



kemunduran filsafat pasca-Ibn Rushd, namun sesungguhnya lebih berkaitan dengan metode pembacaan tradisi (*turāth*) yang kurang tepat dengan dua poros utama: tradisionalisme/Salafisme dan liberalisme-modernisme. Artikel ini mengkaji pemikiran dua tokoh Arab modern yang sangat penting, 'Ābid al-Jābirī dan Ḥasan Ḥanafī, yang sama-sama berupaya menawarkan cara baru dalam membaca turāth untuk merevitalisasi filsafat Islam. Tujuannya adalah menyingkap relevansi metode mereka dalam menghadapi problem kebuntuan intelektual sekaligus menunjukkan arah baru bagi tradisi filsafat Islam agar tetap relevan dan produktif. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode kualitatif berbasis analisis konten berupa teks karya utama 'Ābid al-Jābirī dan Ḥasan Ḥanafī mengenai tradisi dan pembaruan. Hasil kajian menunjukkan bahwa al-Jābirī, melalui kritik struktural, historis, dan ideologi, berusaha membebaskan tradisi, khususnya teks-teks filsafat dari pembacaan analogis (*qiyās*) dan mendorong rasionalitas tradisi yang lebih sejalan dengan tuntunan modernitas. Sementara itu, Ḥasan Ḥanafī melalui fenomenologi-hermeneutis memandang tradisi sebagai kekuatan ideologis yang harus dihidupkan kembali guna menopang emansipasi dan transformasi sosial. Meskipun berbeda titik tekan, keduanya sama-sama menegaskan bahwa filsafat Islam hanya dapat menemukan vitalitasnya kembali dengan reorientasi tradisi sehingga tetap relevan dan mampu menjawab kebutuhan zaman.

**Kata-kata Kunci:** 'Ābid al-Jābirī, Filsafat Islam, Ḥasan Ḥanafī, Tadjīd, Turāth.

## Introduction

The tradition of Islamic philosophy, which was once flourishing, is currently experiencing an acute crisis of innovation. Some people suspect that Islamic philosophy ended after the era of Ibn Rushd; a suspicion that stems from the Orientalist approach to the history of Islamic philosophy, such as Gutas' classification (Gutas 2002, 15), and it seems that al-Jābirī considers the era of Ibn Rushd as the right moment for epistemological discontinuity (Sebti 2010, 93).

However, the problem is actually much more fundamental than simply the supposed end of philosophy in the Islamic world. The problem that occurs in the contemporary Islamic philosophical tradition is what al-Jābirī refers to as a crisis of innovation (*azmat al-ibda'*), namely a situation of *stagnation* and backwardness in the realm of novelty and authenticity. This condition has rendered the tradition of Islamic philosophy unproductive, static, and repetitive. The tradition of Islamic philosophy can no longer actualize itself in meeting human needs, and in this context, the needs of Arab society. According to al-Jabiri, the cause of this repetition or intellectual decline is an inappropriate method of reading (Jabiri 2015, 8–11), which does not depart from the reality at hand but only repeats the “past” in the form of classical tradition or, if not, only imitates the “future” in the form of modernism and Westernization.

In line with this, Ḥasan Ḥanafī also expressed the same conclusion that “philosophy today grows separately from identity and joins ‘The Other’ without knowing the old indicators and blindly following the new” (Hanafi 2015, 147). The tradition of Islamic philosophy will not develop and will continue to experience acute repetition if it is not read with the

right reading method, namely, a reading method that accommodates tradition and accepts input from modern science; not a reading that is detached from current awareness, such as reading with reference to the past or to Western civilization.

The problem of the crisis of innovation in Islamic philosophy, as pointed out by al-Jabiri, cannot be separated from a broader issue, namely the way Muslims treat the Islamic intellectual tradition (*turāth al-Islāmī*). Islamic philosophy, as an important part of *turāth*, has stagnated because it has been interpreted incorrectly. There are two main ways of reading *turāth*: Traditionalists, sometimes called Salafists, defend classical Islamic intellectual tradition, including medieval Islamic philosophy, and tend to be defensive or apologetic when confronted with Western thought. On the other hand, modernists and liberals, including Marxists, tend to reject tradition. Those who can be called ‘anti-traditionalists’, such as Abderraḥmān Marḥaba and Abdallah Laroui, consider tradition to be a burden of the past that hinders progress and is unable to solve current problems (Salimi 2024, 70–71).

It is at this point that the issue of tradition and modernity becomes very important, because one of the main problems of contemporary Islamic philosophy lies in how *turāth* is treated so that it remains relevant to the needs of the times and is still able to maintain the authenticity of civilization, as has been the main theme of contemporary Arab thought in the 70s and 80s. In addition, the emergence of post-modern discourse, pioneered mainly by contemporary Western philosophy such as structural and post-structuralism, phenomenology, hermeneutics, and so on, has encouraged an evaluation of the history of Islamic philosophy in particular and other Islamic intellectual traditions; perhaps the most influential being Foucault’s thinking on power relations that give rise to *regimes of knowledge* (Kersten 2019, 27).

What is needed, then, is an innovation, namely a method of reading that emphasizes contemporary reality. What the Islamic philosophical tradition needs is pure initial reasoning on an issue—namely, the courage to begin analysis from actual reality—not to understand it completely, but rather to understand the issue with a new method, based on new discourse and perspectives that can answer contemporary issues (Jabiri 2015, 6). The tradition of Islamic philosophy needs to be read using new methods so that Islamic philosophy can remain relevant to contemporary life; this means that Islamic philosophy can be revived and contribute to Islamic civilization.

In this context, ‘Ābid al-Jābirī and Ḥasan Ḥanafī occupy important positions. Both are often referred to as “*the heritage thinkers*” or thinkers in the field of Islamic tradition, with their critiques and renewal projects. Al-Jābirī and Ḥanafī’s deep understanding of tradition is evident in their major works, particularly *Naḥnu wal-Turāth*, *al-Turāth wal-Ḥadāthah*,

and *al-Turāth wal-Tajdīd*. Through their unique perspectives, these two figures discuss the philosophical tradition in different ways; they do not merely narrate the history of Islamic philosophy as historians and philosophers generally do, nor do they discuss the “cognitive content” of Islamic philosophy, but rather offer new methods, readings, approaches, and contexts. al-Jābirī uses Foucault’s archaeology as a tool for critiquing Islamic philosophy, while Ḥasan Ḥanafī uses phenomenology for the same purpose (Hanssen and Weiss 2018, 293). This point is the strength of al-Jābirī and Ḥanafī in the discourse of tradition and the tradition of Islamic philosophy, regardless of the various critical responses to the thoughts of these two individuals. In this domain, namely the reading of the tradition of Islamic philosophy according to ‘Ābid al-Jābirī and Ḥasan Ḥanafī, this article will elaborate further.

The issue of contemporary readings has been discussed by Mohammad Muslih, who examines the phenomenon of contemporary Islam as a form of thought or simply a form of reading. According to him, in addition to the tendency in contemporary Islamic thought to reexamine classical Islamic traditions in the light of modernization, there are also three models of contemporary readings commonly used in this project, namely hermeneutics, deconstruction, and criticism (Muslih 2012, 359)

Al-Jābirī is a contemporary philosopher who *is concerned with* discussing contemporary issues in the Islamic world. His thoughts on tradition and the results written in *his tetralogy* of criticism of Arab rationality are part of a broader series of thoughts on tradition along with other *heritage thinkers* such as Ḥasan Ḥanafī, Moḥammed Arkoun, and Naṣr Ḥāmid Abū Zayd (Kersten 2019, 29).

Research conducted by Yunita Novia entitled *Muḥammad ‘Ābid al-Jābirī’s Thoughts on Tradition and Modernity in Renewal* concludes that al-Jābirī contributed to the introduction of variations in the construction of thought that developed in Islam, and his critique of Arab Reason shows that each mode of thought has its own uniqueness or tendency (Novia 2020, 151). Behind its sophistication, al-Jābirī’s thinking has several weaknesses, as criticized by Lahoud, quoting Ali Ḥarb and Abdou Filali-Ansary; al-Jābirī’s theory of tradition is historically too eclectic, intellectually and politically weak, and does not answer his own questions about the critique of Orientalism (Lahoud 2010, 328–29).

Regarding Ḥasan Ḥanafī, Abdul Haris Rasyidi’s research on tradition according to Ḥanafī in his book *Dirasat Islamiyyah* explicitly mentions the approach of Islamic philosophy, namely: historical, methodological, and teleological (Rasyidi 2017, 209–10). The relationship between the three traditions: classical, Western, and contemporary, is complementary. Again, Ḥanafī’s renewal project seeks to shift the discourse of religion from the discourse of divinity to humanity (Said 2023, 61).

Finally, a comparative study between ‘Ābid al-Jābirī and Ḥasan Ḥanafī

on the relationship between tradition and modernity has been conducted by Armando Salvatore, distinguishing the focus of each figure: al-Jābirī on tradition and Ḥasan Ḥanafī on neo-*fiqh* (Salvatore 1995)

The above literature review shows that research on the reading of Islamic philosophical tradition from the perspectives of ‘Ābid al-Jābirī and Ḥasan Ḥanafī has not been further elaborated. This article argues that al-Jābirī’s structural-ideological approach and Ḥanafī’s humanistic-practical approach to tradition (Islamic philosophy) offer two distinctive paradigms in the revitalization of Islamic philosophy as a project of epistemological-ideological and social liberation. This article aims to analyze the epistemological approach to the tradition of Islamic philosophy through the perspectives of ‘Ābid al-Jābirī and Ḥasan Ḥanafī, as well as to evaluate their contributions in deconstructing and reorienting the legacy of Islamic philosophy as a project of liberation and actualization of contemporary Islamic thought.

This research is a qualitative-descriptive study using a literature review as the data collection method. To gain an understanding of the content, context, and function of the discourses of ‘Ābid al-Jābirī and Ḥasan Ḥanafī, the appropriate approach is content analysis. The works of al-Jābirī and Ḥasan Ḥanafī, such as *Naḥnu wa al-Turāth*, *al-Turāth wa al-Ḥadāthah*, and *Turas dan Tajdid*, will be used as primary sources. This article contributes to the development of contemporary Islamic studies, especially in the field of Islamic philosophy, by offering ‘Ābid al-Jābirī and Ḥasan Ḥanafī’s method of reading Islamic philosophy as an effort at revitalization and reorientation through deconstruction and reconstruction.

### Sketch of Thought

The direct and indirect influence of the West on Islamic civilization inspired the Arab Renaissance (*nahḍah*). Hourani divides this era, which he calls the liberal era, into three generations: the first generation (1830–1870), the second generation (1870–1900), and the third generation (1900–1939). This distinction not only shows the time difference between generations but also shows the development of modern Arab thought in general. Broadly speaking, the thinking of this first era of awakening reflected the ideas of enlightenment, freedom, equality, and reform inspired by European civilization (Hourani 2004, xviii–xxi). However, the spirit of the Arab renaissance did not have a strong foundation; in fact, during a century of renaissance, a crisis emerged: where should the Arab nation go? Return to the past with all its progress and setbacks, or follow the future, namely modernity and Westernization? This crisis ultimately gave birth to a binary opposition between authenticity rooted in tradition or modernity, with its contemporary manifestations (Salvatore 1995, 198); Salafi readings and Orientalist readings; readings of classical tradition and readings of Westernization (*ightirāb*).

Issa J. Boullata maps three forms of thought within the framework of *turāth-modernity* interaction: *First*, intellectuals who consider *turāth*, the classical Arab tradition, to have no intrinsic value in supporting a civilizational revolution. These intellectuals, who are generally influenced by Marxism, socialism, or 'leftist ideology' to varying degrees, believe that tradition needs to be completely overhauled, based on new values of materialism that are characteristic of modernity. *Second*, some are more religiously inclined with a simplistic and analogical view that tradition (*turāth*) is Islam; because Arabic has been ingrained with Islam both as a religion and a culture, and because Islam has brought the Arab nation to glory, especially in its early days, this group calls for a return to tradition, namely pure and transformative Islam, by rejecting all forms of Western civilization.

*Third*, intellectuals who believe that tradition still has relevance and intrinsic value, with the caveat that tradition is only a means or vehicle for progress. The goal is to renew and reform society through tradition so that it can be in harmony with modernity (Boullata 2022, 4–5). Tradition is a foundation and identity, while modernity is an inevitability of the times. Based on Boullata's classification above, 'Ābid al-Jābirī and Ḥasan Ḥanafī can be considered to belong to the third group, namely utilizing *turāth* while adjusting to modernity through self-correction, which means internal correction of the *turāth*.

For this reason, 'Ābid al-Jābirī and Ḥasan Ḥanafī are categorized as neo-traditionalists (*al-turāthiyyūn al-judūd*), characterized by their loyalty to tradition, but still maintaining a *sense of criticism* towards tradition, re-examining the historical reasons for traditional Islamic knowledge, making it relevant to the present with a commitment to preserving it (Hanssen and Weiss 2018, 292). As a group standing on two fronts, they critique elements of tradition that are flawed and outdated on one hand, while defending tradition from the total intervention of Western influences such as Orientalism, liberalism, Marxism, and similar influences on the other.

As neo-traditionalist thinkers, al-Jābirī and Ḥanafī were certainly influenced by Western thought, particularly by the "post" movements, namely post-structuralism and post-modernism, which were indeed trends in European thought in the 20th century. This influence is clearly evident in the works of both figures, who often translate concepts such as *episteme*, subjectivity, ideology, the Other, phenomenology, deconstruction, and other terms. This influence is understandable, as both al-Jābirī and Ḥanafī lived in North Africa, a region heavily influenced by France due to colonialism. Al-Jābirī, who proudly claimed to be a product of Islamic education, was introduced to "post" thinking through the works of philosophers who were part of this movement (Hanafi 2002, 320; Ḥanafī 2012, 14; Hanafi 2015, 73).

This sketch of thought explains how al-Jābirī and Ḥanafī view tradition, especially the tradition of Islamic philosophy. Both figures believe that the Islamic world needs to re-read classical tradition in general and the tradition of Islamic philosophy in particular. The necessity of *re-reading* is based on their concern about the malaise afflicting the community due to ‘epistemological accidents’ in classical tradition and the stagnation of thought and emptiness of human values within it. By dismantling the structures of tradition, including philosophy, al-Jābirī and Ḥasan Ḥanafī sought to rebuild these structures with appropriate materials and in line with the demands of the times.

### Al-Jābirī’s Method of Reading the Philosophical Tradition

Islamic tradition is the main theme of ‘Ābid al-Jābirī’s important studies. His writings on Islamic tradition demonstrate his deep understanding of the subject and invite responses from various circles and other “reading attitudes”; he may be a scholar widely referenced outside the Arab intellectual world (Lahoud 2010, 322). It should be noted that al-Jābirī discusses the tradition of philosophy in his work *naḥnu wal-turāth*, which is his first and most important work on the tradition of Islamic philosophy. Chronologically, the book *naḥnu* became the foundation for his tetralogy of criticism, which offers concrete examples of how to analytically address important texts from the Arab-Islamic cultural heritage, such as classical philosophical works, to reactivate their rational elements (Salvatore 1995, 202)

Al-Jābirī’s thinking on tradition stems from the accumulation of various tragic events that have befallen the Arab nation. The question here is about identity (*al-huwiyyah*): “Who are we? What do we want to be?” (Jabiri 2015, 86) This is because the Arab nation, which is the locus of al-Jābirī’s thinking, is experiencing an identity crisis. Identity is the most important element for achieving progress. The Arab revival movement in the 19th and early 20th centuries, *nahḍa*, has failed due to its inability to effectively utilize tradition, namely the elements of tradition that contain rational elements. The criticism of the *nahḍa* thinkers lacked deep philosophical content: the use of inadequate theological methods in the case of religious thinkers and the imitation of European rational concepts without inspiring the rational spirit of the people (Abu-Rabi’ 2004, 260).

According to him, the Arab nation exists in two relationships, “the past” and “the future,” while neglecting “the present,” which is absent from their consciousness (Jabiri 2018, 63). Because of this, the Arab revival movement failed to produce any meaningful achievements. The Arab nations still lag in various fields. For this reason, tradition is important to study, not in a total sense (the past), but to face the present and automatically orient ourselves towards the future. Humans cannot be separated from the traditions that surround them, because if they try

to do so, what will happen is self-alienation, or the sinking of subjectivity into the object and, in its place, the object occupying the dying subject (Jabiri 2018, 72).

Because not all traditions are always good and relevant, and rejecting them will cause an identity crisis, what needs to be done is to look to tradition while seeking elements that support progress, which in this case are rationality and objectivism, and to engage in dialogue with modernism. In this context, al-Jābirī raises the theme of tradition, namely as a foundation for identity and an instrument of progress.

Ābid al-Jābirī defines tradition with a broad scope that touches the deepest consciousness of the Arab nation. Tradition, in the collective Arab sense quoted by al-Jābirī, is “the intellectual and spiritual heritage that unites and makes the Arab nation the successor to its predecessors.” (Jabiri 2018, 156) Tradition binds Arab society into a single entity: a unity of identity, a unity of consciousness, a unity of spirituality, a unity of paradigm that has been formed by the predecessors (*salaf*) to ultimately shape the identity of the Arab nation. As the shaper of the identity of a cultural successor, in this case, Arab culture, tradition is not only the result of possibilities that have been realized in the past; the power of tradition also includes the achievement of various possibilities that have not yet been realized, but have great potential to be realized (Jabiri 2018, 157). It has enormous potential to bring about change in society, not just as a relic of previous civilizations. Therefore, tradition is not only related to the past, as is commonly understood, and has the potential to kill the vitality and creativity it contains, but it also accompanies the present or contemporaneity. This means that tradition is continuous.

Tradition is the essence of the past in its perfection and totality: it is creed and law, language and literature, reason and mentality, rationality, feelings, and hopes embedded within it. Simply put, tradition is a unity of cognitive and ideological dimensions, as well as the foundation of reason and emotion in Arab Islamic culture (Jābirī 1991, 24; Jabiri 2018, 156). In this case, when tradition is mentioned, all of its constituent elements, both intellectual, such as classical religious knowledge, including philosophy, and ideological aspects, such as political, social, economic, and consciousness motives, among others, are automatically included in the definition of tradition.

The internal aspect of tradition, namely the Arab Islamic tradition, faces a problem: the shackles of traditional authority are very strong in society. No matter how far society wants to move forward, in the end, tradition pulls them back (*mafḥūm al-turāth li al-turāth*) so that tradition itself becomes the reference point for authority. This results in stagnation, a lack of creativity, innovation, and productivity, and a tendency to repeat oneself. People who think this way are called fundamentalists (*al-salāfiyah al-dīniyyah*, classical reading)(Jabiri 2018, 64).

Meanwhile, from an external perspective, tradition is often confronted with modernity (*ḥadāṣah*), which raises the issue of tradition's relevance in the contemporary era. Because tradition intrinsically cannot provide a worldview, it must be viewed from another perspective, the Western perspective, which is often analogized with modernism because there is no way to make tradition relevant and contemporary except by understanding it through *the modern/contemporary episteme* (Hanafi and Jabiri 2015, 126). This has the potential to erase traditional identity and is considered absurd because it is impossible to carry out reform through the identity or traditions of others (the West). Al-Jābirī refers to people with this kind of thinking as liberals, and included in this group are Marxists, who have the same reading orientation, namely an orientalist style of reading (Jabiri 2018, 79; Lahoud 2010, 325)

The problem of tradition, in this context, Islamic philosophical tradition, according to al-Jābirī, revolves around the issue of objectivity and rationality (continuity). This stems from the ambivalent dual role of tradition: between maintaining the authenticity of Arab Islamic tradition with all its strengths and weaknesses and responding to the influence of the West, Europe, or Israel, which has penetrated too deeply into various aspects of (Ro'uf 2010, 72). Furthermore, al-Jābirī offers a method of reading philosophical tradition to expose tradition through criticism (structural, historical, and ideological) to achieve objectivity. This objective tradition is then connected to current reality, or the present, so that it remains relevant and productive.

There are two important components in al-Jābirī's reading of tradition: 1) a method of reading that is suitable for tradition in the contemporary era; and 2) elements of vision and principles of reading. The first component is, as discussed earlier, the effort to obtain an objective and continuous tradition. To achieve this goal, three substantial steps need to be taken:

The first step is to break free from the paradigm of *fahm al-turāth li al-turāth*. This means that tradition is no longer understood for its own sake, but rather for the sake of the reader and its contemporary relevance. Traditional readings before al-Jābirī were trapped in the paradigm of *fahm al-turāth li al-turāth*, which was based on the basic rule of qiyas: *Qiyās al-gāyb 'alā al-shāhid*. This reading was trapped in the authority of traditions by always using the past as the main reference (*al-shāhid*) for reading the future (*al-gāyb*), thus creating an endless deadlock because it could not be based on reality. For this reason, al-Jābirī proposes an "epistemological break", not in the content of knowledge brought by tradition, but at the level of mental action (Jabiri 2003, 32).

There needs to be a change in the mechanism of reasoning (*al-fi'l al-'aqli*) to escape the trap of old ways of reasoning. In the first step, al-Jābirī wants people not to be overshadowed by traditions that cause them to be

*unfair* in reading the future. Readers must feel that they are the owners or masters of tradition, not the other way around, becoming slaves to tradition (Jabiri 2003, 43).

The second step is to create a neutral relationship between ‘us’ and tradition, and vice versa. This step is taken to achieve objectivity in tradition, that is, to separate the subject from the object and the object from the subject. Al-Jābirī divides this into two stages; the first stage is to separate the subject from the object so that the subject is not influenced by the object (tradition). Because it is related to the language of tradition, which al-Jābirī exemplifies as Arabic, modern linguistic methods are needed that are considered capable of providing an objective approach. One of the rules proposed by al-Jābirī is: “researchers must ignore the interpretation of the meaning of the text before they understand the material and its mutation (material as a network of relationships between various units of meaning, and not a collection of isolated units of meaning)” (Jabiri 2003, 36–38).

Someone who wants to distance themselves from tradition must free themselves from understandings *and preconceptions* that are based on certain biases. The second stage is to separate the object from the subject so that the object regains its independence, individuality, identity, and historicity (Jabiri 2003, 38). There are three methods used by al-Jābirī to perform this dissection: the structural approach, the historical approach, and ideological criticism (Jābirī 1993, 23–24).

These three methods or phases are actually carried out chronologically (structural-historical-ideological), but due to pedagogical demands, it is common to begin with historical analysis, followed by ideological criticism, and finally structural analysis (Jabiri 2018, 173). The structural approach means examining a tradition starting from the texts as they are. Readers postpone or bracket (*epoche*) understandings or perspectives that limit the text (Adian 2019, 27).

The text is read holistically to discover the network of meanings woven within it. The historical approach means connecting the thoughts of the author of the text, which have been reconstructed through structural analysis, with its historical context in various dimensions. This analysis is necessary to understand the author’s historical dimensions intimately in relation to the text produced and to validate the previous structural analysis. Ideological criticism means revealing the ideological function, especially the socio-political function, which is hidden in the content of a particular text or thought, or which is deliberately imposed on the text in a particular *episteme* that is its reference (Jābirī 1991, 32; Jābirī 1993, 24). This approach demonstrates Foucault’s influence, particularly regarding the concept of ‘archeology and genealogy of knowledge’ in which discourses constellate to form a specific “episteme”, a certain conditional way of thinking, the network of relations that make it possible

to say something at a certain time (King 2017, 489–91).

According to al-Jābirī, the only way for a text to be contextual and relevant to itself is through ideological criticism. After all of the above processes, the subject and object become independent of each other. At this point, readers can see, for example, philosophical texts as traditions that are ready to be used for the needs of today's readers. The next question is how to connect independent subjects and objects with the present.

The third step is to connect the tradition that has been 'objectified' with the present. It turns out that objective traditions or texts are not entirely open to readers because of historical processes that necessitate intellectual marginalization (Jābirī 1993, 25); society only wants truths or meanings that are relevant to their situation: the conditions of the times, social and political demands, practical and dogmatic needs, and so on. This makes it necessary to look deeper into tradition to find buried truths or meanings that are relevant to the needs or circumstances of today's readers.

To achieve this goal, there is only one method that can be used according to al-Jābirī, namely mathematical intuition (*al-ḥads al-riyāḍī*), which becomes "a direct and exploratory representation that reveals evidence and provides various anticipatory understandings when there is a dialogue between the reader and the text, which is created based on objective data that emerges from the first representation of our methodological concerns" (Jābirī 1993, 25; Jabiri 2003, 41).

It is this intuition that then helps the reader to discover the meaning hidden by the text. It seems that al-Jābirī believes that philosophers hide something, beyond their philosophical skills and achievements, which reveals the true essence, meaning, or truth. Through the process that has been undergone, al-Jābirī suggests that readers reveal this secret by engaging with the problems and intellectual achievements of philosophers so that mathematical intuition can work to project the truth that is being sought. For al-Jābirī, it is through this 'unity', namely *inter-contemporaneity*, that continuity can be regained: continuity in the evolution of consciousness through the search for (Jābirī 1993, 26; Jabiri 2003, 43).

The second component in reading tradition is the vision or principle of reading. In order for the method of reading tradition (the first component) not to stray from a framework, the method needs to be placed within a certain frame (*ru'yah*) and starting point. According to al-Jābirī, this framework and starting point are: the unity of the problem, the historicity of thought, and *the standpoint* of Islamic philosophy's reading of other philosophies.

The unity of problems (*waḥdah al-ishkāliyyah*) shows that, regardless of diverse identities, ideologies, intellectual orientations, or any

similarities, there is one binding factor that unites them, one common problem. Problematics is a network of relationships within a particular system of thought, which encompasses various issues and interacts with them in such a way that, on a theoretical level, it is impossible to solve the problem in isolation, because the problem can only be solved globally (Jābirī 1993, 27; Jabiri 2003, 45).

Instead of demanding a one-dimensional answer, the unity of the problem actually values the diversity of perspectives or answers that are united in a unity of thought (*wahdah al-fikr*). Through the identification of unity of thought that refers to the unity of problems, readers will realize that the above units are not limited to a particular time and place (Jābirī 1993, 28–29; Jabiri 2003, 47).

Perhaps the problems faced by classical philosophers remain unresolved to this day, despite thousands of responses to the same issues. Thus, these unities demonstrate fertility, coherence, and the power of integration across various ways of thinking without being bound to a specific time and place. To determine whether this tradition is relevant to today's readers, it is necessary to explore the historicity of its thinking.

The historicity of thought (*tarīkhiyyah al-fikr*) is the relationship between thought and the various political, sociological, economic, and cultural realities that produce it, or at least the thought that is developing in the midst of it (Jābirī 1993, 29; Jabiri 2003, 48). The unity of problems that are not bound to a specific time allows a thought to interact with the present. However, are all thoughts from the past relevant to readers in the present or future? To find this relevance, there are two criteria: the cognitive field and ideological content. The cognitive field is formed from homogeneous cognitive material, which limits the movement of a thought.

Meanwhile, ideological content is the function of ideology (socio-political) in which philosophers, individually or collectively, subordinate their cognitive material to the above ideological function. The historical vision of this thought shows that cognitive material and ideological content are sometimes not in line with each other. The consequence is that some philosophical issues, even though they are the same in substance, such as the relationship between reason and revelation, can have different ideological content.

Furthermore, this means that the same cognitive material can be relevant to different ideologies: the issue of reason and revelation, even though it is classical cognitive material, still opens up ideological opportunities for different readers, and ultimately, the material is always relevant.

Finally, the standing point of Islamic philosophy refers to how Islamic philosophers understand other forms of philosophy, such as Greek philosophy. This vision is a case study of the two previous visions. Al-Jābirī

strongly criticizes Muslim philosophers for failing to pay attention to the unity of Greek philosophical thought, as well as for not distinguishing between its cognitive material and ideological content. This mistake caused Islamic philosophy to become stagnant, unproductive, and merely *imitative*. This mistake of not identifying cognitive content and ideological content was also made by writers of Islamic philosophy, both *insiders* and *outsiders*. Al-Jābirī emphasized the necessity of distinguishing cognitive content from ideological content. Prioritizing cognitive content *per se*, as philosophers do when reading philosophical texts or writers do when writing the history of philosophy, only gives rise to repetitive philosophical opinions and discourses with mere differences in the means of expression. However, when the reading of philosophy pays attention to ideological content, such reading will discover developing thoughts, which are determined by their own principles and problems, while being filled with contradictions that continue to grow (Jābirī 1993, 30–33; Jabiri 2003, 51–56).

In other words, the potential of Islamic philosophy does not lie in its cognitive content, which may have remained the same since Greek philosophy until now, but rather in its ideological content, which holds the creativity and productivity of philosophy.

Al-Jābirī's reading of the Islamic philosophical tradition places great emphasis on ideological aspects. According to him, the cognitive aspects of the Islamic philosophical tradition have not changed much; they are useful as long as they are united by a common set of problems and a common way of thinking. Al-Jābirī's target is the ideological content in a philosophical text, what is hidden or unreadable in *traditional* or Orientalist readings. At this point, al-Jābirī offers a deconstructive reading: philosophical texts are dismantled from all assumptions, placing the text and the language that surrounds it as something tentative. The result is that the reader and the text are equally autonomous. Furthermore, al-Jābirī carries out a reconstruction or restructuring by taking parts of the autonomous text to be used for the interests of the subject or reader. What al-Jābirī does opens up new possibilities in the philosophical tradition, namely, making it a foundation for reforming civilization.

Al-Jābirī's Foucauldian archaeological reading of ideology differs from Ḥasan Ḥanafī's phenomenological-hermeneutic reading, even though both discuss tradition. As will be discussed later, Ḥasan Ḥanafī's project of renewing tradition is more focused on language and its meaning; how the meaning of old language is dismantled and replaced with contemporary meaning. Meanwhile, the object of al-Jābirī's criticism and renewal is the ideological content embedded in philosophical texts. At least in his book, *Nahnu wal-Turāth* al-Jābirī is not particularly interested in the problem of language. He is more interested in the hidden relationships behind the text, which then influence the epistemology of Islamic philosophy

and, in particular, the epistemology of Arab Reason, where he illustrates how Islamic ideology and ancient Persian ideology fought each other in discourse to compete for “Arab reason.” the result of which was the defeat of Islamic ideology in the East, so that Islamic philosophy in the East was no longer as “original” as Islamic philosophy in the West (Jabiri 2003, 69–71).

For this reason, al-Jābirī emphasized the need for an “epistemological break” to avoid the irrationalism of Islamic philosophy in the East, where, according to him, Islamic philosophy in the West was a role model and reference for ideal philosophy with its rationality, especially with Ibn Rusyd, who became a beacon of Islamic philosophical thought in the West (Sebti 2010, 93; Kersten 2019, 29).

### **Ḥasan Ḥanafī’s Method of Reading the Philosophical Tradition**

An important figure in the history of contemporary Islamic philosophy who is also a promoter of studies on tradition and the tradition of philosophy in the Arab world is Ḥasan Ḥanafī. Through a series of philosophy forums held in Egypt, Ḥasan Ḥanafī emphasized that Islamic philosophy needs to be reconstructed through the reconstruction of tradition, using classical tradition as a starting point (Harb 2012, 132). Instead of adopting Western philosophy, the Islamic philosophical tradition still holds great potential to become the starting point for the progressivism of Islamic society.

Tradition in the context of Ḥanafī thought is not much different from al-Jābirī because of the trend of thought at that time, namely a series of tragedies that befell Muslims and Arabs in particular, culminating in the defeat of the Arabs in the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 and the Israel War of 1967. It is therefore not wrong for Ibrahim Abu-Rabi’ to use this event as a starting point for contemporary Arab thought, which in this case includes contemporary Islamic epistemological thought (Abu-Rabi’ 2004, 57–62).

This event made Arab intellectuals from various backgrounds aware of the importance of establishing a clear identity: between “I” as an Arab or Muslim, and “the Other” as Europe, America, and Israel. Unlike al-Jābirī, who emphasized tradition in the local Arab context, Ḥanafī emphasized tradition in a broader context, namely Islam (Hanafi 2015, 67). Tradition preserves the ego or sense of “self” that is very important in determining identity, because if tradition is not based on the ego, or if the ego is intertwined with “The Other” so that it is simply absorbed, or if the tradition is not in its proper condition, it will give rise to alienation (*ightirāb*). In relation to progressivism, the ego identity that is the root of tradition is an expression of freedom; if a society has a tradition rooted in an appropriate ego identity, then freedom (*al-ḥurriyyah*) will emerge (Ḥanafī 2012, 10). Therefore, tradition should not be ignored, but rather it must be ‘purified’ so that it can be used.

As will be explained later, Ḥasan Ḥanafī uses Western philosophical methods to analyze the epistemological side of tradition. Although he argues that Western philosophy is not only from and for the West, but is universal, based on the similarity of the conditions in which philosophy was born. Ḥanafī, for example, states that Islam needs Phenomenology philosophy; not in the sense of phenomenology copied from Husserl, but phenomenology that is a necessity for every civilization, because “Phenomenology is a natural outcome in every culture threatened by a bifurcation between Rationalism and Empiricism, between formalism and materialism and the need to find a third way in a certain philosophy of life” (Hanafi 2002, 318).

In the context of Islamic tradition, phenomenology is a way to bridge two poles, between the religious pole and the modernism pole. In addition, hermeneutics is also very important in understanding and re-interpreting tradition because “the interpretation of tradition is a prerequisite for the revival of civilization”(Hanafi 2015, 73).

Ḥasan Ḥanafī understands tradition as everything that has been passed down to “us,” that is, contemporary society, from the past in the dominant civilization, so that it is both an inherited issue and an issue for the present recipient at various levels. Tradition is the starting point for maintaining continuity in national culture, strengthening the foundations of the present, pushing it towards progress, and participating in various issues of social change (Hanafi 2001, 9).

It is clear that tradition is used by Ḥanafī for broader and more practical purposes, namely the empowerment and liberation of humanity, and Ḥasan Ḥanafī often emphasizes this. Tradition is not just a collection of theories; in its material or formal form, it is “A theory of praxis, a guide for behavior and national heritage that can be revealed, mastered, and developed to reconstruct humanity and its relationship with the earth as two obstacles that hinder every effort of developing countries in their evolution and development” (Hanafi 2001, 9).

Tradition is related to “psychological reserves in the hearts of society”; classical tradition is part of reality and its psychological content (Hanafi 2001, 13). All of the potential of classical tradition mentioned above has several serious shortcomings that hinder the optimization of tradition, namely that classical tradition prioritizes the theoretical side and neglects the practical side. In addition, the historical and humanistic dimensions are missing from classical tradition, so that in its development, classical tradition appears ahistorical and unrealistic; it is unproductive because it does not directly touch on the reality of (Hanafi 2001, 15–16). In fact, tradition is basically the property of civilization, departing from social reality that is responded to by revelation, then the revelation is processed in various fields to form classical tradition. Therefore, an effort to renew classical tradition, called *tajdīd*, is needed.

Discussing tradition and *tajdīd* in this context cannot be separated from various interpretations. Ḥasan Ḥanafī divides interpretations of tradition or cultural attitudes into three categories: *first*, interpretations that are satisfied with classical tradition alone, characterized by hypocrisy, incompetence, and narcissism. *Second*, an interpretation that relies solely on the new, namely modern Western culture, by abandoning tradition, is characterized by blind imitation and double standards. *Third*, an interpretation that synthesizes the two, between tradition and renewal, either through “*tajdīd* from outside” or “*tajdīd* from within.” Ḥasan Ḥanafī analyzes and criticizes the three interpretations above because none of them are based on reality; sometimes they are based solely on tradition, on the times, or on the results of thought. According to Ḥasan Ḥanafī, the essence of the issue of tradition is how to interpret reality (Hanafi 2001, 32–41).

This means that the discussion of classical tradition is not for its own sake, but for the sake of progress and liberation based on the reality of society. Ḥasan Ḥanafī’s grand project is to encourage Arabs to rethink all the fundamental issues that arose in the past and have become the legacy of contemporary Arabs, then to select all valid and feasible solutions that are appropriate to current needs (Boullata 2022, 57).

Ḥanafī agrees with philosophers and historians of philosophy in general that the emergence of the Islamic philosophical tradition began with al-Kindī, followed by Ibn Rushd as its perfecter. Ḥanafī is more inclined to refer to philosophy as *ḥikmah* or *‘ulūm al-ḥikmah* because it is closer to the classical Islamic tradition than the term “philosophy,” which has Greek connotations (Hanafi 2004, 5; Harb 2012, 132).

In line with his vision to reconstruct classical tradition in relation to Western tradition and reality, classical Islamic philosophy must first be deconstructed to dismantle its anomalies: sacralization and ideological veils that favor the status quo, to then be rebuilt based on revelation or reality. The first step taken by Ḥanafī was to criticize the crisis of method in Islamic studies, considering that the classical tradition was built on sciences that interpreted revelation or reality. There are two forms of crisis in scientific discussion methods: scientific arrogance that dominates Orientalist studies and rhetoric that is often used *by insiders* with the initial aim of countering the Orientalist approach. It is important to explain the second crisis in methodology because it is more relevant to the discussion in this article.

Rhetoric (*al-naz’ah al-khiṭābiyyah*) is criticized for its superficiality in theorization. The crisis of rhetoric arose as a defensive response to the Orientalist scientific approach to classical tradition. The superficiality of rhetoric is caused by immature forms of expression, driven by emotional factors that only produce apologies without a clear theoretical basis (Ḥanafī 1992, 96; Hanafi 2001, 136). More specifically, rhetoric is criticized

because the methods, or more precisely, the patterns it produces, have hindered and damaged the dynamism of tradition (philosophy). There are at least four methods in rhetoric:

1. Repetition (*taḥṣīl al-ḥāsil*), which is the repetition of the content of the text being studied without understanding and interpreting it; philosophical texts are only commented on without being understood more deeply and related to practical needs, resulting in tautology and repetitive discussion. This repetition is the cause of the crisis in Islamic philosophy.
2. Praise or apology, which is a mixture of justification and thought because the object or thought is justified and defended without questioning its theoretical structure or rational basis, so that it can be said to be a lack of criticism of the classical tradition.
3. Debate and polemics, as a consequence of apologetics, which are even worse because they have no objective purpose.
4. Narrow intuition, narrowing or reducing fragments of truth in thought to mere theory, or returning these fragments of truth to revelation, thereby losing their vitality (Ḥanafī 1992, 96–105; Hanafi 2001, 136–50). The products of this rhetoric are not suitable for use in the agenda of reconstructing tradition, because what results from this activity is only repetition, reversal, destruction, and denial of the truth in tradition. Therefore, Ḥasan Ḥanafī offers a method of renewing classical tradition based on current reality, which is then applied theoretically in Islamic studies.

Classical tradition, or in this case, philosophical tradition, has experienced many failures, mainly due to misinterpretation or methodological crises as explained above. To read Islamic philosophy “correctly,” it is necessary to use the method of reading that is appropriate, for theoretical purposes or practical purposes. As with contemporary reading in general, which strives to find other meanings in a text/reality by revealing dimensions that have not been read or have been deliberately ignored (Muslih 2012, 359), it can be said that Ḥasan Ḥanafī practices contemporary reading with deconstruction—not in the Derridean, phenomenological, or hermeneutic sense. These three reading method frameworks are applied in three forms of renewal: language, consciousness, and reality (cultural environment).

First, Ḥanafī deconstructs the old language in the philosophical tradition. According to him, old language is no longer capable of being a vehicle for expression and communication in the present era for several reasons (Hanafi 2001, 160–70). He gives examples in Islamic philosophy, such as “reason,” “emanation,” or “matter,” where the use of such old language is no longer relevant. According to Ḥanafī, this language renewal

is natural, not artificial, in the sense that it is not contrived for intellectual acrobatics. In fact, the substance or meaning contained in the language remains the same, but in order to express it in the current era, the language must be renewed (Hanafi 2001, 156). Language revitalization is not done arbitrarily, but there are several criteria: 1) the language is general so that it is understood by many people; 2) it is open to potential change; 3) it is rational; 4) it has antonyms in empirical reality; 5) it must show human categories.

6) Eloquent Arabic language (Hanafi 2001, 171–76). Most importantly, this deconstruction of language is a reflection of subjectivism, “I”, which attempts to place itself within “being-in-the-world” by drawing on transcendent aspects, referred to as God, to descend into human consciousness (Kersten 2019, 34). Thus, deconstruction of language in this sense is to provide language that the subject uses to discover and determine their consciousness.

Second, a phenomenological reading is applied to the relationship between consciousness and tradition. The main agenda of phenomenology is to return philosophy to the everyday experience of the subject of knowledge, back to the richness of concrete, inherent, and lived human experience (Hanafi 2002, 318–19; Adian 2019, 27).

Ḥanafi believes that renewal can be achieved by finding a new level to analyze something that exists within tradition (Hanafi 2001, 191–92). That is, our concrete consciousness, namely modern humans, including crises, humanity, needs, and so on, directs us to the hidden aspects of tradition. The tradition of philosophy was born from the awareness of philosophers in the past to translate, comment on, and ultimately engage in philosophical activities that produced a variety of thoughts. Philosophers today must also do the same, namely, directing their awareness to give birth to a new tradition of philosophy, which is related to the concrete experiences of philosophers and everything that surrounds them. This also indicates that any tradition, including philosophy, is the result of past struggles in specific situations, contexts, and problems faced with future conditions. Consequently, tradition is no longer viewed as sacred, so it can be reconstructed without the need for language barriers and psychological barriers.

Third, hermeneutical practice, in the form of a dialogue between subject and object in relation to changes in the cultural environment. Traditional sciences are essentially born from reality, namely, classical reality. Ḥanafi emphasizes that reality influences the structure, essence, method, and language of every science. Ḥanafi’s hermeneutics is humanistic hermeneutics, which asserts that the results of interpretation must be applicable or practical, and as a response to textualist readings and the reality of Islamic thought that is too theocentric and far from the human dimension (Sholeh 2003, 166).

When reading philosophical or intellectual texts, philosophers must realize that what they are reading is a product of the past that was a solution to the problems of its time; now these texts are read to find the essence of the problems, whether in the form of knowledge structures or other things, to be applied in the present. Three hermeneutical paradigms are most important according to Ḥasan Ḥanafī: *First*, tradition has no objective meaning unless it is solely the bearer of objective-actual demands imposed on it so that tradition can be reread to place new objectives within it. *Second*, cleansing the tradition of irrelevant objective burdens for the sake of broader public interests. *Third*, selecting various alternatives in tradition that are in line with the demands of the times (Hanafi 2015, 74).

In principle, Ḥasan Ḥanafī’s phenomenological reading of praxis is not much different from al-Jābirī’s ideological reading. As explained earlier, Ḥasan Ḥanafī’s reading strongly emphasizes phenomenology, which is related to individual or collective consciousness about the present; in addition, it is also very ambitious, with a reading that produces practical consequences to directly change people’s lives. Ḥanafī deconstructs language as an effort to replace old consciousness with new consciousness, old meanings with contemporary meanings. In fact, he also attempts to dissect ideology in philosophical texts. While al-Jābirī wants to show how knowledge (philosophical texts) is produced from the prevailing ideology of power, Ḥanafī wants to show how philosophical knowledge departs from human consciousness and then becomes a tool for transformation towards a better life.

However, al-Jābirī and Ḥasan Ḥanafī’s reading methods are the same, based on deconstructing texts and reconstructing them to find the relevance of these philosophical texts, either by dissecting the ideology in the text or opening up the possibility of historical consciousness in dealing with the text. For convenience, the following is a comparison table of al-Jābirī and Ḥasan Ḥanafī in their reading methods:

**Table 1.** Comparison of the readings of the philosophical traditions of al-Jābirī and Ḥasan Ḥanafī.

Aspect	‘Ābid al-Jābirī	Ḥasan Ḥanafī
Purpose of Reading	Objectification of tradition so that it can be made relevant to the present day	Revitalization of tradition for social liberation and human consciousness
Main Method	Structural-Historical-Critical Ideology	Deconstruction-Phenomenology-Hermeneutics
Focus of Criticism	Hidden ideology in the text classical	Old language and consciousness of the past

Key Steps	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Break free from traditional authority;</li> <li>2. Objectify the text.</li> <li>3. Connect with reality through intuition.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Deconstruct language.</li> <li>2. Renewal of consciousness.</li> <li>3. Interpretation of reality for practical purposes.</li> </ol>
B a s i s Epistemology	Rational-ideological (inspired by Foucault)	Practical-humanistic (inspired by Husserl & Ricoeur)
D i r e c t i o n Transformation	Reform of Arab-Islamic	Reconstruction of traditions for the emancipation of the people

### **Revitalization and Reorientation of Islamic Philosophy as a Result of Contemporary Readings**

Islamic philosophy is an important part of the history of Islamic civilization. Not only does philosophy contribute to a specific field of study, namely philosophy itself, as part of Islamic studies, but furthermore, philosophy became a gateway to creativity, progress, and glory in the Islamic world since its emergence in the 9th century until around the 15th century, before Islamic civilization eventually experienced degradation and decadence. This great achievement was possible because philosophy, through its critical and analytical methods and the anti-classical spirit of the Qur'an, was able to accommodate other sciences and engage in dialectics, so that new sciences, such as science, medicine, physics, astronomy, politics, and others in the field of rational science, were born from philosophy. Philosophy also encouraged the dynamics of religious science, giving rise to sub-sciences resulting from the dialectic of philosophy and religious science, such as philosophical Sufism, the theory of *uṣūl al-fiqh*, rational theology, Qur'anic hermeneutics, and so on (Hanafi 2004, 5; Bagir 2020, 50–51). The readings of al-Jābirī and Ḥasan Ḥanafī have resulted in a revitalization and reorientation of Islamic philosophy that is useful for the development of contemporary Islamic studies.

Both al-Jābirī and Ḥasan Ḥanafī have provided examples of how their interpretations can revitalize and reorient Islamic philosophy. For example, al-Jābirī's project of critiquing Arab rationalism is actually the result of applying his interpretive method to Islamic philosophy and Islamic thought in general. Driven by a spirit of rationalism and objectivism, al-Jābirī felt that there was something wrong with the structure of Arab society's consciousness or Arab reason. He may have questioned why Islamic philosophy in the East was different from that in the West; Eastern philosophy was more often concerned with Sufism and theology, so that the development of philosophy was only a defensive effort to uphold beliefs, while Islamic philosophy in the West

showed constructive thinking, which was truly philosophy in al-Jābirī's sense, based on science, mathematics, and logic, resulting in "secular" philosophical and scientific thinking (Syafrin 2014, 234).

Faced with the problems plaguing the contemporary Arab world—that is, in al-Jābirī's era—was the problem of modernity. Al-Jābirī felt the need to reconstruct Islamic philosophy, which is part of Arab reasoning, based on definite reasoning or rationality, as philosophy should be; he pointed out the need to develop a strong epistemology because the old Arab reasoning was not built on the proper foundation, and, unfortunately, the Arab people were unconsciously controlled by this old reasoning. Therefore, his reading of Islamic tradition, including philosophy, resulted in the popular "structure of Arab reasoning": *bayānī*, *irfānī*, and *burhānī* (Novia 2020, 147).

By analyzing each category, al-Jābirī places his hopes on *burhānī* epistemology because the *burhānī* epistemological system is based on human empirical and rational abilities. The source of this epistemology is reality and empiricism; the social and humanities domains in the sense of science are obtained from experiments, research, trials, in laboratories, or in the real world, both social and natural (Novia 2020, 150).

Meanwhile, Ḥasan Ḥanafī provides a completely different example. Ḥasan Ḥanafī's orientation is praxis, namely, how the reading of Islamic philosophy can produce theories that can be directly applied in reality. His criticism of rhetoric that obscures the potential of tradition and his proposed method result in a "pure" philosophy: free from abstract, metaphysical, and illuminative meanings as found in its classical form. Then, according to current needs, philosophy is confronted with actual problems such as poverty, racism, hunger, climate crisis, and so on; next, this "pure" philosophy is made down-to-earth, that is, focused on solving humanitarian problems; from theocentric to anthropocentric. The most obvious example of the application of this method is the "Islamic Left" project of Ḥasan Ḥanafī (Rufaiqoh et al. 2023, 165).

According to Kazuo Shimogaki, the Islamic Left is an Islam-based manifesto that is considered the perfect teaching from God to humans. The foundation of Islamic Leftism is, of course, tawhid (Shimogaki 2011, 17–18). Ḥasan Ḥanafī understands tawhid not in the old sense as a testimony to the oneness of God, something that all Muslims already do; according to him, tawhid today is related to "our contemporary crises" such as poverty, oppression, capitalism, and, as a matter of urgent necessity, the liberation of Palestine (Hanafi 2001, 22; Shimogaki 2011, 15). Next, a new understanding of tawhid and its contextualization with the current situation requires praxis or direct practice of this new theory/interpretation, and in this case, Islamic Left is a praxis ideology that must be implemented by all Muslims.

It is quite clear that al-Jābirī and Ḥasan Ḥanafī provide direct examples

of the application of their reading methods to the tradition of Islamic philosophy. In al-Jābirī's example, we find that Islamic philosophy is no longer read from a single perspective, that is, read only in its cognitive/epistemological aspects, such as reading Ibn Sina, al-Gazali, and Ibn Rushd alone. What needs to be considered is the ideological aspect that unconsciously shapes philosophical texts, and from this aspect, Islamic philosophy can be studied dynamically and progressively. The reorientation of Islamic philosophy in 'Ābid al-Jābirī's thinking is part of his grand project to revive Islamic rationality and free Arab-Islamic thought from its epistemological crisis. This reorientation departs from a critical analysis of the structure of reason (*'aql*) that shapes the Arab-Islamic scientific tradition, and is directed at renewing a more rational, objective, and contextual way of thinking. Similarly, the example of Ḥasan Ḥanafī shows that philosophy is no longer read rhetorically, but reconstructively. The goal is not philosophy itself, but rather a greater purpose: the formation of an emancipatory ideology. There has been a shift in the orientation of philosophy from the divine (theocentric) to humanity (anthropocentric).

### **The Contribution of Reading to the Development of Contemporary Islamic Studies**

An interesting study for 'Ābid al-Jābirī and Ḥasan Ḥanafī—apart from philosophy—is Qur'anic hermeneutics. This is because both believe that the Qur'an is the source and center of Islamic tradition, so it needs to be treated correctly, objectively, and continuously, and reopened from—in Arkoun's terms—its status as an “official closed corpus.” 'Ābid al-Jābirī argues that the way to liberate the Qur'an is to read it not in the order of the official Ottoman mushaf, but in the order of the revelation or *tartīb al-nuzūl*, to link the Qur'an with history. Next, with his three methods (structural, historical, and ideological), al-Jābirī hopes that the Qur'an will be authentic and contemporary in itself, and that readers can also engage in dialectics with the authentic Qur'an based on their needs (Wijaya 2017, 221–26).

The same spirit is shown by Ḥasan Ḥanafī in his theory of interpretation, which Ilham B. Saenong calls hermeneutics of liberation (Saenong 2002, 8). Still related to his reading method (deconstruction, phenomenology, and hermeneutics), which is articulated with other terms: historical, eidetic, and practical criticism, Ḥasan Ḥanafī proposes that the Qur'an must engage in dialogue with reality. Ideally, theoretically, praxis is carried out by comparing the ideal structure reflected in the formulation of new meanings from the activity of interpretation and the social structure obtained from the analysis of factual situations (Saenong 2002, 158–59). This means that the Qur'an is not read and understood for its own sake, but for the sake of a “revolution” in consciousness and social movement.

Through the reading methods they initiated, both 'Ābid al-Jābirī and Ḥasan Ḥanafī made important contributions in opening up space for a more contextual, historical, and critical re-reading of the Qur'an. Both of them participated—along with contemporary Islamic thinkers—in breaking down the status of the Qur'an as an official closed corpus. They offered hermeneutical ideas based on the needs of the people and social realities. This was an important step towards a new direction in contemporary tafsir studies that was more dynamic and transformative.

In addition to philosophy and hermeneutics, the field of history is also an area of focus for these two philosophers. History is an important part of Islamic studies, especially as an approach to understanding Islam (historical method). Although very important, history in Islamic studies is understood in a conventional and linear sense, and the “best” innovation in understanding history so far is to understand it in a social context, also known as “social history” (Arfa, Syam, and Nasution 2015, 134). This understanding still leaves gaps, such as “what if history is not as it is presented?” and “isn't history written by the victors?”

For al-Jābirī, history is the space in which structures of reason are formed, so that the reading of Islamic history must be done structurally and ideologically, not just narratively. He suggests reading history, especially historical figures, carefully and critically in relation to socio-political aspects, ideology, and the vision that arose from the struggles with the realities of their time. Through this method, history will be revealed as it should be, showing the conflicts and interests within it without the veil of ideology; according to al-Jābirī, written history is ideology (Jabiri 2018, 523).

Ḥasan Ḥanafī seems to criticize the historical method because it examines history *in a fragmented manner* and only touches on the formal aspects of Islamic history, thus “completely leaving out the roots of the phenomenon in revelation or consciousness” and lacking interpretation. Unfortunately, the historical method is often used by Orientalists who become “scientifically arrogant” (Hanafi 2001, 102). In line with al-Jābirī, history must be understood in its totality and interpreted according to current needs, or in other words, history must be reconstructed. Ḥanafī does not reject the total historical approach. He rejects the Western historical method, which only understands fragments of history in historical reports (*taqrīrī*) (Hanafi 2001, 114).

Through the historical perspectives and approaches they propose, al-Jābirī and Ḥasan Ḥanafī have gone beyond conventional descriptive approaches. They place history as a field of consciousness and criticism, rather than simply recounting or repetitively presenting narratives of the past. Of course, they are not the first to do this. For example, Ḥasan Ḥanafī mentions the name of Ṭayyib Tīzīnī (1934–2019) as a professional philosopher who wrote Arab history from a materialistic perspective

(Hanafi 1995, 254). In any case, in this way, the study of Islamic history and the historical methods used in Islamic studies become more reflective, ideological, and relevant to the current conditions of the ummah.

Understandably, the contributions of ‘Ābid al-Jābirī and Ḥasan Ḥanafī to contemporary Islamic studies are not only limited to the tradition of Islamic philosophy, but extend to other fields of Islamic studies such as Qur’anic hermeneutics and Islamic historiography. They offer a new approach that opens up space for a more dynamic, relevant, and transformative re-reading of the classical Islamic scholarly tradition. This is an important foundation in the effort to build Islamic studies, which were previously oriented only towards the preservation of a mono-disciplinary tradition with outdated methodologies, into Islamic studies that are responsive to the realities of the times and the needs of the ummah, as well as relevant to *contemporary* Islam.

## **Conclusion**

The tradition of Islamic philosophy has experienced a crisis of innovation that has caused it to become stuck in repetition and lose its relevance to contemporary human problems. This problem, as pointed out by ‘Ābid al-Jābirī, is rooted in an inappropriate way of reading tradition, resulting in stagnant reasoning. The solution offered is to carry out an epistemological deconstruction of *turāth* through structural, historical, and ideological criticism methods, so that we can distinguish between traditions that freeze the mind and those that can be redeveloped, especially the *rational-burhānī* aspect that is based on logical and empirical arguments, as has developed in Western Islamic philosophy.

Meanwhile, Ḥasan Ḥanafī emphasizes that the tradition of Islamic philosophy should not be viewed as a thing of the past, but rather as an ideological and practical resource that must be reconstructed to face the challenges of modernity and Western domination. With a phenomenological-hermeneutic approach, he emphasizes a reading of *turāth* that is biased towards the current reality of the ummah, so that tradition functions as an instrument of emancipation and social transformation. From these two perspectives, it can be concluded that the revitalization of Islamic philosophy requires a critical, creative, and contextual re-reading of tradition, so that Islamic philosophy can re-emerge as an intellectual and cultural force in building a rational, just, and humane civilization.

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