THE REFUTATION OF AL-GHAZĀLĪ AND THE DEFENCE OF IBN RUSHD AGAINST THE THREE METAPHYSICAL PROBLEMS OF THE PHILOSOPHERS

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Abstract: *Amid the many complex and radical philosophical debates, one of the most fascinating and widely discussed issues among scholars and philosophy enthusiasts is the intellectual confrontation between al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd. The most prominent philosophical dispute between the two revolves around three major metaphysical problems: the eternity of the world, God's knowledge of particular events, and the denial of bodily resurrection. Both thinkers offer different interpretations of Qur'anic texts through a philosophical lens. Interestingly, although both belong to the same Islamic intellectual tradition, their opposing arguments have generated deep and enduring controversy. This study employs a descriptive research method, specifically a library-based approach, focusing on literature that discusses the philosophical thoughts of al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd. Within this method, processes of classification, data analysis, and conclusion drawing are carried out. Accordingly, the research also utilizes comparative, analytical, and synthetic methods to obtain a comprehensive understanding of their metaphysical perspectives. As a result, the debate between the two continues to be passed down and colors the study of Islamic philosophy, including having consequences in the context of philosophical themes.*

Keywords: *Al-Ghazālī, Ibn Rushd, Metaphysics.*

Abstrak: Di tengah kompleksitas dan radikalisme berbagai perdebatan filsafat, salah satu isu yang paling menarik dan luas dibahas di kalangan akademisi serta pengkaji filsafat adalah konfrontasi intelektual antara al-Ghazālī dan Ibn Rushd. Perselisihan filsafat yang paling menonjol di antara keduanya berkaitan dengan tiga permasalahan metafisika utama, yaitu: keabadian dunia, pengetahuan Tuhan terhadap peristiwa-peristiwa khusus, serta penolakan terhadap kebangkitan jasmani. Kedua pemikir tersebut menawarkan interpretasi yang berbeda terhadap teks-teks Al-Qur'an melalui pendekatan filsafat. Menariknya, meskipun keduanya lahir dari tradisi intelektual Islam

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yang sama, argumentasi mereka yang berlawanan telah menimbulkan kontroversi yang mendalam dan bertahan lama. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode deskriptif dengan pendekatan studi pustaka, yang menitikberatkan pada telaah literatur mengenai pemikiran filsafat al-Ghazālī dan Ibn Rushd. Dalam kerangka metode ini, dilakukan proses klasifikasi, analisis data, dan penarikan kesimpulan secara sistematis. Selain itu, penelitian ini memanfaatkan metode komparatif, analitis, dan sintesis untuk memperoleh pemahaman yang menyeluruh mengenai perspektif metafisika yang dikemukakan oleh kedua pemikir tersebut. Hasilnya, perdebatan keduanya terus terwariskan dan mewarnai kajian filsafat Islam termasuk memiliki konsekuensi dalam konteks tema-tema filsafat.

Kata-kata Kunci: *Al-Ghazālī, Ibn Rushd, Metafisika.*

Introduction

Al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd have been known as strong Muslim figures. Al-Ghazālī was a figure from an impecunious family. In the beginning, he was an expert in *fiqh*. Because of it, he was appointed as the last Wazir of the Saljuq and became a Professor at the Nizamiyah University. Though he has written "*al-Mustaṣfā min 'Ilm al-Uṣūl*", he later made a move to deepen the science of kalam. Although he has written "*al-Iqtiṣād fī al-I'tiqād*" (Making Moderate Belief in God) but he was dissatisfied, and he then deepened his mysticism. Here, he has time to write "*al-Qisṭās al-Mustaqīm*" (Diametrical Sword). Disappointment befalls him to return to him, later; then enter philosophy, nature, and have time to write "*Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*" (Perverting of Philosophy). In the book "*Tahāfut al-Falāsifah,*" this is his philosophical opinion. Specifically, there are three metaphysical problems that are according to him, are quite contrary to Islamic teaching. The three of those metaphysical problems are: 1. The Earlier creation of nature. 2. God does not know about small events or problems. 3. Denial to corporeal evocation (Hanafi 1969, 157).

The different backgrounds between al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd caused some different understandings of the three metaphysical problems of metaphysics. In one party, al-Ghazālī assumed that all philosophers who had a notion and trusted those metaphysical problems were considered infidels. On the other hand, the Dissimilar party Ibn Rushd's opinion that the infidel law, which has been knocked down by al-Ghazālī to the philosophers was not right. This problem was done and over with by Iqbal, who both opposed Islam and Al-Qur'an. The Reason that has been proposed by Iqbal was that al-Ghazālī constituted his opinion on skeptical philosophy. While Ibn Rushd is credited with maintaining Greek philosophy in revolutionizing the intellectual of Islam and assuming of as it is not only opposing against the values of Al-Qur'an, but also opposing against personal targets and values of human beings (Iqbal 1982, 6).

Sir Muhammad Iqbal, in his seminal work *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, revisited this classic debate from a modern

philosophical standpoint. He considered both Al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd as representing two opposing yet complementary tendencies in Islamic intellectual history. For Iqbal, the conflict was not merely theological but epistemological: it reflected the tension between intuition and reason, between spiritual experience and intellectual rationalism (Iqbal 1982, 3–7).

Iqbal acknowledged Al-Ghazālī's monumental contribution in revitalizing Islamic spirituality through his critical examination of Greek philosophy and his turn toward mysticism. However, Iqbal also argued that Al-Ghazālī's method, though intellectually powerful, ultimately leaned toward skepticism (*shakk*), which paralyzed the creative spirit of philosophical inquiry in the Muslim world. According to Iqbal, Al-Ghazālī's critique in *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* succeeded in exposing the logical weaknesses of peripatetic philosophy but unintentionally led to the decline of rational speculation and the rise of excessive dogmatism within later Islamic thought (Iqbal 1982, 85–89).

On the other hand, Iqbal viewed Ibn Rushd as the representative of the rationalist revival in Islam, seeking to reconcile Greek logical methods with Qur'anic rationality. Ibn Rushd, through his *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut*, defended reason as a divine gift that allows human beings to comprehend the structure of creation and thereby affirm God's wisdom. Iqbal appreciated this endeavor, yet he also criticized Ibn Rushd for over-intellectualizing religion by reducing metaphysical realities to mere philosophical abstractions. For Iqbal, Ibn Rushd's Aristotelianism, though valuable in reviving critical thought, could not adequately account for the dynamic and experiential aspects of faith that lie at the heart of Islam (Iqbal 1982, 112–16).

Thus, Iqbal regarded both thinkers as partially correct and partially deficient. Al-Ghazālī was right in emphasizing the limits of rational knowledge and the necessity of spiritual intuition (*kashf*), but his skepticism curtailed the vitality of reason. Conversely, Ibn Rushd was right in affirming the legitimacy of reason, yet his reliance on Aristotelian categories failed to capture the creative and evolutionary character of reality that the Qur'an envisions. As Iqbal famously wrote, *"The spirit of the Qur'an is essentially anti-classical. It is the spirit of movement, of progression, of ceaseless creation"* (Iqbal 1982, 143).

For Iqbal, the resolution of this historic tension lay not in choosing between Al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd but in synthesizing their insights. He proposed a reconstruction of Islamic philosophy that integrates the mystical intuition of Al-Ghazālī with the critical rationalism of Ibn Rushd, all within a dynamic conception of reality inspired by modern scientific and philosophical developments. This synthesis, in Iqbal's view, was the only way to revive the intellectual independence of the Muslim world and to restore Islam's original spirit of creative reasoning (*ijtihād*) (Iqbal

1982, 179–82).

In summary, Iqbal's interpretation of the al-Ghazālī–Ibn Rushd debate underscores a profound philosophical message: that faith and reason are not antagonistic but dialectically complementary. The decline of Islamic civilization, he argued, was due not to the failure of either mysticism or philosophy, but to the inability to maintain a creative tension between the two. Hence, for Iqbal, the future of Islamic thought depends on overcoming this dichotomy—by reuniting the spiritual intuition of al-Ghazālī with the rational inquiry of Ibn Rushd into a living synthesis capable of engaging with the modern world.

The research employs a descriptive qualitative method with a literary approach, focusing primarily on literature that discusses the philosophical thoughts of al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd. This method involves several interrelated stages, including data collection, classification, analysis, synthesis, and conclusion drawing.

In the data collection stage, relevant primary and secondary sources are gathered, such as philosophical texts, commentaries, and scholarly interpretations that explain the metaphysical views of both thinkers. The classification stage involves organizing these materials according to specific themes such as ontology, epistemology, and theology to ensure conceptual clarity.

The analytical process is conducted through a comparative analysis, which aims to identify the similarities and differences between the thoughts of al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd. The process of analysis entails a critical examination and separation of conceptual elements, where each philosopher's ideas are systematically deconstructed to understand their underlying assumptions, arguments, and logical structures. For instance, al-Ghazālī's metaphysical notions are examined independently to identify their key principles and internal coherence.

Following this, the synthetic process integrates these fragmented or dispersed ideas into a coherent conceptual framework. Synthesis in this research means reconstructing various aspects of al-Ghazālī's and Ibn Rushd's metaphysical thought to develop a new interpretative understanding. This stage involves connecting interrelated ideas and bridging conceptual gaps to reveal how both thinkers contribute to the broader discourse of Islamic philosophy.

Finally, the comparative synthesis provides a comprehensive understanding that not only contrasts the metaphysical perspectives of al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd but also uncovers the philosophical implications of their dialogue for contemporary thought. Through these systematic steps of analysis and synthesis, the study aims to achieve a deeper and more integrated comprehension of classical Islamic metaphysical traditions. Contemporary scholarship continues to engage with the Al-Ghazālī–Ibn Rushd controversy as a central issue in the study of Islamic

philosophy. Hakim analyzes Ibn Rushd's critique of al-Ghazālī, focusing on three metaphysical topics—eternity, divine knowledge, and bodily resurrection—and argues that these debates shaped the foundations of Andalusian rationalism (Hakim 2021, 145–63). Marzuki, Wildan, and Rijal reveal that this controversy embodies a clash between *bayānī* (textual) and *burhānī* (rational) epistemologies in classical Islam. (Marzuki, Wildan, and Rijal 2023, 192–216).

Kadir provides a comparative theological analysis of al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd, emphasizing their differing conceptions of justice and intellectual freedom in the context of modern Islamic thought (Kadir 2024, 102-15. Furthermore, Yono explores the relevance of their epistemological principles to contemporary Islamic education, arguing that the synthesis between faith and reason remains a pressing issue for Muslim intellectual discourse today (Yono 2025, 55–70).

These studies demonstrate that the al-Ghazālī–Ibn Rushd debate is not merely of historical importance but also of philosophical and pedagogical significance. Nevertheless, much of the existing research remains descriptive. The present study contributes by reexamining the notion of *takfīr* (accusation of unbelief) in *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* and Ibn Rushd's response in *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut*, seeking to interpret how rationality and faith continue to be negotiated within the framework of contemporary Islamic philosophy.

The major themes of the debate between al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd include several key issues:

a. Differences in method—the literature highlights a fundamental methodological divergence: Al-Ghazālī prioritizes scriptural hermeneutics and emphasizes piety along with skepticism toward rational claims that exceed revelation; Ibn Rushd, by contrast, stresses the internal coherence of rational philosophy (Tedy 2016, 11–20).

b. Interpretation of *qadīm*—many studies point out that their disagreement is not merely about terminology, but about ontological categories (*qadīm* as a "degree of existence" versus "temporal priority"). This creates nuance in understanding whether the philosophers' claims imply a denial of the Creator's role (Yamani 2023, 16–21).

c. The issue of God's knowledge of particulars (*juz'iyyāt*)—the literature shows continued interpretive efforts: several scholars argue that Ibn Rushd does not deny God's knowledge but proposes a distinction between God's eternal knowledge and His knowledge of newly occurring events. Al-Ghazālī worries that such differentiation undermines the perfection of God's attributes (Yamani 2023, 16–21).

d. Bodily resurrection — Indonesian scholarship often emphasizes

that differing interpretations (literal vs. allegorical/philosophically problematic) make this issue prone to being politicized into accusations of heresy. Several articles recommend a cautious reading to prevent theological polarization (Yamani 2023, 16–21).

Metaphysics Congeniality

The word metaphysics comes from the Greek Meta, meaning besides, after, or returning, and physics means the real nature. Its intention of science investigates what is to investigate the essence of the opposite of this real nature. Its problem is investigating the essence of everything from real nature, infinitely, what can be under arrest by just the five senses (Bakry 1971, 45). Van Peursen defined that metaphysics is a part of philosophy, sharing giving all mind to its question, hitting the inmost root, constituting all of us (Peursen 1998).

In the Middle Ages, in the epoch of al-Ghazālī's life, one met only the metaphysical name. By then, teaching hit its existing, and the discussion in philosophy hit God has been loaded in science, named metaphysics. By then, the people's opinion that the second kind of problem is inseparable from the other, dissimilar.

Metaphysics is a branch of philosophy that investigates the most fundamental nature of reality, particularly concerning what "truly exists" beyond or independent of sensory experience. In scholarly discussions, metaphysics is described as a discipline that examines the structure of reality along with the first principles of existence, addressing questions such as "What is being?" "Is reality composed of one or many entities?", and "How are essence and substance related to one another?" (Putra and Hidayat 2017, 1–6).

Mustansyir, in his analysis of metaphysical schools of thought, asserts that metaphysics (or ontology) constitutes the central point of philosophy because it discusses being in all its dimensions (Mustansyir 1997, 1–14). Furthermore, according to Putra and Hidayat in their article on metaphysical issues in science, metaphysics is not merely speculative; rather, it is substantial in providing theoretical foundations for scientific assumptions, for example, through reflections on fundamental truths that cannot be resolved by scientific paradigms alone (Putra and Hidayat 2017, 1–6).

In relation to science and knowledge, metaphysics is not viewed merely as abstract speculation but also as an ontological groundwork that provides basic assumptions for constructing scientific theories—such as the status of entities, categories, causes, and the structure of causality in nature. Moreover, metaphysical inquiry often intersects with discussions on time, eternity, substance, essence, and the deepest structure of reality, as represented within Islamic intellectual traditions as well as classical

and modern philosophical thought (Oktarika 2023, 63–66).

In its disciplinary development, contemporary methodological debates position metaphysics at the crossroads between "armchair" approaches—namely, a priori reasoning based on conceptual argumentation—and approaches that demand more formal justification, such as the use of mathematical logic or formal theory (Strollo 2018, 7–20). Consequently, several scholars propose that metaphysics may be understood as a form of logical inquiry into the structure of reality, that is, a conceptual analysis organized rigorously and systematically (Strollo 2018, 7–20). On the other hand, contemporary metaphysical research in international journals also demonstrates highly specific and technical directions of inquiry, for instance concerning the ontological structure of kinds, the biological nature of essences, or the use of terminology to explain the relationship between species and categories of being (Miller 2021, 18–31).

Biography of al-Ghazālī and the Background of al-Ghazālī's Opinions

As the greatest intellectual Muslim in history, al-Ghazālī had a lot of erudite masterpieces. Sulaymān Dunyā has tried to conclude the entire/composition of al-Ghazālī, which was divided into four areas of science:

1. The science of *kalām* (theology) addresses the problem of the infinite and belief in God and others.
2. Science of common basics (*'aqliyyah*), its target and the challenge.
3. Stream of Bāṭinī Shi'ite group.
4. Sophism (metaphysics) (Ahmad 1997, 61).

Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Ghazālī was born in 450 AH / 1058–1059 CE in the city of Ṭūs (Khurasan, Persia) and passed away on 14 Jumada al-Akhirah 505 AH (around 1 December 1111 CE) in the same city (Sulistiani, Furqon, and Arifin 2024, 50).

Al-Ghazālī was raised in a modest family. His father, a wool spinner who earned his living through manual labor, was known for his piety (Sulistiani, Furqon, and Arifin 2024, 50). From an early age, Al-Ghazālī demonstrated a deep interest in knowledge. He began his basic education in his hometown, then continued his studies in Nishapur—one of the major centers of Islamic scholarship at the time—where he studied under renowned teachers such as al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī (Artika et al. 2023, 31–32).

Al-Ghazālī's intellectual journey unfolded through several phases. In the early years of his career, he taught and authored works in jurisprudence and theology. He later experienced a spiritual crisis that led him to temporarily withdraw from public life and undertake a period of spiritual seclusion (*khulwah*) (Syafril 2017, 184). After this period, he resumed writing and produced some of his most significant works, including *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn*, which profoundly shaped the Islamic theological and Sufi

traditions (Artika et al. 2023, 31–32).

Al-Ghazālī's legacy is not only theoretical but also practical. In Islamic education, his thought has had a lasting influence: he places the heart (*qalb*) at the center of human formation and emphasizes that true education touches not only the intellectual dimension but also spiritual and moral aspects. This influence, as explored in historical Islamic literature, continued throughout the 11th century and beyond in the fields of education, theology, and Sufism (Hamzah et al. 2024, 115–30).

At the time of al-Ghazālī's era, the growth of theology, philosophy, and Bāṭinīyyah was very fast. In this context, al-Ghazālī to learn the three problems that were arising. Al-Ghazālī, who has been since childhood, has had a critical mind. In learning theology, philosophy, and Bāṭinīyyah gave an analysis which critical enough. In al-Ghazālī's observation, the philosophy of seeing is not in line with theology. The Doubt of al-Ghazālī generated stress among the Muslim philosophers of Islam on one party, and by al-Ghazālī on the other side, the stress culminated in a rising when the masterpiece and monumental book of al-Ghazālī's book entitled *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*.

Al-Ghazālī has written *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* to deny twenty mistakes of the Muslim philosophers, therewith the predecessors who understand theistic philosophy in Greek. The philosophers who have been denied by al-Ghazālī were divisible into three groups:

1. Materialistic Philosophers (*Dahriyyūn*). They are atheists denying the existence of Allah and formulate the experienced eternity and the experienced creation by itself.
2. Naturalist Deistic Philosophers (*Ṭabī'iyyūn*). They conduct various research in the universe, and everything is amazing in the fauna and flora.
3. Theist Philosophers (*Ilāhiyyūn*). They are Greek philosophers, like Sokrates, Plato, and Aristoteles. They are so Effective in such a way that they prove the mistakes of materialistic and naturalistic philosophers so that the other party does not have time to do the same matter (Ghazālī 1986, xv–xvi).

In the field of philosophy, especially concerning science, al-Ghazālī proposed six fields. The six areas of the investigation are: mathematics, logic, physics, metaphysics, political philosophy, and ethics (Ghazālī 1986, xv–xvi). Thereby, al-Ghazālī owned an area of interdisciplinary science, but the most typical opinion of al-Ghazālī tends towards the character of Sufism.

Al-Ghazālī (450–505 AH/±1058–1111 CE) lived within a highly dynamic social, intellectual, and theological context that profoundly shaped the trajectory of his thought (Assyabani 2020, 243–60). From an epistemological standpoint, al-Ghazālī's intellectual background was

shaped by the religious and political conditions of his time: the rapid development of theological schools (*kalām*), philosophy, and Sufism gave rise to intense ideological competition.

On the socio-political front, the Islamic world at the time was beset by tensions: the Abbasid caliphate was in decline, while various groups—such as the Bāṭinīyyah (an esoteric Shī'i sect) and thinkers influenced by Greek philosophical traditions—exerted strong influence among Muslim intellectuals (Badriyah 2021, 28) This situation prompted al-Ghazālī to adopt a critical stance toward philosophy, which he believed had the potential to deviate from Islamic revelation and orthodox tradition (Muliati 2016, 77–86).

In addition, the spiritual background of al-Ghazālī is equally essential in understanding his thought. Biographical and Sufi studies indicate that he was deeply influenced by spiritual experience and Sufi practices (Syafril 2017, 5). In his works—particularly *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn*—al-Ghazālī synthesizes moral, intellectual, and spiritual dimensions, emphasizing the importance of knowledge that is not merely theoretical, but also practical and transformative for the soul (Kusuma and Rahmadani 2023, 18).

In the realm of philosophy, al-Ghazālī occupies the position of a mediator: although he critiques philosophy, especially in *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*, contemporary scholarship (including studies within the framework of philosophical naturalization) shows that he did not reject philosophy in its entirety. Rather, he reframed it within the boundaries of traditional Islamic theology. Thus, the foundation of his intellectual background is not a complete rejection, but an attempt to reconcile reason, revelation, and spiritual experience.

Between al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rusyd in Three Metaphysical Problems

In the book of *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*, al-Ghazālī mentioned twenty problems, where he opposed to ossifying founding of philosophers or showed not sturdy the reasons and opinions of the philosophers. From the twenty problems, three problems in metaphysics disagreed with the beliefs of Islam, and one who trusts the three problems assumed by God lied about the prophets, so that to al-Ghazālī, all philosophers who had and believed the opinions like that were punished as infidels. The three problems are: 1) The earlier world existence, 2) Allah does not know any small events and problems. 3) Denial of corporeal evocation (Hanafi 1969, 157). The Reasons of all philosophers about the three metaphysical problems are:

1. The Earliest Existence of the World

What such by earlier is that there has been so since the beginning, so it is not an early time. Al-Ghazālī highlighted that the philosophers say that this nature is earlier. The earlier of God for nature was equal to the earlier

al-'illah li-l-ma'lūl (cause for effect), that is, from the facet of existence and level, not from the epoch facet (Hanafi 1969, 157).

There are three reasons from the philosophers to say that nature is earlier; they are:

a. If it's said that nature exists newly, went out from God, which early, it means that which came earlier (God) has been there, but the nature does not exist yet. After "at the time" (X time) came, hence shake hands to become to exist. So, to raise the question of why the newly arisen (existence) of "at the time"? If told that God originally did not command to perform nature, but later; then in commanded, then why did that power arise newly "at the time"? That problem is only finished if it is said that nature exists earlier in its existence.

b. God is earlier than nature, not from the facet of epoch but from the facet of the substance, like in advance of the movement of somebody for the motion of his shadow, its meaning is equal to the epoch facet. If that what was desired by God in advance from nature and period so before the existence of period from of epoch hence before there are epoch of when nature exist, have there are epoch which there is no it back part and this resistance, because if there is boundary at one of his back part, hence the boundary must be also at the end of the other. Then two of those reasons are not possible that the existence of nature is new.

c. Every new one is not possible to be quit of the object, and the object itself is not new. The new one is only from the nature of and the object getting at the object. The nature is "possible exist". The characteristic cannot be self-supporting, but needs the others, a dissimilar case in its place. Another is material. Characters and change can become an object, but that object exists to accommodate the nature of and the change. Thereby, nature has existed before existing (Gazalba 1973, 333–35).

2. The Knowledge of God Towards Small Events

According to al-Ghazālī, that faction of Philosophers has an opinion that God does not know small things and events, except by common sense. The Reason of the Philosophers is that the new ones with all their events are always changeable, while the knowledge always follows to be known, or, with another word, the change of case known to cause the change of knowledge. If this science change that is from known becoming unknown, or on the contrary, it means that God is changeable, while the change of God's existence is vitamin not possible to happen impossible (Ahmadi 1982, 176–77).

3. Corporeal Evocation

Al-Ghazālī's opinion that, according to the evaluation of Philosophers from the facet of the experienced mind of the hereafter, spirituality is nature non-material nature (materialism), because the case of spirituality is higher than its value. In consequence, according to them, the mind does not surprise the existence of corporeal evocation.

According to the spiritual atmosphere, hence evocation in the hereafter wait to have the character of just spirits. Become bodily evocation, meaning our body will be reinstated, needn't happen. In proposing the reasons, they expressed the return of the body at the three possible of:

a. That human being consisted of body and life, as those which told by some of Moslem of Kalam scholars, the soul is self-supporting and arranges the body; there is no existence. The definition of dying is the breaking of life, namely, God shall no longer create life, and therefore, there living or no, nor the body. So, the meaning of evocation is that God brings back the body there, not because of death to existing, and brings back its life there. In other words, the body of a human being, after becoming collected and reorganized according to the form of a human being, and given life. First Possibility of this cannot be agreed because congeniality "making" returning, making like what has been, non-making what has there he/she himself, cause of what has here, will not become to exist to return.

b. If said that the soul of a human being remains to exist in the hereafter, but the body (which happened in this world), will be reinstated later with its legs and hands themselves compactly. The possibility of this second is not justifiable, because legs and hands hereafter die separated or eaten by caterpillar or birds, or become vapor, etc., meaning it is difficult to reassemble all the shares. If told gathering of is parts of the can be happened, because God's power is not limited, hence arises the question how the things of with one who eats others' flesh, meaning the body of its (thing) one, but the human being is two. In this state, it is not possible to bring back two souls to one object.

c. If told that the soul of a human being is brought back to the body, either body with its members, that which from the beginning, or with another dissimilar body at all. Become, which is brought back [by] [is] [his/its] human being, body cause (insignificant things), the human being is referred to as human being because its soul, not because of the object. This matter is agreed, because that object is limited by the number of medium souls, apart from the body is not limited, and therefore falls short. If this mind is accepted to mean to acknowledge soul transmigration, that is soul of a human being

hereafter to get out of a body that will return to another; a dissimilar body, and from here to another; a dissimilar body again, so on (Ahmadi 1982, 179–81).

The Answers of al-Ghazālī to the Three Metaphysical Problems

1. The Earliest of the Universe

Caused by three reasons from the philosophers to maintain that nature existed earlier, hence their answer is also three, they are:

a. Al-Ghazālī has a notion that what is its objection if said that by his *irādat* (God will), who earlier existed wants to exist the nature when realizing. If arising question arises that such a by God, which that like our intention to perform something, then the deed cannot possibly be late, except caused by a barrier. While God as who performs making, has completed its condition and there are no things that require waiting anymore, but its deed is lost time also. Al-Ghazālī answers that the question is not stronger than their words (the philosophers), who believed in the newness of nature because of the desire that is earlier than one. Raising the question again, the value of all time in its linkage with desire is equal, but why the time selected to realize nature, why is time not before or after?

b. Al-Ghazālī has replied that the meaning of God's desire is enabling one to differentiate something from others. There is an Absolute desire at Allah, that can choose a certain time and no other; a dissimilar time without being asked by the cause, because the cause is His desire too. If still be asked, also, meaning God's desire is limited, it is not absolute. While God's desire is free.

c. To the second reason, God is in advance of nature, and the epoch means God has been alone, exists, while nature does not yet exist. If that nature is earlier, it means that Allah has been with the nature. In the situation, the first can be conceived as the existence of a single substance, that is, Allah. In a second statement, it can be assumed that there are two substances: Allah and Nature. So, it's become necessary to conceive that there is a third existence, that is, epoch. And surely if such with epoch is a moving object (nature), meaning that before there are things of the object, of course, there is an epoch yet.

d. To the third reason, the nature of "possible" is the mind's job. Something that is estimated by a mind to exist, and which is not impossible referred to as "a case which is possible". What is referred to as impossible "impossible case". If that can be estimated by an inexistence referred to as "case which is obliged to", that is surely and for-

ever, there is. The three cases are a job of the mind which does not need an existing separate outside mind, to earn the nature (Gazalba 1973, 179–81).

2. The Knowledge of God of Small Problems and Events

Al-Ghazālī argues that the philosophers have a notion that God does not know small events. According to al-Ghazālī, knowledge is additional, or linked with substance, which means that it differs from the essence. The Opinion of philosophers saying that the nature of God is also His essence means there will be no dissociation between both, or they do not know an additional term, such as those which are recognized by al-Ghazālī. According to al-Ghazālī, if it happened by change of the addition, hence God's essence remains in a state of its ordinary, as also if there is a standee on our right, later, then he makes a move to our left side, hence changing in fact is him, non us (Hanafi 1969, 162–63).

3. Corporeal Evocation

Al-Ghazālī has said that if the soul of a human being remains to exist here, after dying (leaving with body), because it represents a self-supporting substance. The foundation is not at variance with Syara, even shown as those who are mentioned in Q.S. Āli 'Imrān [3]: 169, whose meaning: "*Thou don't assume that those who were killed on the street of that Allah die, even they that live beside it's the infinite, getting enjoyment and happiness*" (Hanafi 1969, 165).

In the first place, al-Ghazālī confessed that the body will awaken again, that is, by way of the soul brought back to the first body or the other; dissimilar body or even substance of body newly even if. But the transfer of the soul from one body to another, a dissimilar body, is not agreed upon by al-Ghazālī.

From the three problems of the above metaphysics, at last, al-Ghazālī has a notion that all philosophers who have a notion like that as infidels. That infidel is loaded in the chapter of the conclusion of the book of *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah al-Ghazālī.*

Ibnu Rusyd's Act of Caring for the Attack of al-Ghazālī

Al-Ghazālī has given one accusation to all philosophers who have an idea and trust the three metaphysical problems, assumed as infidels. While Ibnu Rusyd has advocated it since the attack of al-Ghazālī with his book "*Tahāfut al-Tahāfut*". His protest and opinion on the accusation of al-Ghazālī shall be as follows:

1. The Earliest Natural Existence

Ibnu Rusyd tried to hold views that nature is earlier as this opinion Aristotle's opinion, and its essence does not oppose the religious

teachings. According to Ibnu Rusyd, on one side, this world is new, cause its existence requires the cause of the outside, namely God, as the first cause. But from another side, this nature is earlier, because its existence is not preceded by no and is also preceded by epoch, its existence because of the happening of this nature, non "*creatio ex nihilo*" (levying from no), but its substances have been made available (Ishak 1980, 52).

And even has been told by Ibnu Rusyd that the sentence of Al-Qur'an express nature made by is not from no, but from something that there have, such as those which contained in the Holy Qur'an of hood, at seventh verse which its meaning: "*And He it is Who created the heavens and the earth in six Days -and His Throne was upon the water -that He might try you, which of you is best in conduct. Yet if thou (O Muhammad) sayest: Lo! ye will be raised again after death! Those who disbelieve will surely say: This is naughty but mere magic* (Q.S. Hūd [11]: 7).

This sentence, according to the meaningful Ibnu Rusyd, is that before the existence of the earth and the roof, there existed others; that exists water, which is above it, there is God's power crown. Before the earth and skies were created, they had irrigated and the crown (Nasution 1973, 44).

The final decision taken by Ibnu Rusyd is that the accusation of al-Ghazālī that all philosophers as infidels because they hold the notion that the universe is earlier, does not at all have occasion to. Ibnu Rusyd has seen that this different idea is caused by its difference between the clan theologian and the philosophers' clan in interpreting "realizing" and "*qadīm*". For the clan theolog, "realizing" meaningful "realizing from no", medium for that clan philosopher's word has meaning "realizing which do not begin and do not end". For the clan theolog word "*qadīm*" means to extend something that has without cause. Medium for the clan of philosophers "*qadīm*" meaningfully deceive only "extant something without cause" but may also mean "extant something that because", equally even also he is caused by him may have the character of "*qadīm*", that is, don't have a start in the form of its (Nasution 1973, 46).

2. Knowledge of God to Small Problems and Events

Al-Ghazālī has alleged that all the philosophers have a notion that God's knowledge does not cover small things, namely, God only knows just big things marginally and does not know small things, and surely clearly. For this accusation, Ibn Rushd said in disagreement, even expressed that al-Ghazālī cannot comprehend real correctly comprehend the opinions of all philosophers. According to Ibn Rushd, Knowledge of Allah is not like human knowledge; knowledge of Allah has become the cause of the happening of this universe. So that knowledge of Allah is wellborn. Because of his earlier disposition. It means that he knew everything before the event happened. But human beings' knowledge only comes after the happening of something. The object of human beings' knowledge

depends on events that have happened.

On that account, the knowledge of Allah becomes an occurrence cause since the wellborn will not change and surely increases with new events. Cause altogether have been known previously. So, the knowledge of Allah does not know unimportant things, and God's knowledge of Allah is not based on the objects. Therefore, it does not increase because the object's occurrence in this environment will not exist while this nature exists (Ishak 1980, 53–54).

3.   Corporeal Evocation

Al-Ghazālī has given punishment as infidels to all philosophers because they do not trust corporeal evocation of existence in the hereafter. According to Ibn Rushd, the accusation is neither the cause of correctness. All philosophers also believed in corporeal evocation of existence in the hereafter. Corporeal just only matching with the hereafter, non-bodily as a human being, like in this world. This matter is according to the level that hereafter conditions represent a higher-level phase, and more especially, so that spirits are as according to that circumstance phase, considering that spirits are not more special than bodily.

That opinion does not mean opposing religion. On that account, it's not right if one who ought to have a notion is punished as an infidel. Only the Clan of Sufism that has the opinion and trust evocation exists in the form of spirits. As the clan of theology says, those who are awakened by waiting are bodies that have been annihilated. This means that he neither tells corporeal evocation existence, nor causes what has been annihilated, later, then reappears, it is not one in number, but one kind, but two numbers (Ishak 1980, 54).

Contemporary Implications of the Debate between al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd on Three Metaphysical Problems

The debate between al-Ghazālī (1058–1111) and Ibn Rushd (1126–1198) concerning the three metaphysical problems: (1) the eternity of the world, (2) God's knowledge of particulars, and (3) bodily resurrection was not merely a theological conflict, but a clash of two epistemological systems that continue to shape Islamic intellectual history. In the modern context, these discussions bear significant implications for the relationship between faith and reason, religion and science, and spirituality and rationalism in contemporary Muslim thought (Elhady 2022, 1–6; Rahman 2024, 85–95).

1.   Implications for the Relationship between Religion and Science

The first issue, the eternity of the world (*qidam al-kalām*), concerns the relationship between God and the universe, whether creation is eternal with God, as the philosophers argued, or created ex nihilo, as al-Ghazālī

maintained. This issue echoes contemporary debates in philosophy of science and theology, particularly the question of whether the universe's existence is contingent upon divine will or operates autonomously through natural laws.

2. Implications for Divine Knowledge and Human Freedom

The second issue, God's knowledge of particulars (*al-juz'iyyāt*), directly affects the understanding of human freedom and moral responsibility. Al-Ghazālī held that God knows all particulars directly, thus preserving divine omniscience and sovereignty. Ibn Rushd, however, proposed that God knows particulars through His knowledge of universals, thus preserving divine transcendence without negating rational causality.

3. Implications for Eschatology and the Meaning of Human Existence

The third problem, bodily resurrection (*al-ba'th al-jismānī*), concerns the ontological status of the soul and the afterlife. Al-Ghazālī defended literal bodily resurrection based on Qur'anic revelation, while Ibn Rushd reinterpreted it symbolically as the immortality of the rational soul.

4. Iqbal's Synthesis and the Reconstruction of Islamic Thought

According to Sir Muhammad Iqbal, both al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd represent necessary but incomplete phases in the evolution of Islamic thought. Iqbal argued that al-Ghazālī's spiritualism must be reconciled with Ibn Rushd's rationalism to produce a dynamic and creative understanding of Islam. In The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, Iqbal wrote: The spirit of the Qur'an is essentially anti-classical. It is the spirit of movement, of progression, of ceaseless creation (Iqbal 1982, 143).

Conclusion

In the end, Ibn Rushd has given a decision to the attack of al-Ghazālī that al-Ghazālī has punished the philosophers in three problems as infidels, and that cannot be agreed upon by Ibn Rushd. Infidel is out of reason in the corporeal evocation problem, because the problem in the opinions of the philosophers is theoretical. Infidel in the problem is that Allah does not know some imprecise small events, because the problem does not become any opinions of the philosophers. Infidel in problem with the earlier of natural existence is not precise and right, because the congeniality of the earlier of natural existence is unlike what is comprehended by Muslim *kalām* scholars.

Come to light that there is our controversy in attitude between al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd, and this generates a problem for every Muslim. Which comes closer to both more come near values of Islamic truth? This

problem has been addressed by Iqbal, and both of them are opposing Islam and the Holy Qur'an. The reason that has been proposed by Iqbal is that al-Ghazālī constituted his opinion at skeptical philosophy, while Ibn Rushd assessed as a maintained Greek philosophy in revolutionizing the intellectual of Islam and assuming of as which is not only opposes against values of Al-Qur'an but also opposes personal targets and the values of human beings.

The metaphysical debate between al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd continues to influence modern Muslim thought in theology, philosophy, and science. Al-Ghazālī's emphasis on divine omnipotence preserves spiritual consciousness and moral submission. Ibn Rushd's rationalism fosters intellectual responsibility and the autonomy of reason. Iqbal's reinterpretation bridges the two, proposing an integrative Islamic modernity that reconciles revelation with creativity, faith with knowledge, and tradition with progress. Thus, their debate transcends its historical context, serving as a philosophical template for rethinking the relationship between faith and reason in the modern Muslim world.

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