nofal, Nabil. 1993. “Al-Ghazālī: A. D. 1058–1111; A. H. 450–505.” *Prospects* 23 (3–4): 519–38. <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02195133>.
- O’Donnell, Martin J., John W. Eikelboom, Salim Yusuf, et al. 2019. “Effect of Apixaban on Brain Infarction and Microbleeds: AVERROES-MRI Assessment Study.” *American Heart Journal* 178 (August): 145–50. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ahj.2016.03.019>.
- Prayitno, Arief. 2026. “Defense Business Administration Optimization: A Secondary Data Approach with Dynamic Models.” *Social Sciences & Humanities Open* 13 (June): 102317. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssaho.2025.102317>.
- Price, Linda L. 2010. “Content Analysis.” In *Wiley International Encyclopedia of Marketing*, 1st ed., edited by Jagdish Sheth and Naresh Malhotra. Wiley. <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444316568.wiem02062>.
- Rochman, Sue. 2020. “Marriage and Sexuality in Islam: A Translation of Al-Ghazālī’s Book on the Etiquette of Marriage from the *Ihya’*.” *Women’s Studies International Forum* 9 (5–6): 575. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0277-5395\(86\)90050-6](https://doi.org/10.1016/0277-5395(86)90050-6).
- Romero-Carazas, Rafael. 2024. “Filosofía de la Ciencia y la Investigación.” *Revista: Mundo Científico Internaciona* 8: 81–89.
- Rozi, Fathur. 2020. “Kritik Al-Ghazali Terhadap Pemikiran Para Filosof.” *PUTIH: Jurnal Pengetahuan Tentang Ilmu dan Hikmah* 5 (1): 1–14. <https://doi.org/10.51498/putih.v5i1.59>.
- Rushd, Ibn. 2001. *Faṣl Al-Maqāl (The Decisive Treatise), in Averroes on the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy*. G. F. Hourani, Trans. Luzac.

- Saleh, Sujiat Zubaidi. 2009. "Kritik Ibn Rusyd Terhadap Pandangan Para Filsuf Tentang Ketuhanan." *TSAQAFAH* 5 (1): 97–117. <https://doi.org/10.21111/tsaqafah.v5i1.149>.
- Shamsudheen, Shinaj Valangattil, Saiful Azhar Rosly, and Syed Abdul Hamid Aljunid. 2021. "Drawing Ethical Mentation in Islamic Banks; Addressing Operational Lines Heterogeneity with Special Reference to Al-Ghazali's Ethical Philosophy." *International Journal of Ethics and Systems* 37 (4): 559–80. <https://doi.org/10.1108/IJOES-12-2020-0205>.
- Stark, Robert J., and Joanna Ciesielska. 2019. "Vertebral Infection in a Male Individual Buried in the Monastic Cemetery (Cemetery 2) at Ghazali (ca. 670–1270 CE), Northern Sudan." *International Journal of Paleopathology* 24 (March): 34–40. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpp.2018.08.011>.
- Steleżuk, Andrzej, and Marek Wolanin. 2023. "Primary Research Using Quantitative Methods in Social Sciences." *Zeszyty Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Technicznej w Katowicach* 16 (June): 145–56. <https://doi.org/10.54264/0069>.
- Surajiyo, Surajiyo. 2022. "Al-Ghazali's Responsibility and Ibnu Rusyd's Defense against Three Questions of Metaphysics of Philosophers." *Al-Risalah* 13 (1): 118–31. <https://doi.org/10.34005/alrisalah.v13i1.1729>.
- Taufiqurrahman, Taufiqurrahman, and Radea Y. A. Hambali. 2021. "Ibn Rushd's Response to Ibn Sina and Al-Ghazali's Philosophical Thoughts on Cosmology." *HTS Teologiese Studies / Theological Studies* 77 (4): 1–8. <https://doi.org/10.4102/hts.v77i4.6362>.
- Tunison, Scott. 2023. "Content Analysis." In *Varieties of Qualitative Research Methods*, edited by Janet Mola Okoko, Scott Tunison, and Keith D. Walker. Springer Texts in Education. Springer International Publishing. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-04394-9\\_14](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-04394-9_14).
- Ugli, Bekpulatov Ulugbek Rakhmatulla. 2025. "Socio-Philosophical Analysis of Symmetry and Asymmetry." *Journal of Multidisciplinary Academic and Practice Studies* 3 (3): 603–11. <https://doi.org/10.35912/jomaps.v3i3.3167>.
- White, Marilyn Domas, and Emily E. Marsh. 2006. "Content Analysis: A Flexible Methodology." *Library Trends* 55 (1): 22–45. <https://doi.org/10.1353/lib.2006.0053>.
- Wulakada, Al Ghozali Hide. 2025. "Philosophical Approach in Legal Research." *Journal of Public Representative and Society Provision* 5 (3): 545–53. <https://doi.org/10.55885/jprsp.v5i3.606>.
- Yasmin, Aulia Naurah, Isra Nur Fadilah, and Fitri Mutia. 2024. "Reference Services

in the Library: Literature Review.” *Pedagogi: Jurnal Ilmu Pendidikan* 24 (2): 150–58. <https://doi.org/10.24036/pedagogi.v24i2.2051>.