

DISCOURSE ON MOVEMENT AND THE THEORY OF TRANSUBSTANTIAL MOVEMENT OF MULLĀ ṢADRĀ IN THE PROCESS OF PERFECTION OF THE SOUL

Kholid Al Walid*

Universitas Islam Negeri (UIN) Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, Indonesia;
kholid.alwalid@uinjkt.ac.id

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Abstract: *Motion is a natural law that both physicists and philosopher's study. Physicists persistently pursued the concept of motion, but motion in modern science is only elaborated as a material natural phenomenon so do the Greek and peripatetic philosophers in the Islamic philosophy tradition. The fundamental question this article wants to answer is whether motion is only limited to material and accidental as believed by Physicists and Greek and peripatetic philosophers in the Islamic philosophy tradition. Mullā Ṣadrā, the philosopher of muta'āliyah wisdom, shows evidence that motion is not limited to these two things but also occurs at the substance level (al-ḥarakah al-jawhariyyah). The problem in this case, which is also related to the Soul as the Substance of the human self is whether the soul experiences motion and if the soul experiences motion, what kind of motion happens to it. To answer this, a literature study was conducted using an analytical argumentative approach commonly used in philosophical research. Based on the evidence used by Mullā Ṣadrā, it can be proven that the movement is not only limited to the accidental level but also the substance level besides the soul experiences movement, which is the movement of perfection in the physical and spiritual as well as in the world and afterlife.*

Keywords: *Accident, Existence, Motion, Soul, Trans-Substantial Motion.*

Abstrak: Gerak adalah sebuah hukum alam yang selama ini dikaji oleh ahli fisika dan filsafat. Para fisikawan terus-menerus menekuni konsep gerak, namun gerak dalam sains modern hanya dielaborasi sebagai fenomena alam material, begitu pula para filsuf Yunani dan peripatetik dalam tradisi filsafat Islam. Pertanyaan fundamental dari artikel ini adalah hendak menjawab apakah gerak itu hanya terbatas pada materi dan bersifat aksidental sebagaimana yang umumnya dipercaya oleh fisikawan dan filsuf peripatetik Yunani di dalam tradisi filsafat Islam. Mullā Ṣadrā, seorang filsuf *ḥikmah muta'āliyah* menunjukkan berbagai bukti bahwa gerak tidak hanya terbatas pada dua hal tersebut (materi dan aksiden) tapi juga terjadi pada level substansi (*al-ḥarakah al-jawhariyyah*).

* Corresponding Author

Masalah dalam kasus ini yang juga berkaitan dengan jiwa sebagai substansi manusia adalah apakah jiwa mengalami gerak dan jika jiwa mengalaminya, gerak seperti apa yang terjadi pada jiwa. Karenanya untuk menjawab pertanyaan ini peneliti melakukan studi literatur dengan menggunakan pendekatan analisis argumentatif yang secara umum digunakan dalam penelitian filosofis. Berdasarkan bukti bukti yang digunakan oleh Mullā Ṣadrā bahwa gerak tidak hanya terjadi pada level aksiden melainkan terjadi pada level substansi. Selain itu, jiwa mengalami pengalaman gerak, di mana gerak tersebut adalah gerakan menyempurna di dalam fisik dan spiritualitasnya sebagaimana yang terjadi di dunia materi maupun non-materi.

Kata-kata Kunci: *Aksiden, Gerak, Gerak Transsubstansial, Jiwa, Wujūd.*

Introduction

Motion is defined as the movement of an object from one point to another. In everyday life, humans are inseparable from this phenomenon and experience this motion process personally indeed motion is a phenomenon whose existence cannot be denied (Kamal 2006, 49). This phenomenon occurs in animals that move with the desire because of stimulation in finding food or the fear of threats. In contrast, humans move with desires that are more complex than what happens to animals. The earth and planets also experience motion both by rotation and revolution. Scientists have tried throughout time to create a means of transportation that with the motion that occurs on it can transport objects from one place to another with the acceleration of motion so that the travel time is short and now we can have a variety of extraordinary means of transportation (Lee 2019, 27; Lohse 2017, 14; Papakonstantinou and Skoumios 2021, 459).

Motion as an objective phenomenon is an ordinary event and part of nature's laws. Physicists observe and analyze this motion and produce many views and analyses. Galileo (1564–1642) transformed the understanding of motion with more empirical experiments and observations. His contributions include the concept of inertia, where an object in motion will continue to move at a constant velocity unless an external force acts on it. The acceleration of a free-falling object is the same for all masses (ignoring air resistance) Galileo's view underlies the birth of Newton's laws of motion and challenges Aristotle's view of the need for force to maintain motion (Whitehouse 2009, 219; Ibnnumalik et al. 2022, 390).

Sir Isaac Newton (1643–1727) developed a more formal framework for motion in his "*Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica*" (1687). His laws of motion include the first law (Law of Inertia): An object will remain at rest or in uniform motion in a straight line unless acted upon by a force. Second law (Law of $F=ma$): The acceleration of an object is directly proportional to the net force acting on it and inversely proportional to its mass. Third law (action-reaction): for every action, there is an equal

and opposite reaction (Nejati et al. 2020, 269). Newton combined the concepts of linear and rotational motion into a universal framework of laws, covering the motion of celestial bodies as well as motion on Earth (Newton 1846; Ucar and Merter 2022, 7690).

Albert Einstein (1879–1955) took the debate about motion to a more complex level with his theory of relativity: special relativity (1905): which showed that Newton's laws of motion do not hold at speeds close to the speed of light. Mass and energy are related, and time and space are relative, depending on the speed of the observer. General relativity (1915): introduced the concept of gravity as the curvature of space-time, changing the way objects in a gravitational field were viewed (Heilbron 2003, 120; Verawati, Handriani, and Prahani 2022, 15).

At the subatomic scale, quantum mechanics introduces the concept that particles can behave like waves and their positions cannot be determined with certainty (Heisenberg's uncertainty principle) (Huff 2003, 70). This is in contrast to the description of motion in classical mechanics which is based on definite positions and velocities. In the theory of contemporary physicist Stephen Hawking, even though he does not specifically talk about motion, Hawking expanded it by combining Einstein's general relativity with quantum mechanics, two major theories that describe the universe on a macro and micro scale. This theory, if it is found, will be able to explain all physical phenomena that occur in the universe, both at the cosmic and subatomic levels and Hawking calls his theory the theory of everything (Gribbin and White 1992).

The debate and understanding of motion in physics has evolved from Aristotle's static view to the sophisticated discoveries of relativity and quantum mechanics. Each era brought new perspectives that transformed the scientific understanding of how motion works in the universe (Jun 2014). Modern Western Philosophers such as Hegel (1770-1831) put forward a dictum that later became very famous "*Alles vernunftig ist wirklich und alles wirkliche ist vernunftig*" (Everything rational is real and everything real is rational). According to Hegel, motion is a rational law and it proves that motion is reality on this basis, the universe develops (Harris 1983, 55).

Until now, physicists persistently pursued the concept of motion, but motion in modern science is only elaborated as a material natural phenomenon so that it is not at all related to metaphysical matters. So that, it can be ascertained in the view of physicists, motion is only limited to physical objects and cannot occur outside of the physical. Even based on the views above, we find that motion only occurs accidentally and horizontally. This is different from the discussion of motion in Islamic Philosophy, where the mover is non-material and even further includes non-material substances as well as being a series of evidence of the existence of the main source of the immovable mover.

Islamic Philosophy and Movement

Islamic philosophy has a fairly long history, starting from the meeting of Islam with the Persian tradition after the conquest of Persia by Islam. The meeting of Islam with the great and long Persian civilization brought many influences into Islam and the Arab nation that had just emerged from the era of ignorance (Bahrami and Jahromi 2024, 107). Persia has given birth to many thinkers and philosophers and according to Khamne'i many Greek philosophers immigrated to Persia when the Romans invaded Greece while in Persia itself Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian thought had developed (Shīrāzī 1999, xii).

The meeting between the newly growing muslims with speculative thoughts about God, Nature, and Man sparked the development of new thoughts in the Islamic world. Great philosophers were born from the embryo of Islam and developed various thoughts, from al-Kindi to contemporary philosophers such as Ṭabāṭabā'ī (Bilad 2018, 82; Sholeh et al. 2024, 60; Kamankesh and Ghayedi 2023, 89). They carved various great ideas in the long journey of Islamic Civilization (Nasr 2001, 64). In addition, there are three main Madrasahs of Islamic Philosophy, namely: *al-mashā'iyyah* (peripatetic), *al-ishrāqiyyah* (illumination), and *al-ḥikmah al-muta'aliyyah*. *Madrasah Ḥikmah al-Muta'aliyyah* is a madrasah of Islamic philosophy that has developed until now (Nasr and Leaman 1996).

The main founder of *Madrasah Ḥikmah al-Muta'aliyyah* was Muḥammad Ibrāhīm al-Qawwami al-Shīrazi, better known as Mullā Ṣadrā (Nasr 2006). Mullā Ṣadrā succeeded in carrying out a synthesis between various schools of thought that previously developed in Islam, and which conflicted with each other. Between kalam science, sufism, philosophy, and religious belief doctrine. Sharif describes:

The particular genius of Mullā Ṣadrā was to synthesize and unite the three paths leading to the truth, viz., revelation, rational demonstration, and purification as soul, which later, in turn, leads to illumination. For him, gnosis, philosophy, and revealed religion were elements of a harmonious ensemble the harmony he sought to reveal in his own life and his writing. He formulated a perspective in which rational demonstration of philosophy, although not necessarily limited to that of the Greeks, became closely tied to the Qur'an and the sayings of the prophet and the Imams, and these, in turn, became unified with the gnosis doctrine which resulted from the illumination received by a purified soul. That is why Mullā Ṣadrā's writing combines logical statements, Gnostic intuition, traditional prophets, and the Qur'anic verse (Sharif 1963, 939).

Henry Corbin explains:

C'est dans cette solitude de jardins que Mollā Sadrā consacra plusieurs années de sa jeunesse à atteindre à cette réalisation spirituelle personnelle pour laquelle la philo- sophie est l'indispensable point de départ, mais sans laquelle, aux yeux de Sadrā et de tous ceux de son école, la philosophie ne serait qu'une entreprise stérile et illusoire. Pour entrer dans cette solitude. et pour en ressortir victorieusement, il

fallait avoir déjà pratiqué la haute discipline personnelle qui garantit l'indépendance à l'égard des opinions toutes faites, opinions reçues ou opinions prohibées (Corbin 1984, 7).

Many great principles of philosophy were produced by Mullā Ṣadrā and among the important tenets is *al-ḥarakah al-jawhariyyah* (trans-substantial movement). In general, pre-Mullā Ṣadrā's concept of motion was developed by Ibn Sīnā and also continued by Ibn Rushd. Both muslim philosophers have the view that motion is only limited to the accidental level (*al-'araḍ*) and does not occur at the substance level (*al-jawhar*) (Researches, Shanazari, and Hadi 2020, 3761; Darrehbaghi 2021, 139).

In his book, *al-Shifā'*, Ibn Sīnā refers to the problem of the discontinuity of the subject and attempts to reject the trans-substantial motion with an explicit explanation that cannot be interpreted and considers it impossible. According to him, this phenomenon that vaguely represents a prolonged trans-substantial motion has no continuation and is a discontinuous process full of intervals, which is under the control of a power that transcends the realm of nature.

Concerning the unity of the four causes, and precisely in the Aristotelian example of the creation of the human individual and the evolution of his traits, Ibn Sīnā states:

And thus, it undergoes metamorphosis and transformation to the point of intensity and then breaks off. But on the surface, this gives rise to the error of assuming that the journey is a single process from one form to another. Consequently, it is assumed that there is motion in the substance, when in fact there is not; rather, there are separate movements and moments (Sīnā 1984, 124).

Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna) presents a different view of motion and creation that differs significantly from Aristotelian philosophy. In *al-Shifā'*, he argues against the concept of trans-substantial motion—that is, the idea that matter itself undergoes continuous transformation or movement from one form to another. Instead, he proposes that what appears to be smooth transformations are a series of discrete, unextended moments. These moments, called "*sukūnat*," are moments in which the Form-Giver (God) intervenes to give new form when the basic substance is ready (Sīnā 1984, 123–25).

Ibn Sīnā's view asserts that substantial form does not come into being through a natural process of motion inherent in the substance itself, but rather is given by an external creator. For example, the stages of human development—such as sperm, blood clots, and flesh—do not come into being through a continuous motion inherent in the substance. Rather, these stages result from certain qualitative and quantitative changes that prepare the material to receive a form from a divine agent when it reaches a state of perfect readiness (Jamebozorgi 2024, 18). Thus, Ibn Sīnā frames creation as an act of divine will, rather than as a purely natural or material phenomenon (Sīnā 1984, 128).

This concept marks a fundamental departure from Aristotle. Aristotle's philosophy held that pure actuality, as the highest cause, operates without movement or change and does not act as an active creator as God does according to Ibn Sīnā (Siraazi 1987; Nurdin, Nasution, and Nasution 2019, 532). For Aristotle, all beings emerge from a pre-existent state of actuality, not from nothingness, since being cannot emerge from nothing. Consequently, Greek philosophy did not view creation *ex nihilo* as its primary problem but rather focused on the transition from potentiality to actuality in terms of continuous movement (Furley 1999, 13).

In short, Ibn Sīnā posits divine intervention as a creative act that introduces new forms into existence, as opposed to the Aristotelian unmoved mover, who influences the cosmos indirectly as the primary cause of all motion but does not actively create. This distinction highlights a broader philosophical difference between Islamic metaphysics, with its focus on divine agency, and Greek philosophy, which emphasized self-contained natural processes.

Trans-Substantial Movement (*al-Ḥarakah al-Jawhariyyah*)

One of the issues that philosophers always discuss is the matter of motion because it is a fundamental part when discussing quiddity. Theories about this motion vary widely, some of which view motion as a process of occurrence and destruction. This idea comes from al-Fārābī, Ibn Rushd specifically wrote this theory in a special work entitled *Talkhiṣ al-Kawn wa al-Fasād* in which Ibn Rushd tried to prove the truth of this theory. According to him, motion is the process of moving from one point to the next by eliminating the first point forming the second point, and so on (Rushd 1995, 51).

Ibn Sīnā describes movement as two subjective and objective processes. In the subjective process, a gradual process (*tadrij*) occurs from one point to the next point across space so that movement occurs, this condition according to Ibn Sīnā only occurs subjectively in the observer because the merging of these points into one part only occurs in the subject's perception while the objective is the form of an object that is considered to be moving and the object is permanent which is between the beginning and the end (Sīnā 1996, 33).

Mir Damad rejected Ibn Sīnā's assumption that motion is subjective by putting forward the view that in motion there is constant continuity and that objects remembering space and time are objective realities (Damad 1967, 183–238). Mullā Ṣadrā, like his teacher, rejected Ibn Sīnā's view, but unlike his teacher, Mullā Ṣadrā showed that movement is not only something objective and continuous but also includes substance, in this principle Mullā Ṣadrā contradicts all previous philosophers (Walid 2023, 177).

Before Mullā Ṣadrā, the general view that occurred among philosophers

including Ibn Sīnā was that movement only occurs in four categories of quiddity: quantity (*kam*), quality (*kayf*), position (*wadʿ*), and place (*ayn*). Substance (*jawhar*) in this view is permanent because only changes and movements occur in these four categories, the main objection if there is a change in substance is the impossibility of determining something. In their view, something that was in the past is something that is now and something that is now is something that will come. Like the question of Ibn Sīnā's main student, Bahmaniyar to his teacher Ibn Sīnā: "Why is it impossible for movement to occur in substance?" Ibn Sīnā replied, "If there is movement in substance, then the past Ibn Sīnā is no longer the present Ibn Sīnā" (Rakhmat 2004, xix).

According to Mullā Ṣadrā, movement can't occur only in accidents (*al-ʿaraḍ*) because accidents always depend on substance, so if movement occurs in accidents, it clearly shows movement that occurs in substance. If it can occur (movement) in quantity and quality and its unlimited parts between the two potentially in the sense that Being always renews its identity both in quantity and quality. Then it can also occur in formative substance (Ṭabāṭabā'ī 1387, 69). So that the substance can strengthen and become more perfect in its substance as a Being with a single identity in a continuous manner, different in the process of arriving at substantive identity and unity (Shirazi 1981, 85).

Changes in objects at the accidental level clearly show substantial changes; At the accidental level; the apple was originally dark green then changed to light green, red, and yellow. At the substantial level; the apple was originally young, medium, ripe, and rotten.

Table 1. Example the Changes that Occur in an Apple

Movement	1	2	3	4
Accident	Dark Green	Light Green	Red	Yellow
Substation	Young	Curently	Ripe	Rotten

Trans-substantial movement occurs covering everything, both physically and spiritually. According to Mullā Ṣadrā, humans originally came from the first matter (*mādah al-ūla*) which was combined with the form (*ṣūrah*), through the trans-substantial movement these elements experienced development and change, the matter developed into a blood clot, and then a fetus, baby, child, teenager, adult, old and destroyed. While the form developed into a moving soul (*nafs al-mutaḥarrik*), then the animal soul (*nafs al-ḥaywāniyyāh*), and the human soul (*nafs al-insāniyyāh*). The trans-substantial movement that occurs in matter leads to destruction. While the trans-substantial movement that occurs in the soul leads to perfection (Kalin 2010, 35).

If the movement is as Mullā Ṣadrā put forward certainly still leaves the issue of the unity of identity, because as Ibn Sīnā stated above, if at the level

of substance, there is movement then there is no unity of identity left in the object. According to Mullā Ṣadrā, identity is a structure of events and does not then eliminate the previous object as understood in the theory of *al-kawn wa al-fasād*, but what happens through this movement is an increase in quality which he calls *al-labs ba'da labs* (Shīrāzī 1981, 427), (Getting dressed after getting dressed), according to him the series of events in the movement is like a person getting dressed without removing the previous clothes, there is an increase in quality without eliminating the previous quality, this is certainly a new view and contradicts previous theories that have existed about movement, even though Sabzawari as a Sadrian philosopher later had a slightly different view from Mullā Ṣadrā.

In Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophy, the natural motion of Aristotle and the gradual motion of Ibn Sīnā are replaced by trans-substantial and existential motion originating from the eternal source of Divine grace which is always graceful and always abundant. However, it must be considered that the source of grace does not cause motion but is the cause of eternal and interconnected forms whose fruit is motion itself (Mostafavi and Arefinia 2021, 89). Such statements and thoughts do not correspond to Aristotle's philosophy either in terms of their content or the relationship between the four causes. All motion, which Aristotle sees in essentials and from nature, Mullā Ṣadrā sees in the essence of being and attributes to the Divine creative power (Kamal 2006, 29).

It is in this respect that Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophy differs greatly from Aristotle's philosophy; for Aristotle had presented his discussion of motion in physics and through that discussion, he arrived at the metaphysical distinction between perceptible and imperceptible entities. Aristotle's main aim in his philosophy was to explain nature, that is, the "where" and "why" of the perceptible, observable, and real world in which man lives and is constantly involved (Strauss 1963, 35). This main aim in turn characterizes the nature of his metaphysics. That is, were it not for the necessity of furnishing his natural philosophy following his worldview, knowledge of metaphysics would not have been necessary for him, nor would it have been meaningful in his philosophical system. Aristotle's metaphysics, therefore, is not a problem unrelated to physics and the natural world; in other words, metaphysics is not outside the real and perceptible facts.

Unlike Aristotle, Mullā Ṣadrā considered the problem of motion to be related to metaphysics and explored it in his philosophy under the title of the division of existence into that which is constant and that which is becoming. He uses a precise expression in *al-Asfār* which shows that the problem of motion is related to metaphysics (Shīrāzī 1981, 85). He states that "motion is the renewal of an event, not an event that is renewed," and says that the permanence of motion for the renewing and moving individual is not like the occurrence of an accident for the subject; rather,

it is an 'analytical accident' whose relation to the subject is like the relation of differentia to genus. Sabziwārī, in his commentary on *al-Asfār*, presents the following statement:

Except that trans-substantial motion, like the flow of nature, is not one of the accidents of the body; but rather one of its principles, since the existence of nature is moved and nature is the differentia of the body and precedes it. So, it is a particularization by nature itself, and not after it (Kamal 2006, 38).

From the above discussion, it can be concluded that in the view of Mullā Ṣadrā and his followers, motion and becoming are not opposed to existence in the sense of existence; rather, existence is of two kinds. The first is a kind of existence that is constant and has no temporal dimension that cannot be measured by temporal criteria and; therefore, is not subject to change and transformation. The second is a moved existence that has a temporal dimension that extends over some time and its existence is the same as it becoming (Ṭabāṭabā'ī 1387, 68–70). According to rational evidence, such an entity is essentially material or belongs to matter and is united with it in the same way as the human soul is capable of movement and change as long as it has some kind of belonging and attachment to the body.

Mullā Ṣadrā proved the existence of motion in the external world basically through rational proof and refutation of the arguments of Parmenides and Zenon and not through sense perception. In his opinion, motion is a secondary philosophical concept that can be understood and not an essential concept; and his discussion is philosophical and metaphysical, not a discussion in the field of empirical science. This is because he believes that the concept of motion is not achieved through abstraction and generalization by sense perception; rather, similar to other metaphysical categories; it is achieved through analysis and interpretation of existing objects of perception (Corbin 1984, 65). Thus, we understand existential motion and its extension over time first through knowledge through the presence and recognizing the properties of motion through rational analysis in the form of philosophical secondary understanding. Then, through matching these properties with external objects, we recognize the existence of motion in the external world.

Mullā Ṣadrā theory about this movement is at first glance almost similar to Darwin's theory of evolution, except that in Darwin there is a leap of genus and is limited to the material level, while in Mullā Ṣadrā the genus remains only increasing in quality towards the spiritual level. Forms experience changes in higher forms, we can say that movement brings all species to develop from a general level to a more specific and concrete level. The trans-substantial movement initiated by Mullā Ṣadrā is contrary to the atomism theory of al-Ash'arī and al-Fakhr al-Rāzī, if in the atomism theory identity is formed from different atoms, for Mullā Ṣadrā identity is formed from the structure of events from particular forms that

carry out continuous movement towards a certain form (Rahman 1975, 132).

With this theory of *al-ḥarākat al-jawhariyyāh*, Mullā Ṣadrā shows that the entire universe is always in its original attribute, which is new (*hudūth*) and something new is always in change. Therefore, in the argument about Movement, Mullā Ṣadrā proves that Movement comes from Constant Substance and that is *wājib al-wujūd* (necessary being).

Trans-Substantial Movement and Perfection of the Soul

One of the fundamental parts in the discussion of eschatology is the discussion of the reality of the soul because in any case, the arguments put forward about eschatology all depend on the proof of the soul. Mullā Ṣadrā put forward this principle as the basis for the eschatological view that he built. The important parts of the problem of the soul that need to be put forward here include:

1. Arguments for the existence of the Soul

The soul is a reflection of “*A substance that is non-material in nature but is bound to matter in its activity*” (Ṭabāṭabā’ī 1387, 69). Mullā Ṣadrā provides evidence for the existence of the soul by putting forward three forms of argumentation (Shīrāzī 1981, 6–9).

- a. The most important form of the believer and the absence of futility in the creation of the form of the believer (*imkān al-ashrāf wa ‘adam abāthiah khalq al-mumkināt*). Mullā Ṣadrā with this argument, wants to show that Allah SWT when creating his creatures started from the creation of the most important and perfect substance. The first substance because of its proximity to the source of creation and is the first creation, then its quality becomes unlimited. The next substance has similarities with the first in perfection although in terms of quality, it is below the first level and so on until the lowest level, namely the possible being which is at the limit of actualization of potential to become actual and gives rise to forms of life and gives rise to instinctive effects that guide the creature in its level of life to continue to the main goal of its life. The being at this level that releases the potential to become action is called the soul. The material elements that are manifested only have the receptive potential to receive the soul. The process of actualization of potential to become action is the process of perfecting each form of being showing the absence of futility of each form of being and this is only possible if in the possible being there is an element that drives actualization, and that element is none other than the soul (Shīrāzī 1981, 6–9).
- b. The emergence of effects from matter (*ṣudūr al-athār ‘an al-ajsām*).

This argument is based on the effects that arise from material forms without any external intervention or desire to present them. For example; what happens to the senses, that the senses perceive what is around them by themselves, or the movement that occurs, development or growth or giving birth to a type that is similar to itself. For Mullā Ṣadrā this cannot possibly be present from matter even the primary matter, because the primary matter is only an absolute receptor without the possibility for it to carry out activities let alone produce effects. Therefore, for Mullā Ṣadrā, the effects that occur in the material forms above must come from something other than matter and that is the soul (Shīrāzī 1981, 6).

- c. Life is a Soul (*al-Ḥayah hiya al-Nafs*). The third argument put forward by Mullā Ṣadrā is the argument of life. When we see various beings having senses and perceiving images of things, we know that the beings are alive. The senses and the ability to perceive objects come from among three possibilities: First, the primary source which is the soul. Second, the body which has a soul. Third, the body (Ṭabāṭabā'ī 1387, 69–72).

Mullā Ṣadrā rejected the last two possibilities because according to him if it comes from the physical that has a soul then how is it possible that it happens at the same time the physical is nothing but an object controlled by the soul while the possibility that the ability to perceive only comes from the physical alone Mullā Ṣadrā gave a deeper explanation, according to him that the meaning of the universe, soul, life is not the same, because the meaning of the universe is nothing but a physical form whose existence is preceded by another form as a source for its existence and life. Mullā Ṣadrā in this case gave the example of a boat that provides certain benefits, but these benefits are very dependent on the presence of another form, namely the rower. Thus, according to Mullā Ṣadrā, a certain physical form to produce an effect requires another form other than itself and so on. According to Mullā Ṣadrā, this condition is contrary to the meaning of perfection (Shīrāzī 1981, 21).

There are various other arguments put forward by Mullā Ṣadrā in his attempt to prove the existence of the soul, but the above arguments are sufficient to demonstrate the existence of the soul.

2. Substantial Soul (*Jawhariyyāt al-Nafs*)

Among the ten categories (*maqūlat*) in the division of quiddity proposed by Mullā Ṣadrā, there is a basic division of the categories, namely Substance and Accident. The substance is a description of something

that “If it exists externally, it does not depend on the locus and does not need it in its existence” (*idhā wujiddat fī al-Khārij wujudat lā fī mawḍū‘ mustaghni ‘anha fī wujūdihi*) (Ṭabāṭabā’ī 1387, 68) whereas Accident is a depiction of if “Existing externally its existence depends on the locus and does not need it in its being” (*idhā wujiddat fī al-Khārij wujudat fī mawḍū‘ mustaghni ‘anha fī wujūdihi*) (Ṭabāṭabā’ī 1387, 68).

The existence of a substance is independent in the sense that its existence outside is not attached to or dependent on the existence of another, even though it becomes for the existence of accidents, while the genus above it is something that can no longer be defined, the substance is the highest part of the series of genera that can be known. The question then is whether the soul is a substance or falls into the category of accidents, if the soul falls into the category of accidents, then there is something else that is the essence of the human self as a locus for the human body. The following two arguments provide evidence for the substantiality of the soul:

- a. Various effects that come out such as growing, moving, and so on from various creatures, be it plants, animals, and humans are not caused by something outside of themselves but come from the creature itself. The self in question is not the material body because if so then the whole body will produce external effects therefore the source of the effect is none other than the soul. All forms that become the locus and support for something then that something is a substance, therefore the soul as the locus for various effects must be a substance (Yazdi 2000, 114–16).
- b. Mullā Ṣadrā proved the substantiality of the soul through the science of *ḥuḍūrī*. The explanation of this is as follows: Perception of something is the arrival of the object’s form in the subject. If the subject perceives himself then surely when the perception occurs, he does not need a certain space (as a medium for the emergence of himself as an object of perception) but stands in himself. If perception occurs in a certain space, then his form will not be present in himself but will be present in that space because the existence of the object that occupies it must always be bound to the space occupied and this is contrary to what has been determined (Gohari 1378, 68).

Self-perception is a perception that will never be separated from a person, while awareness of self-awareness or self-knowledge that is possessed can be forgotten at a certain time because knowledge of the existence of this knowledge is not the form of the self itself, this is the same as the subject’s perception of other external objects. With this argument, Mullā Ṣadrā proves that the existence of the soul is not attached to something else but to itself.

3. The Soul in Its Renewal as a Body and Its Eternity as a Spirit (*Nafs al-Jasmāniyah al-Ḥudūth Ruḥāniyyah al-Baqā'*)

What Mullā Ṣadrā means by physical renewal and immortality of the soul (*jasmāniyah al-ḥudūth wa ruḥāniyyah al-baqā'*) is the process of the emergence of a soul that is new and originates from the physical or material and then undergoes a process of perfection through trans-substantial movement (as explained previously) and then perfects itself to become spiritual and remains eternal in that condition.

This view is very much at odds with the previous philosophers of Mullā Ṣadrā who believed that the soul was created before the body was created and then merged with the newly created physical being (Daftari 2010, 38). For Mullā Ṣadrā, the soul occurs simultaneously with the physical and both originate from matter. When matter is first formed, two main elements form the matter, namely form and the basis of matter (*hayyūla*). This development of form is then actualized into the soul while basic matter is actualized into the body (Shīrāzī 1981, 21).

According to Mullā Ṣadrā, the soul is a human form that appears physically and becomes eternally spiritual (*jasmāniyah al-ḥudūth ruḥāniyyah al-baqā'*) (Rahman 1975, 267) as before, affective intellect (*'aql al-munfa'il*) is the end of the physical meaning and the beginning of the spiritual meaning. While humans are the connecting path (*the story of al-mamdūd*) Between the two worlds, he is simple through his spirit and composed through his body. His physical nature is the purest among the forms of earthly matter and his soul occupies the highest level among the primary souls (Shīrāzī, n.d., 223).

To prove this view, Mullā Ṣadrā put forward various pieces of evidence as follows (Shīrāzī, n.d., 220–28):

- a. Anything that is separated from matter will not unite with it and become a near accident (*'arīḍ al-qarīb*) on the basis that in reality the potential dimension and readiness to return to the issue that is substantially a potentiality that is solely produced from the form that forms it. Respondency is not itself but only a part of the main basic material (the life of the jurmians) surely anyone who believes that the soul is separate from matter and then joins with, this view will cause reincarnation to occur (Shīrāzī, n.d., 222).
- b. If the soul existed before the physical was created, then the soul could not possibly be plural or one. It is impossible for the first (plural) because differences only occur in something that has species boundaries. *Naw'* either through its materials, accidents, activities goals, or causes that affect this soul. While the form of the soul is also its substance because its unity in its species and its activities is one thing, its goals are connected to it and resemble it, then its plurality will only

occur either through matter or as it is in its determination (identity) like the body even though in reality the soul is separate from the body, this is inconsistent. The second (one) is because the plurality is accepted after the unity of the specifications of its measurements and accidents, while the soul is not like that (Shīrāzī, n.d., 209–20).

- c. If the soul was created before the body, then the soul must be pure reason and its condition can't change when it is separated from the realm of the sacred. *ʿAlam al-Quds* and then surrounded by various bodily vices. If the soul is a substantial soul, then the soul is only a vacuum since eternity because of the impossibility of moving and there is no vacuum in being. Mullā Ṣadrā, in this case, shows his consistency in rejecting reincarnation because the view that shows the existence of the soul before the existence of the body is trapped in the problem of reincarnation, and with this view Mullā Ṣadrā also shows the influence of the trans-substantial movement that changes matter into spirit and then releases the soul from its ties with matter and enters the realm of *barzakh* then continues to develop towards the afterlife as the spiritual realm and the peak of the soul's development (Shīrāzī, n.d., 220–28).

However, even though it contradicts most of the previous philosophers, there were some views of philosophers before Mullā Ṣadrā the real also views that the existence of the soul does not precede the existence of the body (Nejati et al. 2020, 267). Al-Fārābī and al-Ghazālī believe that the soul did not exist before the existence of the body, only that both of them provide a detailed explanation of how the soul appears together with the body. Al-Ghazālī only states briefly that the soul is created by Allah in *ʿAlam al-Amr* when the fetus is ready to receive the presence of the soul (Fakhry 2004, 421)

In Mullā Ṣadrā's logic, the soul can't experience destruction, because if destruction can occur in the soul, then surely the soul has the potential to receive destruction, while that potential is not the substance of the soul. Something that has the potential for destruction must be with something that is destroyed and that is matter, while the soul is a transcendent substance that is receptive to rational forms, therefore according to Mullā Ṣadrā, it is impossible for the soul to experience destruction (Shīrāzī 1981, 388). This is contrary to al-Fārābī's view because according to al-Fārābī souls that do not experience perfection will remain at their level as matter and can even be destroyed along with the destruction of that matter (Fārābī 1985, 142).

The soul as a substance experiences a movement that perfects the soul which according to Mullā Ṣadrā the soul moves from the level of *al-insān al-basharī* (physical-biological man) perfecting into *al-insān al-ʿaqli*

(intellectual man) perfecting into *al-insān al-malakūtī* (the spiritual man) and its peak reaches *al-insān al-ilāhī* (God's Man) namely a perfect human who has absorbed all the attributes of God (Ramin 2020, 29). The process of perfection is none other than the process of movement in that human potentiality becomes actual (Kalin 2010, 76).

For Mullā Ṣadrā, the soul as a source of *ḥarakah* is a mode that releases potentiality into actuality and the soul is the substance of the human self which therefore undergoes a process of development of perfection due to trans-substantial movement (Yazdi 2000, 37). As explained above, one of Mullā Ṣadrā's theories is *jasmāniyah al-ḥudūth ruḥāniyah al-baqā'* showing that the soul which was initially physical through trans-substantial movement develops into spirituality. Even after worldly life, the soul continues to develop through this trans-substantial movement and this answers the question of changes after death.

Conclusion

Motion is a law that occurs in the universe so physicists study it in depth. However, observations and analysis of motion developed by physicists are only material. Philosophers have discussed motion further before and shown evidence that motion is a law of possible existence. Motion is not just displacement but is interpreted by Aristotle as a change from potentiality to actuality. This definition is also later used by muslim philosophers.

However, the muslim peripatetic philosophers, especially Ibn Sīnā, understood motion to be limited to accidents and rejected the occurrence of motion at the level of substance, considering that generally the theory of motion developed in peripatetic philosophy is based on the theory of *al-kawn wa al-fasad* (construction and deconstruction).

Suhrawardī's pure light concept has significant relevance in facing the global challenge of environmental sustainability. This approach can overcome criticism of the anthropocentrism paradigm which tends to dominate nature, inviting humans to see nature as *tajāliyyat* or a manifestation of divine reality that must be respected. This concept also goes beyond the dichotomy of instrumental and intrinsic value, encouraging a more holistic approach to environmental conservation. The integration of illuminative and equilibrium-illuminative bio-spherical egalitarianism brings dimensions of social justice and ecological balance, emphasizing that humans are an inseparable part of nature and must care for it with full responsibility. In this way, Suhrawardī's Concept of Pure Light provides a philosophical framework capable of inspiring a holistic, long-term vision of the world, resolving tensions between humanity and nature, and generating deep insights into the relationship between the natural and spiritual worlds.

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