

HERMENEUTICS SITUATION AS THE PHILOSOPHIZING METHOD OF MARTIN HEIDEGGER AND ITS RELEVANCE TO SOCIAL RESEARCH

Rifqi Khairul Anam*

Institut Ahmad Dahlan Probolinggo, Indonesia; rifqistaimpro@iad.ac.id

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Abstract: *Applying natural science methodologies to the social sciences causes a crisis in science. A crisis of science means the narrowing of researcher subjectivity so the possibility of research heuristics is drastically reduced. Martin Heidegger a philosopher of existentialism tried to solve this problem by developing a method that integrated schools of phenomenology and hermeneutics. This research aims to describe the hermeneutics situation method which embodies the two things above. This research is a type of library research that is descriptive and qualitative. The important value and novelty of this research is that it examines the closeness of philosophy and social science through Martin Heidegger's way of thinking. A researcher does not live in isolation, he is connected to the context of life in which he lives. The context of life motivates researchers to see the meaning of something. In social research, researchers do not just meet social facts, but meet appropriate events (ereignis). So, social researchers are advised to avoid two things when conducting social research in the context of hermeneutics situation, namely the principle of subject-object division and the value-free principle. The reason is a presumption that a researcher was involved in the surrounding environment which then becomes the object of his research, even before conducting the research. This involvement is what makes the researcher able to understand the object of his research.*

Keywords: *Hermeneutics of Situation, Martin Heidegger, Phenomenology, Social Research.*

Abstrak: *Penerapan metodologi ilmu-ilmu alam dalam ilmu-ilmu sosial menyebabkan krisis ilmu pengetahuan. Krisis pengetahuan artinya menyempitnya subjektivitas peneliti sehingga kemungkinan heuristik penelitian menjadi berkurang drastis. Martin Heidegger sebagai filsuf eksistensialisme berusaha menyelesaikan permasalahan tersebut dengan menyusun suatu metode yang menghubungkan aliran fenomenologi dan hermeneutika. Tujuan penelitian ini adalah menggambarkan metode hermeneutika situasi yang merupakan pengejawantahan dari dua hal di atas. Penelitian ini termasuk jenis penelitian kepustakaan yang bersifat deskriptif kualitatif. Penelitian ini menggunakan unsur metodis pemahaman dan penafsiran. Nilai penting dan kebaruan dari penelitian ini adalah bahwa*

* Corresponding Author

penelitian ini mengkaji kedekatan filsafat dan ilmu sosial melalui cara berpikir Martin Heidegger. Seorang peneliti tidak hidup di dalam suatu isolasi, dia sudah terhubung pada suatu konteks kehidupan di mana dia tinggal. Konteks kehidupan memotivasi peneliti untuk melihat makna sesuatu. Pada penelitian sosial, peneliti tidak sekadar menemui fakta-fakta sosial, namun menemui peristiwa yang sesuai (ereignis). Jadi, peneliti sosial disarankan untuk menghindari dua hal ketika melakukan penelitian sosial dalam konteks hermeneutika situasi, yaitu prinsip pembagian subjek-objek dan prinsip bebas nilai. Alasannya, anggapan bahwa seorang peneliti telah terlibat dengan lingkungan sekitar yang kemudian menjadi objek penelitiannya, bahkan sebelum melakukan penelitian. Keterlibatan inilah yang menjadikan peneliti mampu memahami objek penelitiannya.

Kata-kata Kunci: *Fenomenologi, Hermeneutika Situasi, Martin Heidegger, Penelitian Sosial.*

Introduction

The background to this research problem is a crisis of science caused by the application of natural science methodology in social science. This crisis of science in the social sciences means the narrowing of researcher subjectivity due to methodological reductions. The narrowing of researcher subjectivity is due to the emphasis on the scientific method to obtain certainty in research results; The name of the philosophy that prioritizes method as the only way to obtain valid knowledge is positivism (Riyanto 2017, 9).

Two big problems occur when applying positivism in the social sciences: first is the crisis of science. An overall generalization that is present before a researcher as an objective fact. Objective facts obtained from the application of strict methods such as natural science are the goal, namely objectivism. Objectivism not only does not recognize the role of the researcher but also empties the researcher's self-understanding so that the research results become objective and mechanical. In the end, positivism wants to build the metaphysics of the scientific method or scientism. The application of the principles of the scientific method in every aspect of humanity implies the technologicalization of various areas of human life and reduces humans to their objective dimensions only. This is where the crisis of science occurs, all forms of scientificizing social life result in the loss of meaning of human life which is replaced by human instrumentalization (Hardiman 2003, 53–54).

Second, the loss of the researcher's existential freedom in carrying out social change stems from free human consciousness. Horkheimer once said that in the modern era where there is an iron law of positivism, there is a tendency towards the end of social life, which is because sociology and social sciences are no longer actively participating in activities in public institutions, but are busy building the grand narrative of a theory (Agger 2005, 15).

The problem of positivism is a value-free principle; the value-free principle says that researchers conducting research must free all forms

of assumptions that lie behind the research objectives. The application of value-free principles in social sciences was generally initiated by two major schools of social sciences, namely Auguste Comte's positivism and Max Weber's interpretive sociology; Although the two are very different, in principle, they adhere to the belief that social science must be free from values (Ruslin 2019, 197).

Positivism sees sociology as having to research only phenomena that can be observed. What can be observed are social facts in the form of statistical data that connect one variable with other variables so that a theoretical deduction is formed. These methodical steps do not necessarily involve the researcher's feelings. For example, in Durkheim's research about suicide, the research only needs to check the validity and reliability of the data showing the suicide rate and what causes it. Durkheim did not need to look at the mental condition or feelings of the deceased person who committed suicide, or all the psychological aspects related to suicide research (Steiner 2023, 34).

On the other hand, Max Weber also used the principles of the value-free method, although somewhat differently. Weber researched social action, social action can only be realized through interpretation. Interpretation is only possible when the researcher is directly involved with the research object, through empathy the researcher can penetrate what the research object feels. However, Weber also believed that sociology must also be objective and apply value-free principles in research. Researchers must interpret facts not from their personal opinions, but from concepts that already exist and are widely known. So, when social concepts and facts are brought together, no personal assumptions of the researcher emerge, and research objectivity is achieved (Steiner 2023, 37).

The problem that arises from emphasizing value-free principles in research is the loss of the unique human touch that meets reality. "Meet reality" here means the researcher's understanding in interpreting what is present in front of him (Douglas 2007, 21). The datum for the social researcher is the world of social life around him, in which he has expressed his participation before he draws up his research proposal. So the research path to express the researcher's participation must return to the awareness that arises from the activities of the subject interacting with the object (Lekka-Kowalik 2009, 40).

At this point, the social researcher's singular experience meets the object is unique, not just as an impersonal and neutral observer. Research then becomes an intellectual investigation that is open to reality, meaning that there is freedom for the researcher to reveal what is present in his mind, namely the possibility of the existence of something (Hadi 2011, 15).

Two research articles show the problem of scientism in framing social ontology, namely:

1. Christin's research entitled "distinguishing between science and scientism," says that scientism is the belief that scientific knowledge is the only form of true knowledge. It holds that reality only consists of those things that can be identified by science and supported by evidence drawn from systematic observation and experiments. Scientism assumes that rational knowledge is scientific and that everything else that claims to be knowledge is just superstitious, irrational, emotional, or nonsensical. In the end, what awaits is the emptiness of meaning that comes from the worldview of scientism because not every question can be answered scientifically. There are social and historical questions, as well as philosophical questions whose answers are not going just to be a kind of scientific evidence but more importantly seek the meaning of those events (Christin 2013, 54).
2. Rotimi Omosulu's research entitled "The main features and constraints of social science's research methods" reveals that objectivity becomes a constraint on social science research. The argument is that in the natural sciences, the researcher does not need, and cannot even if he wishes, impose his biases and desires on his subjects of study. The physicist who wishes to know whether the law of gravity holds or not must observe what is. The point here is that it is always impossible for a social scientist to conduct an objective study without first assigning a value. As a result, there can be no objective study of social reality since life, with its illogical actuality and infinite number of conceivable interpretations, is limitless. At this stage, social sciences cannot be considered a generalizing endeavor. Given this, the objectivity and generalization that social scientists often claim can not transcend particular social situations in which all social perceptions are influenced by the perceiver's social background (Omosulu 2013, 1914–15).

The theoretical basis of this research is the thought of Martin Heidegger, who is one of the leading philosophers of the 20th century (Dwiangga, Mulyatno, and Antony 2023, 19). Martin Heidegger's thoughts are generally derived from the founder of the phenomenology school, namely Edmund Husserl, who aimed to save the subject of knowledge. The phenomenology school focuses attention on everything that appears in everyday life. The involvement of a researcher in everyday life presupposes concern for a problem. The researcher's intention in starting research is based on what has been experienced in a situation involving the researcher and the research object (Horriggan-Kelly, Millar, and Dowling 2016, 2).

Martin Heidegger added the hermeneutics method to the phenomenology building; that is, the hermeneutics method of

phenomenological description is interpretive. Especially in social phenomenology, hermeneutics as an interpretive principle that reveals the world of everyday life is directly related to the social sciences (Kruger-Ross 2015, 7). For example, to interpret a social action, the researcher must not only feel it with empathy but also understand (*verstehen*) what the main problem is from the researcher himself. Here the interpretation that arises from understanding the main problem becomes intertwined between the subject and the object of knowledge.

This research examines Martin Heidegger's hermeneutics method, which Martin Heidegger calls in the book *Phenomenological Interpretation of Aristotle* (initiation into phenomenological research) a hermeneutics situation. This research aims to describe the hermeneutics situation from the point of view of conducting social research. The important value and novelty of this research is that it examines the closeness of philosophy and social science through Martin Heidegger's way of thinking.

Martin Heidegger's thoughts have been widely discussed in terms of his existentialism, while this research focuses on thinking about research methodology that integrates humans as revealers of the existence of things in the world of everyday life and humans as the basis for the ontology of social science. The researcher wants to reveal through Heidegger's thoughts, that there is a close relationship between philosophy and social science in searching for the meaning of everyday life, not within the framework of social science scientism but in the intertwined process of a researcher interpreting the meaning of the presence around him.

Hermeneutics Situation as Philosophizing Method of Martin Heidegger

Martin Heidegger's philosophy is guided by a question: what is the meaning of something called "being"? Heidegger noted three prejudices about the meaning of the word "Being", namely: (1) Being is the most universal concept; (2) Being as a concept cannot be defined; (3) the concept of "Being" is a concept that is evident in itself (Tonner 2010, 1). Heidegger considers these three prejudices to be met not only with a lack of answers but also with a lack of direction in the question (Heidegger 2001a, 24).

Heidegger said that "being" is the presence of an entity, meaning that the question of "being" is a question regarding the meaning of the existence of something. Heidegger gives priority to the question "being" through understanding something (ontological) and the fact of something (ontic), meaning that ontological priority refers to the fact that all knowledge and all forms of curiosity already assume "understanding the existence of something" (Heidegger 1975, 19).

The ontological prioritization of the question of the meaning of the presence of something has a reason, namely that the researcher's self

is a relevant presence at the beginning of the search for the meaning of something (Gelven 1989, 29). The entity that is the researcher himself and has the possibility of revealing the presence of something is called *dasein*. Questions regarding the meaning of the presence of something then become circular reasoning which ends up forming the essence of *dasein* itself (Heidegger 2001a, 195).

Heidegger (2024, 9) looks for the meaning of the presence of something based on the existence of a researcher who is looking for reality. "Reality" is a fundamental term in ontology. Heidegger (1962, 243) looks for the basics of reality in the facts of everyday life experience. Heidegger (2001a, 25–26) looks for the meaning of the presence of something by analyzing what is present around the researcher as one of the possibilities for the existence of something; This means that researchers research based on the presuppositions they already have as a basis for viewing phenomena that have been understood, to guide research questions.

Based on the argument above, reality must be understood a priori, that is, as having the basis of being in the world (Syamsuddin 2011, 113). Being in the world means that the researcher has been absorbed in a relationship with a location in space and time (Heidegger 2001a, 80). The researcher has experienced events around it and these events have become their life experiences, this then becomes his *dasein* (Dreyfus 1990, 17–18).

Dasein means self-understanding of ourselves through the factual being-present-at-hand, objective facts about itself. The fact regarding the existence of *dasein* is unique to each *dasein* which is differentiated from the fact of a mineral. This fact of *dasein* is called facticity (Heidegger 1999, 12).

Heidegger's thinking is not a theory about the category of being or ontology in ordinary philosophy terms, but rather a disclosure of the meaning of the entity being investigated based on the facticity of the researcher (Heidegger 1999, 2). Heidegger formed the concept of the meaning of the existence of something with an "ontological ontic" principle, meaning that every question about the meaning of the existence of something in every research has the presumption of having an "understanding" of what is to be researched. Every "understanding" is always owned by *dasein* which is a fact of something around *dasein* (Heidegger 2001a, 32), *dasein* in this case is the researcher himself. Based on the ontological description above, the researcher indirectly carries out an existential analysis of *dasein*, meaning that the analysis of something is based on the path of understanding *dasein*. The path of understanding *dasein* cannot be random but based on the history that each *dasein* has uniquely (Gelven 1989, 33).

Based on the discussion regarding the meaning of the presence of something above, the way to access the meaning of something can only be

through visible symptoms. Research methods based on visible symptoms are called phenomenology (Heidegger 2001a, 60). Phenomenology as a research method does not see the object as something given within itself but rather as a process of interpretation based on the facts of a researcher's self-understanding at a certain time (Heidegger 1999, 58–59).

Phenomenology is a way of research regarding phenomena, phenomenology consists of two components, namely: “phenomenon” and “logy” or “logos”. The term phenomenon shows something in itself. Something can show itself depending on each case that the researcher sees, of course, it is also possible for an entity to show itself as something that it is not. Something that shows itself is what is called “appearance,” meaning that something that appears can look like something but researchers need to dig deeper into the meaning of that thing that appears. Something that appears “shows” something that is not itself. Behind something that appears there seems to be something that does not show itself. What appears is something that appears in someone's presuppositions, meaning that something that appears as a reference relationship can fill the possibility of something within itself (Suddick et al. 2020, 2).

The second component of phenomenology is logos. Logos has its basis as discourse. Logos is interpreted in many senses such as “reason,” “decision,” “concept,” “definition,” and “foundation.” Logos can be understood as belief, but belief is a decision. Logos is the act of connecting two things and taking a stand on whether to accept or reject a decision. Heidegger interprets logos as speaking, meaning realizing “what is said” in conversation in the sense of letting something be seen by showing it. Because logos are letting something be seen by showing that it can be true or false. But all remain unsafe from the concept of truth in the sense of “agreement”; rather, the entities spoken of are not hidden or allow them to be seen as something that is not hidden (Heidegger 2001a, 56).

At this point, Heidegger defines the word “truth” as unconcealment, and logos is a special mode of revealing something so that it is visible but logos cannot be placed as the “location” of truth. Heidegger defines truth as unconcealment, it is more genuine than truth as agreement, which means the simplest perception that determines the presence of something, for example, seeing always finds color, and hearing finds sound. This is “true” in the purest sense that is not covered by anything (Stefani and Cruz 2019, 120–21).

Something that is not a pure form can always change into another form and always makes something appear as something, has a structure of possibilities to cover up. “truth as unconcealment” is different from covering up, it is a phenomenon of truth with more than one kind of basis. It is different from realism and idealism that understood in the philosophy of knowledge. While logos here lies in seeing something directly, meaning

allowing something to be experienced, by not only opening up the understanding that one already has but also showing something about something else, logos means the connection of something with something else (Heidegger 2001a, 57).

Based on the interpretation of “phenomenon” and “logos”, there is a relationship between the two as “phenomenology”, the formal meaning of phenomenology as a branch of research that seeks to show something itself from itself. Phenomenology as a way of researching phenomena means grasping objects directly to show and be directly shown (Kakkori 2009, 20). Phenomenology is a way to talk about ontology and a way to show it precisely. Only as phenomenology does ontology become possible, the phenomenological concept of the phenomenon of seeing something “behind” what is visible (Heidegger 1999, 57).

Something that looks “behind” is something that makes the presence of something. What is present in each case is the presence of an entity, bringing the entity within itself forward is the core of phenomenology as the basis of ontology; meaning that the basis for the existence of something is taken from the facts of an entity and then interpreted (Kruger-Ross 2015, 7). The facts about an entity through the correct meaning by *dasein* and the basic structure of understanding are the basis of *dasein*’s phenomenology. The phenomenology of *dasein* referred to here is a path of research regarding the meaning of something in the basic structure of *dasein* within the horizon of a phenomenon (Heidegger 2001b, 46).

At this point, phenomenology as a way of research into phenomena can only be realized through interpretation. The name of Heidegger’s method for interpreting phenomena is called hermeneutics situation. Hermeneutics situation referred to here is paying attention to the researcher’s overall presumptions regarding the research problem. Hermeneutics situation is formed previously in the fundamental experience of relating to the object, it means that there is a previous image of the object which then becomes the basis for the structure for interpreting the object. This previous image is an understanding of the object and it is not a matter of theory but rather an understanding of everyday life (Heidegger 2001b, 48).

Hermeneutics situation is an interpretation of *dasein* based on pre-understanding (Laverty 2003, 24). Hermeneutics situation means a “circular” existential interpretation, meaning that the interpretation depends on the understanding that the researcher has. This connects the researcher’s projection of the object forward first, while at the same time moving backward to pre-understanding. Projection onto an object simultaneously retrieves (*Wiederholung*) the pre-understanding that the researcher has of the object (Caputo 1987, 80).

Interpretation of something that is noticed through the researcher’s understanding. Understanding is a description of something that

is already known about a situational context. Understanding in the first place is not a way of knowing or mode of knowing but rather the existence of something that is already known in advance, which is where someone says "I can" interpret something as something. Interpretation is a form of expression of understanding, something that is already known in understanding and can be interpreted by someone is called meaning (Heidegger 1985, 209).

The ontology of knowledge is rooted in understanding, understanding is something that *dasein* has as a structure of existence (*existentiale*) which determines interpretation which is called a projection structure, meaning that *dasein* has been thrown into the world and has the facticity to understand objects, this fact forms *dasein's* projection as something that connects the entire possibility of existence knowledge in the world. The understanding formed from these projections becomes the possibility of interpreting something as something (Heidegger 2001a, 189).

Hermeneutics situation moves to an "as-structure" which makes the researcher interpret the entity that is understood "as" something. This means that *dasein* has understood something around it. Based on its thrownness, *dasein* advances towards the possibility of understanding with what is called projection, which is the most possible possibility of human being thrown in the world. Understanding as a projection character forms the existence of human knowledge in the world (Heidegger 2001a, 189).

Understanding is the basis of existence for interpretation, understanding of the world must be understood before it can be interpreted, it is explicitly said that the structure of something as something. A researcher does not research something aimless, but what the researcher research is something which is considered a problem in his life (Laverty 2003, 24).

Understanding obtains a basis through structure in life through feelings (*befindlichkeit*). Feelings are a structure before experience, meaning that as a human being who has lived in the world, he is always living in a situation. The world in Heidegger's sense is always the spiritual world in which the daily environment a person lives in and is absorbed in (Heidegger 1985, 255). An example of an everyday world environment is a craftsman's work environment, he is absorbed in that environment, as a unique place for craftsmen. He meets his handicrafts, meets other craftsmen and buyers of handicrafts, the structure of life as it is is called the everyday world environment (Heidegger 1985, 192).

Feelings guide understanding in interpreting events that are present in front of the researcher (Ratcliffe 2012, 2) (Reuther 2013, 8). Before someone understands something, there is a feeling of caring about something. The feeling of caring is a basic human structure that exists before understanding or pre-understanding (Heidegger 1985, 299). Meanwhile, interpretation is the expression of understanding as an

“as” structure based on a pre-understanding. There are three kinds of background structure of an understanding (Stefani and Cruz 2019, 122). That is:

1. Fore-having. Fore-having means that *dasein* has a complete understanding of the object based on its history. For example, someone cannot interpret a hammer if they do not have experience using a hammer as a whole.
2. Fore-sight. Fore-sight means that someone has a certain view of something that can be interpreted as something.
3. Fore-conception. Fore-conception is an image formed from background and background views, an image of the existence of something that has been grasped before someone learns a system of concepts or general schemes.

These three pre-understandings form a researcher’s horizon to be able to interpret the meaning of something. So meaning shows a projection of something that can be formed based on a researcher’s pre-understanding (Lavery 2003, 24). The meaning of something then becomes something that is “existential,” meaning that the meaning is not something floating but must be based on the principle of expressing a researcher’s understanding of a problem that is close to the researcher’s daily life (Heidegger 2001b, 92).

Understanding goes along with the possibility of error or truth, because understanding, in each case, connects the disclosure of *dasein* which is intertwined with problems in his world, the difference in understanding is an existential modification of the projection of understanding as a whole. Meanwhile, interpretation cannot work if we never perceive something that is ready-at-hand, something that is ready-at-hand the researcher must have in total involvement with what is closest to him; The totality of involvement is the essence of the structure of pre-understanding (Sebold et al. 2018, 5).

Meanwhile, interpreting is interpreting the meaning of entities in the world, the meaning of the word “meaning” is projecting something into something that can be understood as something, it is obtained from a pre-understanding structure. Therefore, meaning in principle is something of an existential ontology (Heidegger 2001a, 193).

There is no safe interpretation. Interpretation is traditionally placed as the place of truth; no longer put there, but as a conversation (Stefani and Cruz 2019, 123). Interpretation has three elements, namely: (1) belief as apophantic, namely showing, indicating given something something as that or not. (2) belief as a predication, namely giving something a certain character, for example, a hammer is “too heavy”, the word “too heavy”

gives the belief that a hammer is heavy. (3) belief that communication means being together with other people and showing something as something. A researcher shares with others something that is designated as a particular character. Qualitatively, this cannot be measured in an objectively valid measure, namely everyone's problem and true for everyone, but rather belief as showing something that is given a certain character and talking about it (Heidegger 2001a, 196).

Morals The Relevance of Hermeneutics Situation to Social Research

Heidegger sees humans as being-in-the-world, meaning humans are absorbed in worldly life in the world such as houses, trees, and people, in short, the realm of everyday life such as the world of work (Reuther 2013, 3). "World" according to Heidegger describes the whole of worldliness, meaning that worldliness is the character of the world which has a time structure and time is a priori the character of worldliness (Heidegger 2001a, 91).

Heidegger said that the world is very close to *dasein* because *dasein* is in-the-world which forms the daily horizon so that the world can be seen in a view. The everyday world that *dasein* experiences is called the environment. This everyday horizon will later become readiness-in-hand, meaning that *dasein* has interacted with entities in its environment and understands the meaning of its daily life environment (Davis 2014, 9).

Dasein which understands the meaning of practical action is realized in the skill of using tools which is differentiated from theoretical behavior regarding a tool. Tools mean everything that we find for our use, for example, means of transportation, work tools, and writing tools. Ready-to-hand relates to having experienced and interacted with situations in the environment, ready-to-hand means the ability to apply practically the use of tools in everyday life (Heidegger 2001a, 98).

Ready-to-hand is related to being-in-the-world, namely, *dasein* involves oneself in the world, and involving oneself in the world shows the researcher's concern for something close in his life, so understanding for him is something that is well known to *dasein*. Heidegger contrasts the closeness of humans and their environment with Rene Descartes' views regarding the relationship of mind and entities in the world, the natural condition of *dasein* is invisible, and Descartes forms the principle of the source of knowledge in the thinking subject; this means that there is a two-way division between mind and matter, a division of subject and object which is the beginning of modern epistemology (Aspers and Kohl 2013, 497).

The application of the roots of Descartes' thinking in phenomenology lies in Edmund Husserl's phenomenological method, namely transcendental phenomenology, which means releasing the content of consciousness from the context of the situation so that it reaches the core

of the phenomenon which is in principle an ideal type for each situation context (Aspers and Kohl 2013, 493).

One of the methodical elements used is eidetic reduction. "Reduction" means simplifying reality to only one of its aspects, eidetic reduction eliminates anything coincidental to construct a core structure which is a certainty in the formation of the existence of something. This core structure is called "eidetic variation." Eidetic variation starts from a case that is used as a guiding model (*vorbild*), the starting point for variations in ideas using imagination to infer general things from particular things based on similar images guided by facts as a model. Eidetic variation, which initially attempted to describe something in itself, became a conceptual tool for determining the general type of inquiry into the nature of everyday life experiences (Westerlung 2020, 36).

Heidegger sees Husserl's transcendental phenomenology with the aim of pure consciousness forgetting what the existence of something means, "the existence of something" here means what is present before a researcher. Husserl ignores the question of how one knows the meaning of things. Husserl developed the principle of a research method regarding something that appears to be able to reach absolute pure awareness without returning to the context of the situation of something's presence (Aspers 2010, 267). Heidegger (1985, 109) sees that phenomenological reduction rejects not only the individuation of life experience but also does not see action as a human decision, but only sees the structure of human action in its whatness.

Therefore, Heidegger offers to avoid two things in phenomenological research, namely: subject-object schema and value-free prejudice. The subject-object schema means the distinction between consciousness and being; consciousness is "I think" or a center of I or ego, while being is the existence of an entity that is present in front of a researcher (Aspers and Kohl 2013, 493). Heidegger (1999, 70) sees that the intention to something or intentionality is something personal, this is reflected in Husserl's concept, namely that actions and actions are directed, meaning that in the first place, a phenomenological researcher has directed what he means to a situation, and each situation as something individualizing.

Heidegger (1999, 63) sees the division of subject and object, the distinction between consciousness and the meaning of something's existence is the opposite of the nature of something's presence. Heidegger said the nature of an object's presence depends on the subject who sees it or both in a relationship. *Dasein* sees the facts of life as not a kind of theoretical construction that applies a scheme to see objects in which there is a process of subject-object isolation which is then united again in many ways; rather, the researcher has been coping with his life's problems and has an understanding of them.

The second thing to avoid is value-free prejudice. Value-free prejudice is the keyword for the highest principle of science for constructing theories. Value-free prejudice is a disaster for the early roots of social research because it constitutes a fundamental blindness to critical inquiry. The search for research becomes aimed at something self-evident (Laverty 2003, 26).

Heidegger (1999, 64) said that a researcher always has a life context, such as the surrounding environment, meaning that in approaching the main problem, a researcher already has a motive for what he wants to say. Value-free is only when there is nothing to do, value-free is a person's fear of facing the face of the general public.

Aspers and Kohl (2013, 488) see what Heidegger said above as related to the methodological principles of social research, namely that a social researcher has facticity and *dasein* as part of his world and of a research plan ready in hand. Social researchers have shortcomings in their social foundations because the epistemological basis refers to the Cartesian epistemology above. What social scientists mean by "social" is no longer everyday life but a derivative of Cartesian epistemology, namely seeing everyday life in a conceptual scheme. Social scientists such as Weber, Durkheim, and Simmel see society in terms of objects and researchers are subjects separate from society.

Heidegger sees that the facticity of social researchers is closeness to their environment; not social facts like Durkheim, namely material facts that must be approached outside the researcher, to free oneself from presumptions and to free oneself from subjective feelings to be able to show the essence of the object being studied. Heidegger uses the concept of reference to the relationship between the researcher and his environment so that the researcher has a ready-to-hand understanding (Aspers and Kohl 2013, 499). References are human actions to understand the meaning of their environment.

Understanding is always in the context of a situation. Understanding is a reference within a broader frame of reference and simply perceiving entities will not tell you anything about them, because the entity has no meaning unless it has understood its meaning as a whole, for example, letters in a foreign language cannot be understood unless you have understood the entire meaning of the language. Understanding becomes a presumption for researchers to view a situation in their environment. This circular structure of understanding is a presumption for understanding something meaningfully. The inevitability of pre-understanding that forms understanding Heidegger calls the hermeneutic circle (Laverty 2003, 28). Heidegger (2001b, 141) emphasized that it is not a matter of leaving the hermeneutic circle but rather entering it in the right way, it mean that our understanding will not function without the presupposition of a reference.

The hermeneutic circle is the center of the hermeneutics situation. The hermeneutic circle would be to short circuit the very understanding, to resist its ontological makeup, and render it mute, wordless without a trace of an idea. Avoiding the circle would be to deprive understanding of a “way to go” and so leave it stalled. The task of a researcher, accordingly, is not to hold himself exempt from uncovering for himself what research result he has accomplished by drawing upon his primordial self-understanding by consulting his preunderstanding (Caputo 1987, 76). At this point, it can be said that the purpose of hermeneutics situation is to restore factual existence to its original difficulty; hermeneutics situation tries to recapture the hardness of life before all the theories show a fast way out the back door of the flux of time (Caputo 1987, 1).

Aspers and Kohl (2013, 498) see hermeneutics situation as the most appropriate methodical principle for conducting social research and presuppositions in reading social facts, meaning that social facts are not something that is outside the researcher as an eidetic reduction and point of view reduction, namely the researcher’s point of view is confined to being able to see the object in-itself so that a researcher can objectively see the object without any presumptions.

Heidegger (1985, 188) sees social facts as something that shows itself within itself, but something that announces itself still needs to be interpreted because something itself cannot speak for itself, social facts are in a building of concepts that are relevant to the researcher’s understanding. In short, social facts that appear to a researcher can be interpreted based on the frame of reference of the researcher’s presuppositions. Researchers express their understanding of social facts in two ways: (1) Researchers collect social facts based on a frame of reference that is the researcher’s presuppositions. (2) Social facts then become a reference for describing something in research.

Social fact’s position in the principle of the hermeneutics situation method is placed as a sign for the basis of describing something as the possibility of something. According to Heidegger, the concept of a sign connects one thing with another. A sign connects one thing with another to form the formal character of something but without telling its essence. The sign shows something as something ready-to-hand, meaning that *dasein* already has a reference from *dasein*’s pre-understanding to see something as a formal indication of something based on a situation (Heidegger 2001b, 138).

Heidegger (1995, 293) defined “formal indications” as methodical elements that demonstrate the determining character of a thing. Burch (2011, 6) adds that formal indication means the embodiment of concepts in the content of the writing by the researcher’s presuppositions and the social facts that are the material of the formal indication. The concept here is not a scheme but rather the possibility of the existence of something

being studied based on the researcher's presuppositions from basic experiences in his life.

Heidegger offers a formal indication as a methodical element of hermeneutics situation to replace the notion of phenomenological reduction in interpreting everyday life. Heidegger sees that Husserl was too theoretical in reading everyday life. Heidegger criticized Husserl's transcendental phenomenology which tried to describe everyday life but forgot the temporal-historical being of *dasein* which is the natural condition of a human being (Westerlung 2020, 147).

Heidegger replaces the elements of phenomenological reduction with formal indication as a principle for constructing concepts, namely that the research concepts used have the character of determining the presence of something but do not provide a definite meaning representing each case; a meaning that is present only refers to the research context. The term "formal" used in formal indications refers to concepts that are used not arbitrarily but based on mature thinking based on research findings and social problems that exist around them (Shockey 2010, 531–532).

The results of social research cannot be reduced to either literature or a collection of field facts, but refer to a situation where each researcher fights for himself to find words to express the researcher's original understanding. Based on this, the researcher must understand the world not as something objective and also not avoid isolating the "world" as a phenomenon something outside the researcher. Consequently, the researcher must be able to read relationships between the world and the researcher's limitations to be able to see the whole situation based on the researcher's understanding.

Conclusion

The conclusion of Martin Heidegger's thought regarding hermeneutics situation and its relevance to social science research; It was found that there was a relationship between the daily life experiences of a social researcher and the social research he conducted. In every social research, a researcher does not live in isolation, he is connected to the context of life in which he lives. The context of life in the surrounding environment provides a horizon for understanding how the researcher behaves toward a proposed research problem.

The context of life is also the root of personal habits, which motivate researchers to see the meaning of something. At the research level, the principle of hermeneutics situation says that researchers do not just meet social facts, but meet appropriate events (*ereignis*). The phrase "appropriate event" means that a researcher encounters an event that is by what he understands so that he can interpret something as something. Not every event is an appropriate event, appropriate events only occur when there is a unified understanding of the person experiencing the event and the event itself (Heidegger 2008, 60).

At this point, social researchers are advised to avoid two things when conducting social research in the context of hermeneutics situation, namely the principle of subject-object division and the value-free principle. The reason is that a researcher presumes that he is involved in the surrounding environment which then becomes the object of his research, even before conducting research. This involvement is what makes the researcher able to understand the object of his research.

Therefore, hermeneutically, the theoretical division of subject and object is not appropriate to use in social research, because what is present before the researcher is not an object or social fact but an appropriate event (*ereignis*), meaning that the researcher himself has been absorbed in the event he is experiencing. The meaning of events cannot be objectified for each researcher because each event is unique to the researcher who experiences it, which is differentiated from "process". A process is a moment that can be observed in a laboratory, for example, releasing energy. At the same time, each researcher will always bring a valuable understanding regarding his research objectives. So it would not be appropriate to completely break the chain of understanding the values that one has, because if that is done, it will also break the chain of the researcher's understanding of his research (Heidegger 2008, 61).

Martin Heidegger's hermeneutic approach can ultimately be useful for researchers in understanding reality, especially human phenomena and actions. Humans as interacting and social beings. Everything that happens must be related. Looking at something is not only about what is visible, but it is necessary to see what causes it to happen or the basis of an event.

Reality is not only what is visible, but behind it, many factors make it happen. The approach taken by Heidegger can be used by researchers to understand humans and social phenomena as a whole and provide a broad perspective in understanding and seeing something.

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