

AL-FĀRĀBĪ'S SYNTHESIS: PLATO, ARISTOTLE, AND THE SHAPING OF ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY

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Abstract: *The discourse surrounding Islamic philosophy has garnered significant attention among scholars, highlighting a multitude of benefits and limitations related to its authenticity and its position as an essential component of Islamic cultural legacy. Some believe that Islamic philosophy is simply a reinvention of Greek philosophical concepts, thus undermining its credibility. Conversely, proponents advocate the integration of Greek philosophical principles with Islamic tenets as a synthesis rather than a simple replication. This article aspires to delve into these diverse perspectives by analyzing the historical transformation of Islamic philosophy, with a spotlight on its initial periods, particularly stressing the impact of Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (d. 951 CE), a significant figure in Islamic philosophy who synthesized Greek philosophical ideas, notably those of Aristotle and Plato, to construct a unique Islamic philosophical framework. Through a qualitative conceptual analysis, this article evaluates the authoritative dimensions and philosophical disputes between Aristotle and Plato, particularly concerning ontology and epistemology, while accentuating al-Fārābī's endeavors to harmonize their philosophical positions. This article suggests that al-Fārābī engaged in a critical examination of both Plato's and Aristotle's perspectives on universal truth and human cognition, which ultimately led him to incorporate their philosophies into a unique Islamic framework.*

Keywords: *Al-Fārābī, Aristotle, Epistemology, Ontology, Plato.*

Abstrak: Diskursus seputar filsafat Islam telah lama menarik perhatian signifikan kalangan cendekiawan yang menyoroti kelebihan dan keterbatasan terkait autentisitas dan posisinya sebagai komponen penting warisan budaya Islam. Sebagian ilmuwan berpendapat bahwa filsafat Islam tidak lebih dari sekadar reinvensi dari konsep-konsep

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filsafat Yunani, sehingga melemahkan kredibilitasnya. Sementara itu, para pendukung cenderung melihat filsafat Islam sebagai bentuk integrasi prinsip-prinsip filsafat Yunani dengan prinsip-prinsip Islam, daripada replikasi semata. Artikel ini berupaya untuk menyelidiki perspektif yang beragam ini melalui analisis transformasi historis filsafat Islam, berfokus pada fase awal perkembangannya, khususnya menekankan kontribusi Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (w. 951 M), seorang figur kunci dalam filsafat Islam yang mensintesis filsafat Yunani, terutama ide-ide Aristoteles dan Plato, untuk membangun kerangka filsafat Islam yang unik. Dengan menggunakan analisis konseptual kualitatif dan penelitian pustaka yang ekstensif, artikel ini mengevaluasi dimensi otoritatif dan kontroversi filosofis antara Aristoteles dan Plato, khususnya yang berkaitan dengan ontologi dan epistemologi, sekaligus menonjolkan upaya al-Fārābī untuk menyelaraskan posisi filosofis mereka. Artikel ini mengindikasikan bahwa al-Fārābī terlibat dalam pemeriksaan kritis terhadap perspektif Plato dan Aristoteles tentang kebenaran universal dan kognisi manusia, yang akhirnya membawanya untuk menggabungkan filosofi mereka ke dalam kerangka pemikiran Islam yang unik.

Kata-kata Kunci: *Al-Fārābī, Aristoteles, Epistemologi, Ontologi, Plato.*

Introduction

Throughout history, the concept of Islamic philosophy has emerged as a focal point of scholarly discourse, characterized by its inherent complexities and dynamic nature, particularly its foundations which highlight the starting point of this notion. Scholars have engaged in discussions surrounding the term “Islamic philosophy” itself, scrutinizing whether it can be deemed genuinely as a distinct Islamic tradition or if such a philosophical framework is a mere transmission from Greek philosophy to Arabic by muslims intellectuals at the age of the classical period. Nasikhin et al. posit that the terms ‘philosophy’ and ‘religion’, especially within the Islamic framework, are often interpreted in contradictory manners; philosophy is typically linked to rational thought, while religion is associated with spiritual phenomena, which tends to obscure the objective truth from a logical standpoint (Nasikhin, Ismutik, and Albab 2022, 21).

In other words, philosophy is categorized as scientific, while religion is non-scientific (Humaidi 2018, 147). Nonetheless, certain advocates of Islamic philosophy argue that muslim philosophers developed better and distinct concepts of philosophy through the integration between Islamic concepts and Greek philosophy (Saleh and Humaidi 2022, 4). Ishraq Ali underscores the imperative of analyzing muslim philosophy in conjunction with Greek philosophy, as numerous philosophical concepts trace their roots to the latter (Ali 2022, 1) which advocates for a synthesis of Greek and muslim philosophical traditions. Consequently, this inquiry necessitates a socio-historical analysis, aiming to trace the evolution of Islamic philosophy back to the Medieval epoch.

By the historical examination, Sarah Stroumsa employs the concept of ‘Islamicate Philosophy’ to articulate the nature of muslim philosophical

thought that was historically conceived and advanced by Muslims, Jews, and Christians within a shared historical framework (Stroumsa 2019, 11). The term bears a close resemblance to the terminology utilized by the earlier scholar, Marshall G. Hodgson, who refers to it as 'Islamicate falsafah,' which elucidates the perpetuation of the philosophical tradition in Arabic and Syriac, thereby encompassing a novel intellectual constellation within Islamic society (Hodgson 1974, 429). Conversely, another earlier scholar, Philip K. Hitti, opts to employ the designation "Arab Philosophy" to depict the philosophical discourse that emerged from Greek origins, which was subsequently modified by the intellectual contributions of the subjugated peoples and other Eastern influences, tailored to the cognitive inclinations of Islam, and articulated through the medium of the Arabic language (Hitti 1946, 368).

Nevertheless, one of the most significant critiques that propelled Islamic philosophy into the domain of scholarly discourse was articulated by the French orientalist, Ernest Renan. In his critique of Renan's publication *Averroès et l'averroïsme*, Marenbon characterizes Renan's interpretation of Averroism (a school of medieval Islamic philosophy) as "the narrative of a tremendous misinterpretation." Moreover, Renan asserts the controversial argument, which prompted subsequent intellectuals to evaluate his hypothesis, claiming that Semitic peoples, encompassing the Arab communities, display an inherent lack of tendency to engage in philosophical exploration due to the inadequacy of their languages for philosophical discourse, which he argues are predominantly defined by religious orthodoxy rather than rational deliberation. To substantiate his assertion, he observed that the so-called Arab philosophers were, in fact, non-Arab individuals, specifically Persians and Spaniards (Marenbon 2013, 283). He posits that the Arabs were neither innately nor inherently philosophers; it was solely the Greeks who possessed the capacity to engender philosophy. Consequently, he concludes that the historical role of the Arabs was confined to the transmission and preservation of Greek philosophy for the Latin Middle Ages (Rudolph 2017, 1).

Ultimately, Renan's critique has inadvertently fostered a positive impetus among scholars to substantiate the existence of Islamic philosophy and delineate its significant distinctions from Greek philosophy. One of the distinguished scholars who has engaged with this discourse is Sayyid Hossein Nasr, who champions the designation of "Islamic philosophy" and articulates it as the *hikmah* that refines the human soul through the conceptualization of entities and the assessment of both theoretical and practical verities, thereby signifying a harmony between knowledge and its practices (S. H. Nasr 2006, 36). Furthermore, contemporary investigations, such as those conducted by Patimah et al., also prefer the term *hikmah* to characterize Islamic philosophy and define it as a means of pursuing knowledge and truth within Islam, which

is regarded as a form of guidance (*hidāyah*) from Allah SWT (Patimah, Zarkasyi, and Kayadibi 2022, 166, 167).

In pursuit of a comprehensive understanding of the developing evolution of Islamic philosophy, numerous scholars have endeavored to furnish authentic insights by examining the contributions of a specific medieval philosopher, Abu Nasr al-Fārābī, to unveil the riddle of how muslim philosophers were profoundly influenced by their Greek counterparts, particularly Plato and Aristotle. Ishraq Ali contends that al-Fārābī was significantly shaped by the philosophical doctrines of the Greeks as well as the politico-religious milieu prevalent during the medieval period (Ali 2022, 7). The text *'Arā Ahl al-Madīnah al-Faḍīlah'* serves as a testament to al-Fārābī's attempts to Islamize philosophy by reconciling the ideas of Plato and Aristotle (Yuslih 2022, 46), thereby legitimizing his intellectual innovations (Druart 2019, 158). Moreover, historians designate al-Fārābī as the inaugural system-builder within the annals of the Arab-Islamic intellectual history (Faḥrī 2002, 2), who substantially engages with both epistemological and ontological dimensions of his unique philosophical framework (Hadi 2024, 15). Despite the extensive exploration by numerous academics into the origins of Islamic philosophy, there remains a significant lack of research focusing on why medieval muslim thinkers like al-Fārābī favored Greek philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle in their philosophical frameworks, which has contributed to the acknowledgment of Islamic philosophy as a vital element of Islamic heritage, persisting into modern Islamic culture.

Based on the question articulated above, this article concentrates on the evolution of Islamic philosophy during its formative periods by highlighting the eminent muslim philosopher, Abu Nasr Muhammad al-Fārābī (d. 951 CE), who adeptly synthesized the philosophical doctrines of Greek thinkers, primarily Aristotle and Plato, through a distinctive Islamic philosophical framework. The discourse subsequently advances to elucidate the contentious dialogue between Plato and Aristotle across various dimensions, particularly in ontology and epistemology, followed by a succinct exploration of the attempts to reconcile both philosophical stances through the lens of Al-Fārābī's insights. This study employs a qualitative conceptual analysis method alongside extensive library research, given that the examination remains suited within the theoretical domain. Ultimately, this article suggests that al-Fārābī constructed his Islamic philosophical system upon a critical evaluation of the ideas posited by Aristotle and Plato, creating a synthesis of both ideas to substantiate the existence of universal truth. Al-Fārābī recognizes the substantial divergences of each methodology concerning fundamental issues of human intellectual cognition within the epistemological sphere, which compelled him to integrate both viewpoints in one of his distinguished works, *al-Jam' bayn Ra'y al-Ḥakimayn Aflaṭīn al-Ilāhi wa Aristīṭalis* (*the*

Reconciliation of the Views of the Two Sages, Plato the Divine and Aristotle).

Exploring Chronological Foundations of Islamic Philosophy: A Question of its Place in Islamic Tradition

A careful study of the historical roots of Islamic philosophy calls for an in-depth grasp to discover how the phrase 'Islamic philosophy' relates to Islamic heritage. Hodgson refers to Islamic philosophy with the term *falsafah*, characterizing it as a tradition within the muslim milieu that is derived from the Greek term *philosophia* (Hodgson 1974, 418). *Falsafah* emerged as the technical lexicon and standardized terminology employed by medieval scholars of the Near East to articulate what is contemporaneously recognized as 'philosophy' (McGinnis and Reisman 2007, xvii). Although it was occasionally rendered into Arabic as *ḥikma* or wisdom. Scholars have delineated *ḥikma* as an intrinsic facet of the Islamic tradition as articulated in the Qur'an. Burhanuddin and Wasath draw attention to the parallels found between the concept of tradition and the expression of *turāth* as referenced in Surah Fajr verse 19, *wa ta' kulūna al-Turātha...* (and you devour the inheritance), characterizing tradition as a blending of historical inheritances and contemporary existence, thus embracing both ancestral and societal elements that future generations might explore (Burhanuddin and Wasath 2019, 6). Under these circumstances, researchers attempt to clarify the motivations behind muslims' propensity to absorb profound external influences into their cultural framework by examining the socio-historical and political context of the medieval era.

Ali and Mingli contend that the infusion of Greek philosophical discourse into the medieval Islamic milieu is predominantly attributable to the comprehensive initiative aimed at translating Greek texts into Arabic, which was executed through the collaborative efforts of Christian and muslim intellectuals from the eights to the tenth centuries, primarily in Baghdad, the epicenter of the Abbasid caliphate (Ali and Mingli 2020, 93).

Ahmet T. Kuru elucidates that, during the Abbasid epoch, Islamic scholars experienced a degree of autonomy from state control, wherein intellectuals, encompassing philosophers from a variety of backgrounds, including Sunni and Shi'i muslims, Christians, Jews, and even agnostics, received financial support from the Abbasid authorities to translate ancient texts from Greek, Syriac, Middle Persian, and Sanskrit into Arabic (Kuru 2019, 4). The period of Abbasids is noted for its vibrant economy and innovative thinking, especially during the times of caliphs like Hārūn al-Rashīd and his heir al-Ma'mūn, who championed the arts, sciences, and the conversion of texts from diverse languages (Ali and Mingli 2019, 3). Under their patronage, scholars were afforded the liberty to pursue manuscripts in Constantinople, a city in which the Greek intellectual

tradition was profoundly nurtured (Hodgson 1974, 298).

Peter Adamson and Richard C. Taylor characterize this translation movement as “the single most significant impetus and determinant for the Arabic philosophical tradition” (Adamson and Taylor 2005, 3). McGinnis and Reisman argue that the earliest seed of the Arabic translation movement was sown during the period of the Roman Emperor Jovianus in the middle of the fourth century C.E., who ceded a substantial territory to the Sassanian (Persian) Empire. Historically, when Christian authorities within the Roman Empire commenced the persecution of various heterodox Christian sects, these factions sought refuge in Sassanian territories while transporting with them texts of Greek scholarship that were subsequently translated into Syriac. The movement leads to the rise of Arabic translation. It roughly began with the accession of the ‘Abbasid dynasty in 762 C.E. Among the earliest works translated were Aristotelian logic, followed thereafter by works of natural sciences, medicine, and metaphysics (McGinnis and Reisman 2007, xviii).

Ali emphasizes that three pivotal historical occurrences facilitated the transmission of Greek philosophy to the medieval muslim world: 1) the Christianization of the Roman Empire, 2) Persia emerging as a new incubator for Greek philosophy, and 3) the muslim conquests alongside the Arabic translation movement (Ali 2023, 1) the interplay between philosophy and religion often takes the form of conflict in medieval Muslim thought as exemplified by the Al-Ghazali versus Averroes (Ibn Rusd. Taylor adds that the translation movement was not solely propelled by the patronage of the Abbasid caliphs but was also substantially enhanced by the invention of paper (Adamson and Taylor 2005, 2). Frankl Griffel asserts that as a consequence of the translation movement, the sciences of antiquity (*‘ulūm al-awā’īl*), including Greek sciences, were amalgamated and assimilated into Islamic science (Griffel 2021, 566). Nevertheless, what mechanisms facilitated the integration of these distinct scientific disciplines?

According to the discourse presented by Ali and Mingli, the quest for an optimal mode of association is instigated by the prevailing discontent with the existing social order, which has incited intellectuals over the centuries to pursue an ideal sociopolitical configuration that could potentially remedy all human dilemmas (Ali and Mingli 2019, 1). Consequently, Ali posits that the philosophical tenets of medieval muslim thought were significantly influenced by Greek philosophy as well as the religious and political context of the era (Ali 2022, 7). In this context, McGinnis and Reisman elucidate the conceivable compatibility between classical Greek scholarship and native Islamic traditions. While classical Greek scholarship encompasses domains such as ‘logic, natural, philosophy, and metaphysics,’ the discourse surrounding the Qur’an intermittently references verses that resonate with philosophical principles, including

the affirmation of the existence and attributes of God (McGinnis and Reisman 2007, xxviii).

Both Ali and Mingli assert that the Qur'an, paired with the sayings and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad, are the foremost guides for Muslims once Muhammad has died. Given that Islam emerged in a context devoid of law, these revelations became the sole and definitive legal framework for Muslims, addressing both spiritual and temporal concerns (Ali and Mingli 2019, 2). Notwithstanding the divergent perspectives, both philosophical inquiry and religious thought engage with analogous social, political, ethical, and metaphysical inquiries, resulting in a nuanced interaction between the two (Ali 2023, 1) the interplay between philosophy and religion often takes the form of conflict in medieval Muslim thought as exemplified by the Al-Ghazali versus Averroes (Ibn Rusd. Hitti characterizes this phenomenon as the adjustment of both traditions to fulfill the distinctive requirements and cognitive frameworks within Islam across a multitude of disciplines, including medicine, philosophy, alchemy, astronomy, mathematics, and geography, which were catalyzed by the advent of paper and the prophetic tradition that perceives science as bifurcated into theology and medicine (Hitti 1946, 364). Sayyed Hossein Nasr articulates this synthesis as a dynamic interplay between *falsafah* and Islamic theology, or *kalām*, after the medieval epoch (S. H. Nasr 2006, 41).

Furthermore, Hitti posits that the initial integration of Greek philosophical thought within the framework of Islam was initiated by Abū Yūsuf Ya'qūb ibn Ishāq al-Kindi, an Arab scholar, and was subsequently advanced by Muḥammad Ibn Muḥammad Ibn **Ūzalāgh** Ibn Tarkhān, who is reputed to have originated from Fārāb in Transoxania and is often identified as al-Fārābī (Faḥrī 2002, 6); this endeavor was later culminated in the Eastern regions by Abū 'Alī al-Ḥusain ibn 'Abdullāh ibn Sinā, a Persian philosopher (Hitti 1946, 370). Among these three eminent philosophers, this article will primarily concentrate on elucidating the contributions of al-Fārābī, as he is distinguished as the most authoritative of the Arabic philosophers. Born circa 870 AD in Fārāb, which is contemporary Uzbekistan, al-Fārābī devoted a significant portion of his life to Baghdad, where he engaged in the study of logic under the tutelage of prominent scholars of his era (Ali and Mingli 2018, 27). He was recognized in Western circles by the appellation *Alpharabius*. Upon relocating to Damascus in 945 AD/330 AH, the Sultan of the Hamdan Dynasty in Aleppo expressed great admiration for his wisdom and intellectual demeanor, which subsequently secured him to the esteemed position of royal ulema (cleric) with a substantial allowance (Burhanuddin and Wasath 2019, 5).

Al-Fārābī's works encompass a wide array of disciplines, including philosophy, music, mathematics, logic, astronomy, philology, and natural sciences, reflecting his multifaceted intellectual endeavors and holding

timeless relevance among academics to be studied (Suleimenov et al. 2023, 94). His treatise titled '*Survey of the Sciences*' (*Iḥsā al-'ulūm – De divisiones of scientiarum*) was translated by Gerard of Cremona in Toledo at the commencement of the twelfth century and was extensively utilized around 1150 by the Archdeacon of Segovia, Dominicus Gundisalvi; it subsequently became an integral part of the standard philosophical curriculum and was later reprinted by Guilelmus Camerarius (Paris 1538). Equally renowned since the twelfth century is the *De intellectu* (Al-Fārābī 1985, 32). Al-Fārābī's notable Enumeration of the Sciences recognized through two distinct Latin translations—one by Gerard of Cremona and the other by Gundissalinus—prompted a significant overhaul of the philosophical curriculum within Western universities from approximately 1230 onwards. Transitioning from the traditional trivium (logic, grammar, and rhetoric) combined with the quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music), the curriculum evolved into a somewhat amended iteration of the Alexandrian educational system that mandated the comprehensive study of all Aristotelian texts, including the introductory *Eisagoge* by Porphyry. The academic journey commenced with logic, subsequently progressed to natural philosophy, encompassing 'On the Soul' or *De anima*, followed by metaphysics, and concluded with ethics and politics. This curriculum also integrated mathematics (Druart 2019, 158).

Al-Fārābī is regarded as a crucial intermediary between Greek and Islamic intellectual traditions. Fakhri characterizes al-Fārābī as the Islamic philosopher who meticulously traced the evolution of Greek philosophy from the era of Aristotle, traversing through the Alexandrian milieu during the Ptolemaic epoch, extending into the Islamic period and culminating in his contemporary context (Faḥrī 2002, 1). The foundational sources of al-Fārābī's philosophical framework are primarily located within the Greek intellectual heritage, specifically in the original texts of Plato and Aristotle, as well as in the Neoplatonism and Aristotelianism that flourished in Alexandria (Steiris and Konayeva 2019, 118). Al-Fārābī produced a plethora of commentaries on Aristotle and constructed his philosophical system by amalgamating Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Sufism, which consequently earned him the designation *al-mu'allim al-thānī*, translated as 'the second teacher' (Hitti 1946, 371). Welnak portrays al-Fārābī as a philosopher who adeptly elucidated Aristotle's intentions to his audience, with his rhetorical approach predominantly shaped by this objective (Welnak 2020, 165). Al-Fārābī sought to demonstrate that Aristotle's philosophy constitutes a universal philosophy and science, predicated on the universal principles of reasoning as delineated by the discipline of logic (Alper 2007, 140).

Historians identify al-Fārābī as the first system-builder in the history of Arab-Islamic intellectual tradition (Faḥrī 2002, 2). Scholars argue that his

philosophical principles are inherently associated with the societal and historical setting of his lifetime. Ali and Mingli emphasize that al-Fārābī's conceptualization of the state, *Madīnah al-Fāḍilah* serves as a response to the pervasive political turmoil experienced by muslims in the aftermath of Muhammad's demise, as well as a blueprint for the restoration of the Medinan splendor emblematic of the Prophet Muhammad's epoch (Ali and Mingli 2019, 4). Moreover, Alper delineates Al-Fārābī's context as characterized by contending dynasties, commencing in the ninth century, alongside the uprising of the Zanj, or enslaved population, in southern Iraq. He perceived the religious community of his time as being imminent peril of moral decay and fragmentation. Consequently, as an authentic philosopher, he proposed the genuine philosophy epitomized by Plato and Aristotle, not merely as a framework for the rational sciences but also as a panacea for the *Dār al-Islām* (Alper 2007, 142). For al-Fārābī, the authentic philosophy was transmitted to the Arabs by the Greeks, specifically through the teachings of Plato and Aristotle. Both thinkers have made notable impacts in the realm of philosophy (Ali and Mingli 2019, 1).

Al-Fārābī employs an Islamic epistemological framework established by muslim scholars, known as consensus (*ijmā'*), which serves as a significant criterion for religious veracity and a compelling determinant of muslim perspectives and convictions, to elucidate the esteemed status of Plato and Aristotle within the historical progression of human arts. He posits that a consensus has been achieved across various nations, each speaking distinct languages, regarding the philosophical preeminence and authority of these two eminent Greek philosophers (Alper 2007, 136). According to Alper, based on the premise that consensus is universally acknowledged as a valid measure of truth on the one hand, and the judgment of the superiority of Plato and Aristotle grounded in the collective agreement of humanity on the other, the view of their superiority lacks serious scrutiny (Alper 2007, 137). However, Alper seems to have misunderstood al-Fārābī's concept of consensus. Based on al-Fārābī's perspective, true cross-subjective consensus (*ijtimā' al-arā'*) arises when diverse minds, after thorough research and examination, agree on a matter, indicating low subjectivity and high objectivity. Uniformity of opinion without critical thought. However, is not genuine consensus but mere imitation, where multiple minds passively submit to a single conclusion rather than actively engaging in agreement (Al-Farabi 1985b, 81, 82). Before delving into al-Fārābī's endeavors to reconcile Greek philosophy with Islamic thought, the forthcoming section accentuates the fundamental concepts within the ontological and epistemological frameworks of Plato and Aristotle, which underscore the underpinnings of al-Fārābī's philosophical discourse.

Plato's Philosophy

1. The Origin of Universals, The World of Ideas

The comprehension of Plato's philosophical framework may commence with the differentiation between objects and forms (*forma*, *ideas*). Plato asserts that the tangible particulars operate merely as representations of the Forms. Individuals can only achieve comprehension of the tangible domain if they perceive it about the Forms. He believes that there exists a distinct category of beings that amalgamate the impure with non-being, and there exists a singular category of being—which is characterized as pure being—from which sensible beings are derived. Sensible particulars are described as 'partaking in' or possessing a portion of the Forms, and it is through this affiliation with the Forms that sensible entities derive the existence they can affirm (Jordan 2005, 121). In the empirical realm, humans encounter various entities (things), such as horses, humans, trees, and so on. The horse, human, and tree that humans encounter concretely are not merely classified as horses, humans, or trees; they are invariably specific instances, such as horse A, horse B, the neighbor's pony, the equine in the zoo, and the carriage horse situated on the roadside, all of which represent individual horses constrained by particular spatial and temporal parameters. The same principle holds for humans and trees, which are perceived as unique and temporal entities (while also confined by spatial and temporal dimensions). All of these entities exist, manifest temporarily, undergo a succession of transformations, and subsequently cease to exist over time. There exists nothing that is entirely identical; even when similarities are present, there are invariably distinctions in various dimensions, whether in terms of quantity, quality, temporality, possessiveness, actuality, and so forth.

Notwithstanding the distinctions among tangible entities, sensory cognition facilitates the synthesis of a singular concept that is universally applicable to diverse enduring entities. This cognitive mechanism allows for the understanding of different objects under a shared identity, unaffected by spatial and temporal limitations, making it an idealistic process. For example, although we may encounter individuals such as Mr. Tanto, Mrs. Darmi, Ms. Dinar, and other individuals, our cognitive faculties are capable of apprehending the universal notion of 'human,' even though this universally applicable 'human' has never been directly experienced through sensory modalities, as the only entities present are Mr. Tanto, Mrs. Darmi, and Ms. Dinar. Moreover, the conceptualization of 'human' persists beyond the eventual demise of Mr. Tanto, Mrs. Darmi, and Ms. Dinar. The notion of 'human' that is comprehended by our intellect is not only universal but also eternal, transcending the confines of both space and time.

Owing to their inherent universal traits, these universals elude sensory perception and can only be comprehended through intellectual faculties; consequently, they may be designated as intelligible (*ma'qūlāt*), which are entities that can solely be grasped by reason (Husain Heriyanto in Yazdi 2003, 39). In light of their identical attributes, it is permissible to refer to this form as an idea. Hence, the terminologies—ideal form, idea, *ma'qūlāt*, intelligible, and universals (which are semiotically interpreted)—may serve as indicators denoting the same signified.

2. Platonic Dualism: The World of Ideas (Forms) and the World of Senses

As previously elucidated, concrete entities are those which are apprehended through sensory perception, characterized by their inherent limitations, variability, and permanence, existing within the empirical realm. Conversely, universals, forms, or ideas are categorized as being universal, eternal, and immaterial (non-material) and subsist within the realm of conceptual thought. In this context, Plato posits that ontological dualism is present between the realm of ideas and the realm of sensory experience. Based on the theory of Plato (Plato 1993; Sfetcu 2022; Yazdī 1992; Nath 2014; Rahaman 2023), the distinctions between the realm of ideas and the realm of sensory experience can be summarized in the following table:

Table 1. Plato's Distinction of 'Sensible World' and 'World of the Forms' (Plato 1993, 77a).

Sensible World	World of the Forms/Ideas
Phenomenal world; an imperfect image of the world of ideas	The perfect reality (the Real World)
Spatial and temporal	Beyond space and time
The world of becoming	The world of Being (true Being)
Particular, changeable	Universal, immutable
Entities are imitations	Original, eternal, transcendental archetypes of things
Sensible	Intelligible
Example: Soekarno, a bench, etc.	Example: Human, goodness, justice, etc.

The fundamental issues reside in the question of how, if one's sensory experience serves as the foundation of knowledge, the individual, specific, and mutable sensory experiences can concurrently function as a basis for the development of universal concepts within the human intellect. Does this not present an inherent contradiction? For Plato, the particularities of sensory reality cannot provide an adequate basis for

the development of universal concepts within the mind. Moreover, it is implausible for such concepts to autonomously exist within the cognitive realm. If this assertion holds, it follows that the origin of these concepts or ideas must derive from an alternate realm or world, distinctly separate from the sensory domain. This realm is characterized as being elevated and fundamentally different from material existence. Such a domain is what Plato designates as the “world of ideas” or “world of forms.” Given its nature as eternal, immutable, and universal, it surpasses the limited, transient, and mutable sensory reality. Consequently, from a hierarchical standpoint, the domain of ideas possesses a preeminent ontological status concerning the material realm, as Plato posited that the intelligible realm of forms epitomizes genuine reality, whereas the corporeal world constitutes merely an imperfect semblance of these everlasting and immutable forms (Gaarder 2000, 127). In essence, these ideas function as referential frameworks for the manifestation of entities as they materialize (the process of becoming) in the empirical world through the mechanism of imitation (Copleston 1952, Vol.I: Greece and Rome:292).

3. The Myth of the Cave: An Analogy of the Idea of Goodness as the Source of All Ideas

Plato’s theory of Forms constitutes a metaphysical framework that carries significant implications for the quotidian behavior of individuals. For, if individuals do not embrace the theory of Forms, they might as well remain confined within the cave, leading a commonplace human existence (Jordan 2005, 103). Plato articulates his conception of the human condition through the allegories of the sun, the line, and the cave, as well as delineating the journey one must undertake to attain the status of philosopher (Jordan 2005, 100). In the allegory of the cave, Plato asserts that individuals are captives shackled within a cave, perceiving solely the shadows cast by the puppets. People desperately require freedom to truly understand the reality of the world. Fortunately, a mentor is accessible, along with a pathway through which individuals can escape the cave and attain enlightenment regarding the external realm. Nevertheless, upon their initial release from bondage, individuals will endure discomfort and confusion; moreover, the guide will seldom find favor among the captives within the cave. The captives within the cave would resort to lethal measures against anyone attempting to illuminate their understanding, should they possess the capability (Jordan 2005, 101).

The allegory of the cave articulated by Plato corresponds to his conceptualization of the supreme reality that functions as the origin of all authentic entities, which is symbolized by the sun. This origin of reality is identified as the Supreme Idea, specifically the Idea of Goodness. Plato draws a parallel between the role of this idea and the capacity of human eyesight to perceive the surrounding environment, facilitated by the sun.

In a similar vein, within the realm of intelligible concepts (*ma'qūlāt*), this Supreme idea empowers the intellect to comprehend and attain genuine knowledge of the ultimate truth. It surpasses all existent ideas and eludes precise verbal articulation; at best, it may be approached through symbols or certain concepts such as beauty, justice, and truth. Consequently, if each idea represents an ideal form that serves as a standard for specific and transient concrete entities (human, cow, flower), then the idea of Goodness embodies the archetype of all ideas, encompassing all concepts, integrating all forms of perfection, and representing the essence of simplicity, alongside the intelligent nature that encapsulates all virtues. This characterization appears to align the concept of the idea of Goodness with the notion of God, thereby suggesting that all universals reside within the 'intellect' of God (Sudarminta 2002, 89).

4. Intellectual Perception as True Knowledge

What Plato underscores is that all entities surrounding humans (specific phenomena) serve solely as a mere reflection or shadow of the authentic and eternal World of Ideas, positing that the complete range of entities within the World of Ideas precedes the Sensory World. This concept is designated as *universalia ante rem* (Sudarminta 2002, 89).

However, the issue at hand is that, in actuality, males do not encounter these universals within the empirical realm. To remedy this predicament, Plato posits the existence of a pre-creation existence. He asserts that individuals possess souls prior to their incarnation into the tangible realm (the sensory domain) alongside a corporeal form. The soul is capable of apprehending universals or intelligible entities within that realm. Nevertheless, its emergence into the physical domain catalyzes forgetfulness. Its observation of sensory phenomena (specific entities) prompts a process of remembrance, allowing it to recognize that all entities in the empirical world are mere reflections or shadows of the realm of ideas. This connection of the intellect to the realm of ideas elucidates why Plato designates this phenomenon as the process of 'recollection' (*tadhakkur*) of what has been previously apprehended by the intellect prior to the soul's entry into the world (Plato 1993, 72e-78b; Al-Farabi 1985b, 97,99). Furthermore, it is imperative to underscore that Plato's intellectual apprehension (*intellectus*) of universal is distinct from Aristotle's conception of *intellectus*, which pertains to 'Abstraction.'

Aristotle's Philosophy: Critique of Plato's Ideas

1. The Absurdity of the Transcendent Forms of Platonic Ideas

In contrast to Plato, Aristotle does not advocate for individuals to completely reconstruct their existence but rather encourages a profound enhancement of their pre-existing comprehension of the universe.

Aristotle posits that individuals engage in philosophical inquiry from their current standpoint, stemming from their established convictions and their prevailing uncertainties. They cease their philosophical endeavors upon the resolution of these uncertainties (Jordan 2005, 105). For Aristotle, humans, who are constituted of both form and matter, must choose between pursuing a harmonious existence (the existence characterized by practical wisdom) that aligns with their composite essence, or a disharmonious existence (the existence defined by theoretical contemplation) that corresponds solely with their form (Jordan 2005, 129).

Aristotle, recognized as a disciple of Plato, presents a rigorous critique of Plato's concept of Forms. One of his principal objections is that Plato's conception of the World of Ideas engenders a profound dualism between the entities of the tangible world and the sensory perceptions aligned with ideas. Copleston elucidates Aristotle's critique, asserting that while, according to Plato, sensory objects are mere reflections or shadows of the realm of ideas, this assertion does not imply that sensory entities inherently possess a formal cause (the principle that confers shape) or an intrinsic determinative quality that categorizes them distinctly, thereby distinguishing them from other classifications (for instance, the process of shaping an object into a human figure rather than a horse). This foundational principle is notably absent in the philosophical framework posited by Plato (Copleston 1952, 292).

Meanwhile, from an epistemological perspective, Plato's theoretical framework, which posits the existence of ideas that are *universalia ante rem* (a paradigm of universals that predate their actualization), is inadequate as a foundation for abstract concepts. Sudarminta offers an illustrative example to elucidate the challenges inherent in accepting this notion. The premise that the nature or essence of humanity is both unique and uniform across all individuals categorized as human implies that individuals are invariably perceived as mere accidental variations of the singular, overarching human nature or essence. The implications of such a perspective are challenging to endorse, for if there exists solely one unique human nature, and both Socrates and Plato are classified as human, the logical inference would be that Socrates is equivalent to Plato (Sudarminta 2002, 90).

2. Hylomorphism: A Response to the Absurdity of Platonic Ideas

Furley et al. elucidate that the disparity between the realm of the intelligible and the tangible world posed a major dilemma for Plato, prompting him to perceive physical objects as ontologically subordinate. The connection of these objects to intelligible realities, which alone possess the capacity to elucidate phenomena, was perpetually questionable. Aristotle's developed hylomorphism partially reconciled

this dichotomy by acknowledging that any individual object represents an inseparable amalgamation of form and matter, both of which cannot exist independently of one another (Furley 1999, 236). Aristotle does not categorically refute the notion that the objects of rational knowledge are universal constituents; rather, he contests the assertion that universals exist as transcendent entities detached from sensory domain. To circumvent this logical inconsistency, Aristotle asserts that the existence of 'ideas' or 'forms' ought to be interpreted as *universalia in re*, or universals that concurrently inhabit the tangible entities we encounter and function as referential frameworks for our abstract notions. This position contests Plato's position. While Plato stresses the existence of concepts as ideas besides the various objects (*universalia ante rem*), Aristotle delineates that the concepts existed only in the objects (*universalia in re*) (Schweighofer and Lachmayer, n.d., 7). This perspective is reinforced by the principle of Hylomorphism (*Hyle: Matter, Morphos: Form*) (Furley 1999, 431).

In this theoretical framework, Aristotle posits that substances within the realm of physical reality (concrete entities) invariably comprise both matter and form. He clarifies a variation between *prima materia*, indicating the core matter that is present in a phase of absolute potentiality, and substantial form, which depicts the configuration that realizes this pure potential matter, assigning it unique attributes or characteristics. It is the substantial form that elucidates the capacity for sensory objects to exhibit identical characteristics or natures. Each entity embodies the same substantial form; however, within each individual, this form is actualized by *prima materia*, thereby resulting in the individuation of matter. Consequently, form is also recognized as the principle governing the actualization of matter. Nevertheless, both *prima materia* and substantial form are not to be regarded as concrete entities; rather, they are two principles that collaboratively constitute concrete objects endowed with specific types of characteristics. Given that form is individuated through matter, it remains immanent in every individual as it perpetually integrates with matter. Hence, Aristotle categorizes individual man, horse, and similar entities as primary substances (Furley 1999, 44).

3. Knowledge as a Process of Abstraction

As previously articulated in the framework of hylomorphism, the shared substantial forms among various individuals belonging to the same category (or class) enable human cognition to comprehend the universal notion that can be asserted regarding distinct individuals. Consequently, this substantial form possesses the capacity to exist both in a tangible manner and within the realm of thought. Aristotle posits that the mechanism through which our intellect apprehends or disengages the substantial form from specific entities—without reference to their

material composition—is identified as the faculty of abstraction. The development of general concepts within our cognitive processes can be attributed to this faculty of abstraction.

Aristotle underscores the pivotal role of sensory experience in the process of abstraction and knowledge acquisition. He firmly contends that the loss of one sense results in the forfeiture of access to knowledge. Additionally, Aristotle questions the concept of intellectual knowledge derived from universal objects, detached from sensory entities, proposing that it may be more of a product of imagination rather than objective perception (Yazdī 1992, 8; Yazdi 2003, 42).

4. Potentiality, Actuality, and God as the Basis of Actualization

Aristotle also distinguishes between potentiality and actuality. He explained that in principle, everything is potential, in the sense that it is not actual. Actuality arises from potentiality. However, since something is in the state of potential, it is not actual; thus, it requires something actual to bring about its actualization. Therefore, actualization is *a priori*, meaning it precedes potentiality. From this, it is concluded that, logically, an entity with potentiality will be able to move from a potential state toward the fulfillment of its actualization, which necessitates the existence of other actual things that make it actual. This process continues until it ultimately stops at the always actual actualizer, or *actus purus*. *Actus purus* is perpetually actual in its purity of actuality, making it independent and serving as an actualizer that is not actualized, known as the Unmoved First Mover. The First Mover, being the source that drives the change of all potential entities toward actuality, also means moving toward itself; it is the ultimate goal of why potentiality is actualized and why goodness is manifested. Thus, Aristotle introduces the conception of God as pure actuality, viewed as perfection, pure goodness, the source of all goodness and perfectness without the slightest deficiency, similar to Plato's philosophy. However, in his view, God is merely the cause and The First Mover. Aristotle does not consider God to be an efficient cause of the existence of other beings (Nasr and Leaman 1996, 236).

After realizing that God is pure actuality, it becomes evident that God is not a material entity. This is because something material is characterized by a process of actualization that changes, which is why it is referred to as potential. In contrast, God is immaterial. As a purely immaterial entity, God's activities are inherently spiritual and intellectual. Therefore, Aristotle views God as the highest thought above all objects of thought (*Thought of Thought*), a notion that is consistent with Plato's idea of God as the Highest Idea, the Idea of all Ideas, and the source of all ideas.

Efforts to Harmonize Plato and Aristotle: The Views of al-Fārābī

Mehdi Hairi Yazdi points out that modern interpretations of Platonism

and Aristotelianism often present them as inherently contradictory, leading to the belief that reconciliation is impossible. This perspective, however, neglects the shared ultimate objective of both schools of thought. Yazdi emphasizes the attempt to uphold the common ground between Plato and Aristotle within systematical unity, particularly their pursuit of a unified understanding of reality (Yazdī 1992, 8–9; Yazdi 2003, 43). Furthermore, al-Fārābī acknowledged the skepticism toward philosophy in the conservative Muslim world and worked to align it with Islamic principles, showing they could coexist (Quraishi and Sargana 2023, 2). This is evident in his efforts to align the ideas of Plato and Aristotle with Islamic teachings and his integration of philosophy and religion (Khoshnaw 2014, 5).

While Plato and Aristotle ground their understanding of human life concerning ultimate philosophical truths (Jordan 2005, 83), Al-Fārābī prioritizes the pursuit of truth as the ultimate goal. This perspective allows him to position seemingly disparate philosophical schools as part of a unified 'stream of truth-seekers.' This approach reflects a broader trend within Islamic philosophy, particularly evident in its epistemology, which is deeply intertwined with ontological inquiries, to establish a common foundation between these traditions. Al-Fārābī defines philosophy as *'the science of everything that exists insofar as it exists...to the extent that human capability (al-ṭāqah al-insāniyyah) allows it'* (Al-Farabi 1985b, 80), a science that investigates the true nature of all that exists (Nasikhin, Ismutik, and Albab 2022, 24), emphasizing the pursuit of 'demonstrative knowledge' of beings 'conceived in themselves.' This pursuit of knowledge, achieved through intellectual apprehension and demonstration, forms the al-Fārābī's understanding of philosophy (Alper 2007, 138). Before delving into al-Fārābī's attempts to harmonize these schools of thought, it is essential to briefly outline the seemingly antithetical yet subtly harmonious philosophies of Plato and Aristotle.

Plato's ontology presents a dualistic framework, distinguishing between the ideal realm of Forms and the sensible world, which he perceives as a mere reflection of these Forms. Conversely, Aristotle grounds his philosophical inquiry in the observable world, emphasizing the dynamic processes of change and actualization inherent in matter. Despite their divergent approaches, both philosophers concur that true knowledge resides in that which is eternal, unchanging, and universal. However, they diverge in their understanding of where this object of knowledge resides. Plato locates it in a transcendent realm, entirely separate from the material world, while Aristotle posits that form is immanent, existing within concrete entities themselves.

Furthermore, Plato and Aristotle diverge in their epistemological views on acquiring knowledge, particularly concerning universal concepts. Plato contends that true knowledge is attained through a form of intellectual

intuition, independent of sensory experience, which he believes only provides access to imperfect reflections of the ideal Forms. In contrast, Aristotle posits that knowledge is acquired through the intellectual process of abstraction, which operates on sensory data derived from the material world. For Aristotle, sensory experience is a necessary precursor to intellectual understanding. Despite their differing approaches to knowledge acquisition, both philosophers converge on the concept of a divine source. Plato conceives of God as the highest Form, transcending all other Forms, while Aristotle identifies God as the Unmoved Mover, the ultimate cause of motion and change in the universe. These points of convergence highlight the underlying harmony between Plato and Aristotle's philosophical systems, despite their apparent differences.

Thérèse-Anne Druart, as cited by Neria, emphasizes the need to approach al-Fārābī as an independent philosopher whose work engages with, but also critically examines, the ideas of Plato and Aristotle (Neria 2013, 84). This engagement is evident in al-Fārābī's treatise *al-Jam' bayn Ra'y al-Ḥakīmayn Aflaṭīn al-llāhi wa-Aristūṭalis* (*The Reconciliation of the Views of the Two Sages, Plato the Divine and Aristotle*), which responds to a significant debate within Islamic intellectual circles. This debate centered on the perceived contradictions between Plato and Aristotle, which challenged the authority of Greek philosophy itself (Alper 2007, 145).

Al-Fārābī's stated aim in this treatise is to address the widespread disagreement he observed among his contemporaries regarding fundamental philosophical questions, such as the origin of the universe and the nature of the soul. These disagreements, he notes, extended to attributing conflicting views to Plato and Aristotle on matters of cosmology, metaphysics, ethics, and politics (Faḥrī 2002, 31). Contrary to interpretations that portray Islamic philosophy as a mere amalgamation of diverse doctrines, al-Fārābī's work, particularly his engagement with Plato and Aristotle, reveals a deliberate and nuanced approach to reconciling philosophical ideas within an Islamic framework. This approach, as Mahdi suggests, goes beyond simply blending different traditions and instead reflects a conscious effort to identify and articulate underlying harmonies between seemingly disparate philosophical and religious perspectives (Mahdi 1962, 3). The following section will delve deeper into al-Fārābī's methods of integrating the ideas of Plato and Aristotle.

The Views of al-Fārābī

Al-Fārābī greatly admired Plato and Aristotle's contributions to the development of demonstrative philosophy. He believed they established the foundational principles and meticulously addressed both the fundamental and intricate aspects of this field. Their authority on

philosophical matters, both significant and trivial, was unquestionable. Al-Fārābī argued that their insights across various disciplines provided a reliable foundation, free from flaws and inconsistencies (Al-Farabi 1985b, 80–82; Alper 2007, 136). However, while acknowledging Aristotle's profound influence, al-Fārābī did not blindly follow his teachings. Instead, he critically examined Aristotle's logic, refining concepts to align with his philosophical perspectives (Suleimenov et al. 2023, 107).

Al-Fārābī stands as a prominent figure in medieval philosophy, whose influence resonated with significant Western philosophers well into modern times. His ability to harmonize the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, bridging their divergent approaches, is particularly noteworthy (Shah 2015, 36). Al-Fārābī achieves this by highlighting the shared essence of wisdom found in both philosophical systems, emphasizing the interconnectedness of intellectual and moral virtues, and demonstrating the correspondence between cognitive and affective aspects (Shah 2015, 56). This inventive interpretation underscores al-Fārābī's belief in the necessity of integrating the perspectives of Plato and Aristotle, which he accomplishes through various methods:

- a) Al-Fārābī emphasizes the necessity of God as the efficient cause—the initiator of change for all things, including divine forms (Al-Farabi 1985b, 101-2,106; Nasr and Leaman 1996, 236). He argues that Aristotle, in rejecting Plato's theory of Forms, encounters difficulties when addressing theological questions, particularly the concept of a 'first cause' for the universe. Al-Fārābī, drawing upon Yazdi, illustrates this difficulty by posing the following questions: Given that God is the living cause of the world and all its beings, wouldn't His essence necessarily contain all the 'Forms' present in existence? If these Forms do not reside within God's essence as blueprints for everything that exists, what pre-existent design guides His creation? And how could He bring about effects in the tangible world without such a design? (Al-Farabi 1985b, 106)
- b) Al-Fārābī carefully considers the linguistic implications of applying terms like 'essence,' 'existence,' or 'life' to both God and the universe (Yazdī 1992, 11; Yazdi 2003, 46–47). He recognizes the challenges of univocal meanings (*mushtarak ma'nāwi*) in this context. If these terms have identical meanings for both God and the universe, it will equate the perfect with the imperfect, a notion he considers unacceptable. On the other hand, purely equivocal meaning (*mushtarak lafzī*) fails to address the relationship between God and the universe that al-Fārābī seeks to articulate.

To resolve this dilemma, al-Fārābī proposes a third option: these terms possess a univocal yet gradational meaning. This approach acknowledges

a fundamental unity in their meaning while allowing for varying degrees of subtlety (*lutfiyyah*), elevation (*'āliyah*), and nobility (*sharfiyyah*) depending on whether they refer to God or the universe (Al-Farabi 1985b, 106–7). This way, the essential unity of the principles and the meaning of the words remain intact despite the differences in their application.

Al-Fārābī, in agreement with Aristotle, believes that our initial knowledge originates from concrete sensory experiences (Al-Farabi 1985a, 88–89). Through these experiences, the intellect extracts universal forms from concrete entities, disregarding their material aspects (Suleimenov et al. 2023, 94). However, al-Fārābī argues that this process of abstraction does not negate the need for an active intellect. He provides several reasons for this:

- a) **The Need for an Actualizing Force:** Human knowledge begins as potential. Al-Fārābī posits that man requires a pre-existing, actual intellect—an active intellect—to transform his potential intellect into an actual one, enabling him to abstract forms.
- b) **The Distinct Nature of Abstracted Forms:** Al-Fārābī distinguishes between the existence of forms in concrete entities and their existence as intelligible realities within the soul/intellect. Forms in concrete entities are bound by categories like space, time, and quality, while intelligible forms in the intellect are free from such limitations (Rev 1947, 42–43). Here lies the distinction.

So, what role does abstraction play? Al-Fārābī, drawing upon Mehdi Hairi Yazdi, suggests that external actions and intellectual abstractions, including our encounters with concrete entities, act as a necessary but insufficient cause for knowledge acquisition. They serve as a preparatory role that prepares our potential intellect, initially devoid of actual knowledge, into an actual intellect filled with intelligible knowledge (Yazdi 1992, 13; Yazdi 2003, 50).

Thereby, al-Fārābī did not merely reinterpret Plato and Aristotle; he integrated their philosophies into his system, addressing what he perceived as misreadings that diminished their authority (Alper 2007, 147). He believed that philosophy provides the foundation for religion, with religion serving as an imitative substitute (Hayes 2020, 74). Al-Fārābī, echoing the thought of Welnak, suggests that the human soul yearns to understand the causes of observable phenomena, both in the external world and within oneself (Welnak 2020, 168). He links prophetic revelation to the imaginative faculty, which represents intelligible truths through images. This process is called Islamic Prophetology, which allows abstract concepts to be conveyed in a way accessible to the senses, particularly through vision (Makhlouf 2024, 7). Makhlouf defines Islamic prophetology as representational modes shaped by divine revelation, influenced by Platonic and Aristotelian ideas like imitation, imagination,

and visualization. This theory, aligning with Aristotle's *poetics* and *rethoric*, explains how religion uses imaginative representations of intelligible truths acts as an imitation of philosophy (Makhlouf 2024, 14). From this standpoint, scholars describe al-Fārābī's philosophy as a blend of Aristotelian and Platonic thought, characterized by its Islamic content and form. They attribute his grounding in logic and natural sciences to Aristotle, while his ethical and political philosophers are seen as drawing heavily from Plato (Suleimenov et al. 2023, 107).

Conclusion

The examination of al-Fārābī's intellectual contribution in shaping Islamic philosophy as a distinctive philosophical framework demonstrates that he contests the dominant perception of an inherent discord between Platonic and Aristotelian notions. Al-Fārābī exemplifies a Muslim philosopher who proficiently harmonized these seemingly disparate philosophical traditions within an innovative philosophical schema that encapsulates a singular aspect of his intellectual system, which is markedly differentiated from the heritage of ancient Greek philosophy.

Al-Fārābī achieved this reconciliation by developing a conceptual framework that integrates both philosophical perspectives, thereby clarifying how their ontological and epistemological proportions not only coexist but also mutually support one another, thus enhancing our comprehension of reality. His amalgamation of Platonic and Aristotelian thought persists as a lasting model for engaging with modern intellectual debates, including those in the domains of logic, politics, music, and philosophical inquiry, within both Western and Islamic academic spheres.

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