



**Abstrak:** Hidup dan keberagaman kita selalu membutuhkan sejarah, tetapi bagaimana pengalaman sejarah itu meninggalkan pesan, dimengerti, tertulis, dan memperoleh status kebenaran—sejarah merupakan diskusi yang cukup panjang. Sejarah/penulisan sejarah adalah hubungan penulis (subjek) dan objek (kejadian/fakta sejarah). Hubungan ini adalah hubungan dialektika yang memengaruhi unsur-unsur kebenarannya, sebab mau tidak mau manusia adalah menyejarah dan penulisan sejarah diarahkan oleh individu perekamnya. Dengan menggunakan pendekatan kritis, strukturalisme (Michel Foucault), untuk melihat episteme (pengandaian-pengandaian dan prinsip-prinsip yang tanpa sadar memengaruhi sejarah dan penulis sejarah, juga sistem pemikiran yang menjuruskan cara mempraktikkan ilmu pengetahuan pada suatu zaman), lewat strukturasi (Antony Giddens), yang menunjukkan bagaimana struktur masyarakat dan berkegiatan termasuk menulis terbentuk, di mana kondisi itu memainkan peran dalam suatu diskursus dan menentukan bagaimana sebuah diskursus terjadi. Konstruktivisme (J. Piaget), yang mengarahkan cara berfikir manusia dari asimilasi, akomodasi dan equilibrium, serta pendekatan subjektif-objektive (filsafati), dan fenomenologi dari Haidegger dan lainnya, untuk mengungkap struktur tahu dan pengetahuan manusia, sehingga terungkap dialektika unsur neotik dan neomatiknya, anasir sebagai 'wesens', hakikat, sejarah yang sebenarnya. Kesimpulannya walaupun sejarah itu ditulis subjektif (unsur manusia dengan kesejarahannya) tetapi dengan pendekatan subjektif-objektif, akan didapatkan sejarah atau penulisan sejarah yang cukup dapat dipertanggungjawabkan dan valid. Selanjutnya harapannya dapat menghadirkan sejarah (Islam) yang objektif (Islam yang diterima secara umum, bukan hanya karena keimanan, tetapi lebih kearah rasional-objektif) dengan bukti kesejarahannya yang cukup valid.

**Kata-kata Kunci:** *Kesadaran Sejarah, Pendekatan Subjektivo-Objektif, Refleksi Filosofis.*

## Introduction

Knowledge of Science (history) is like the 'tree of blessing' written in the Qur'an, 'the olive tree that is neither East nor West' (Q.S. An-Nūr [24]: 35). Criticism is the only one that decides its validity; it does not matter the religious beliefs, geographic region, or ethno-cultural group of those who produce it and submit it all to constant scrutiny (Arkoun 1994, 41). If we look at history, whether it is national history or religion (Islamic), then we can see it as a 'believer' or as a *mu'arrikh* (historian). If we see as people who believe, then we will agree with the existing historical books, by quoting them section by section or comparing one to another. So, what if there are a lot of contradictions in the history books, even to the point where things are quite serious? Perhaps we will use certain rules and principles of *husnuzan*, good prejudice, and so on (Hakim and Rosipah 2022, 54).

In fact, with the existence of an episteme (a tendency towards a certain way of thinking, borrowing Foucault's term), a creed (a collection of premises, axioms, certain beliefs that dominate the way of thinking of historians and their times, perceptions and also actions), then history and historians will lead to certain places, experiencing problems of its objectivity.

The problems of history and historical writing in Indonesia have been

expressed by many researchers, including, Purwanta (2012; Rofiq 2017, 122–41; Mahardika 2020, 2; Susanto et.al 2022, 228–43), as well as in Islamic history, both hadith and another history (Husna 2018, 267–80). Perhaps it's true as Nietzsche said, *“For people, nations, and cultures to live healthily, both historical and non-historical are equally useful”* (Sunardi 200, 39). We need history because history is knowledge of the past that shows present perspectives, and the present which gives traces of its future (Prayogi 2022, 4). Even though as human beings who believe in existence and freedom, we do not have to get stuck in “historical pain” (Sunardi 2000, 27–30; 2009, 40).

We must see which areas need to be traced as archetypes of the past and which are not. In many ways, we need history, both as past knowledge, evidence, and a foothold, as a compass direction. Especially in religion, historical evidence becomes very urgent because it is the only proof inscription that we can take regarding the existence of something in the past. The problem in reading and studying history is; that we cannot be separated from many factors, starting from the author, political factors, when history was written and where, and so on. We know that most history is written by winning groups, affiliation, author's inclination, author's subjectivity, as well as our subjectivity in understanding and reconstructing historical data which greatly influence the writing and reading of history (Notosusanto 1971, 4–7; Poespoprodjo 1987, 2; Kuntowijoyo 2013, 89; Mutawally, Zakaria, and Hazbini 2023, 289).

The question to be asked in this paper is how can we not be trapped by the subjectivism of writers and readers, even though perhaps we will not be able to objectively ascertain the historical data? Because history is the past and many things do not have complete historical data each group, writer, and expert reconstructs these histories according to the factors surrounding them. How do we use a critical approach in history so that the measurement of ‘truth and justice’ can be traced, with the help of phenomenological, existentialist, and deconstructive philosophical studies? This study used an analytical descriptive approach and a literature review (literature study).

## **Forms of Historical Approach**

One of the problems in writing history and its construction is the particular thinking tendencies of people of that time. Episteme is a system of thought that directs the way of practicing science in a certain era so that it is difficult for humans to get out of the framework that surrounds it (Bertens 1996, 215), what questions allow an episteme to be formed?

According to Nietzsche (Sunardi 2009, 28; 2000, 39–45), the historical approach is divided into three main points, namely; 1) Monumental Approach, which sees and pays attention to the history of monumental greatness and scarcity in the past. The history of this form displayed the

amazing success and greatness of the past. So, it seems to be seen as a form of human actualization. People often feel like going back there. The greatness of the past is brought back so that it seems to arise in us, why can't we be like that and so on?

Finally, the greatness of people or culture of the past becomes a model for those who want to establish greatness in the present and the future. People who are infected with this disease, are not unlike using masks to cover the faces of people today who are reluctant to seek their greatness. What they consider culture is a form of nostalgia, and this in turn becomes a worship of the greatness of the past. They only see the results without caring about the historical reality and why they got like that. The characteristic of people with this approach is that they know a lot about past greatness, but they cannot become great.

This is very interesting if we see and appreciate it in Islamic history. Where there is such a thing as a period of "purity of Islam" (caliph of four par-excellence), "golden age of Islam" (Abbasid dynasty), how was the administration and arrangement of urban planning during the era of Hārūn al-Rashīd, Mutawakkil, Islamic caliphate, and others? Here it is not intended to accept or reject it, because acceptance and rejection require comprehensive historical research. But what we want to emphasize here is how many Muslims today are trapped and confined to the past. Historical romanticism, in which our actions and efforts to advance and actualize Islam refer to "the past". As if they are very good and flawless. This is what Nietzsche called "historical pain". We see that in history the same story tells of events such as: how from when the Prophet of Islam was still around, conflicts among the companions were seen, and hypocrisy occurred (Badwi 2022, 136; (Zebua, Ihsan, and Nurjanah 2020, 117).

It Happened the wars among the companions of the prophet, which gave rise to Islamic schism, wars among Islamic kingdoms, the behavior of kings and caliphs who wallow in wealth and intrigue as well as women, and so on (Basri 2021, 36–40; Geo hidup 2019). How can this be studied without excessive romanticism and 'historical pain'? Maybe it is true what Foucault said above, the mistake in seeing and understanding and acting in that way is not due to an error in the way of thinking that is still unclear but is a logical consequence of the system of thought that existed at that time (the era).

Antikurian approach, namely where historical writing seeks the origins and identity of a person or group from the past. This happens because of efforts to protect and respect what is considered a source of identity or origin. Awareness of the past is considered a continuation that makes us what we are today. "Here we may walk and here our limits may not walk." Looking at our present life from the past. Our identity, what is allowed and what is not, what is good and bad, and even right and wrong is seen through the framework of the historical past. In the history

of this form, people's things are the most precious and essential at the moment of birth, and so on. Also in this approach, it is as if people are saying that current events are linear because of yesterday's events. There is a "certain causal relationship" of the current events, yesterday and in the future (Popper 1985, 27–29) as if there was historical determinism that ignores human free will. Here we can see; that the practice of the prophets, companions, and *tābiʿīn* have always been used as a reference for the rightness or wrongness of an action even for things that shouldn't have been like that, and the historical data behind it is still debatable. Once again, the early generations were not as pure as it was imagined, imagined, where we see wars and other upheavals occurring in Islamic history. Many habits that should be abandoned but because of "historical pain", hold fast and do not want to change at all with past opinions or habits (Adha 2022).

Critical Approach, which is an approach that sees the past not as a burden, but tries to see it critically, to make humans independent now by "separating themselves from the past". History is seen and written in an attempt to drag out the past and judge it, scrutinize it, and finally punish it. For this reason, a fairly powerful measure is used, in the form of "Truth and justice". The truth is meant, "Compatibility with objects, for example, written evidence, inscriptions, and so on. Coherence, logical sequence, and so on. The point is to figure out the two approaches above. Monumental greatness, things that are exalted and sacred need to be seen with a critical and rational point of view, where in the end we will be able to find symptoms of "laws of history", where there are things that change and do not change according to the times. Seeing something "eternal" in these historical events (Shadr 1990; Hegel 2005, 1–13), so later with the help of philosophical approaches and historical studies, phenomenology and existentialism (overcoming subjectivity), as well as structuralism, through studying texts, we can trace even to unwritten history.

But some say that history is not tasked with judging the past, teaching the present for the benefit of the future. It is too high a task. History only wants to show what happened. Facts and figures are dry bones, it requires imagination to clothe them with life and meaning and no accumulation of materials, no ransacking of archives, will make a man a historian without the capacity to interpret and construct (Follard 2018, 14).

### **The Concept of Constructing Human Thought according to Jean Piaget**

One of the concepts of episteme that is quite well established is Piaget's theory. Piaget's theory is used in many points of view including the philosophy of structuralism, didactics, psychology, and others. Piaget was born on August 9, 1896, in Neuchâtel, Switzerland. He was an early thinker in the Constructivist theory of knowledge. Constructivism is one

of the philosophies of knowledge that emphasizes that our knowledge is our construction (formation). Piaget criticizes or continues the Kantian conception which only connects knowledge as a subject-object relationship with personal knowledge without the construction formed from both (Chatué and Ngoune 2023, 97).

Knowledge is not an imitation of reality. Knowledge is not a picture of the real world that exists. Knowledge is always the result of a cognitive construction of reality through one's activities. One forms the schemas, categories, concepts, and knowledge structures necessary for knowledge. So, knowledge is not about the world outside of observation but is a human creation that is constructed from experience or the world as far as it is experienced. This formation process moves continuously and every time it is reorganized because of a new understanding (Suparno 1997, 18; 2001; Prasojo 2006, 238).

Humans acquire knowledge through a dialectical relationship between subjects who know and objects they know in a dialectical process, starting from externalization, objectivation, and internalization (Berger and Luckmann 1990, xx). Humans initially consume reality outside of themselves, for example seeing a cat, a chair, and so on. These conceptions form what are called schemata (Piaget), the schemata never stop, but always change and become more detailed. When you see the first cat, the second, and so on. A schema for cats is formed, then performing clean (abstraction) so that the abstract elements of cats (cats in general) come out. Schemata are the mental or cognitive structures by which a person intellectually adapts and coordinates the surrounding environment. These schemata will adapt and change during the mental development of a human being. Schemata are used to process and identify incoming stimuli. Schemata never stop changing and will continue to be detailed (Suparno 1997, 30).

The second process is Assimilation, which is a cognitive process in which humans integrate new perceptions, concepts, or experiences into schemes or patterns that already exist in their minds. A cognitive process that locates and classifies new events or stimuli in existing schemes. Here there is a classification of concepts (cats, cows, dogs, and others, that can be classified as animals, quadrupeds, and so on, also for example chairs, tables, computers, and others are office equipment. Glasses, spoons, forks, plates, and so on are classified as kitchen tools. Grass, roses, mangoes, and so on are classified as plants or fruits and so on.

Accommodation is the matching of new experiences with schemas that have been created earlier. This can form a new scheme (egg seeing a cat, goat, or tiger (classification of animals), suddenly seeing shoes, clothes, and others), here there will be two classifications because it is difficult to combine. But seeing birds, and elephants, then it can be included in the previous classification (animals). Inserting into something that



already exists or modifying the old schema so that it fits the new set is accommodation. For example, a child has a scheme that every animal has four legs. This was obtained from the experience of seeing the animals he had met, and then he found many animals in the fields with more than four legs). Here there is a conflict in thought, so he must change the old scheme or form a new one. Lastly is Equilibrium, namely self-regulation mechanically to regulate the balance between assimilation and accommodation (Suparno 1997, 32; Chatué and Ngoune 2023, 97).

The things that limit this constructivism include: 1) Our old construction. What we conceptualize, our perceptions, and preferences are influenced by previous constructions). 2) Our experience domain. The experience of clashing with the Indonesian armed forces, the experience of being disappointed by boyfriends or girlfriends, and others. These experiences, for example, will form stereotypes and others. This is the cause of many thinking errors, such as generalizations and associations in logic. 3) Our cognitive structure network, the number of experiences or variations of our experience of something; social interaction, solving problems in mathematics and others, will lead to the development of our ability to do so. Such as the ability to see from another angle, creativity, lateral thinking, and so on (Suparno 1997).

### **Antony Giddens's Structural Theory**

Antony Giddens is a Social Scientist and lecturer at the UK's London School of Economics (LSE). He applies the schemata in social reality with the name structure (Priyono 2000). He uses the conception with various modifications from the structuralist philosophy of Ferdinand de Saussure (language analysis). He said structure or schemata are the rules and sources that are formed from and shape the repetition of social practices.

Antony Giddens said that human actions can be grouped into three parts, namely: 1) Unconscious motives, desires, or needs that direct action, not the action itself. For example, when we go to the office, we are rarely motivated to make money, except when it's payday. Going to campus is rarely aimed at seeking knowledge, only routine. If you take public city transportation, you rarely think about why I'm taking this transportation, not just taking the next car. Or when we cross a bridge, we never check whether the bridge will collapse or not? And others. This happens because there is a sense of ontological security so that we no longer need to question our every action. With this, the routine occurs, and the structure is formed, the structure above. 2) Practical conscientiousness, according to instructions, habits, and formalization of rules that are usually done. The act of adjusting to the procedure (so that there is no need to question it again). These two awareness, unconscious motive and practical unconscious will not or is difficult to do and find irregularities, it is more likely to strengthen the structure

of this action. Because they just do it more often, more, according to the rules of the game set by the structure. 3) Discursive consciousness. Here in doing something has a broad horizon, always connects one event to another, as a tug of war various interests, and relational relationships that surround it. There is no one particular cause that makes an event happen, everything is very complex. Here something always happens and does "social analysis" (Gidden 2003, 49).


With these actions the possibility of changes, finding exceptions, and anomalies is possible. Because you always question things (it doesn't mean it's the opposite of 1 and 2, there are still things that are taken for granted). Finally, when there are exceptions, irregularities, and anomalies, and there are more and more of them, then the routine cannot be maintained anymore, finally it is necessary to form a new scheme, not just enough changes (J. Piaget), a new paradigm is formed (Khun 1993).

Without going into detail about the formation of Anthony Giddens' Structural theories, in short Giddens divides into three major groups in the social interaction of the community or structure, namely: First, the Structure of Significance (S) (concerning symbolic schemata, mentions, and discourse). Second, Domination Structure (D) (which concerns schemata of domination over people (politics) and goods/things (economy)). Third, Legitimacy Structure (L) (concerning normative regulatory schemes that are revealed in the legal system). Example: calling one who teaches is "teacher" is a social practice in the structure-signification cluster, this principle in turn concerns the schemata of domination (the teacher's power over students). And concerns the schemata-legitimacy, namely holding exams, and saving money in the bank are examples of dominance structures (see figure, taken from Priyono 2000; Gidden 2003, 35).

**Charts that can be made**

S-D-L	-----	Symbolic Affairs/Discourse	-----	Language Institution
D(Autoritation)-S-L	-----	Politics Affair	-----	Politics Institution
D (Alocation)-S-L	-----	Economic Affair	-----	Economic Institution
L-D-S	-----	Law Affair	-----	Law Institution

It's all in its way made by;



**Figure.** Relationship structure, domination, and legitimacy.



As an example, “the teacher is said to be a teacher” (in the discourse, schemata of signification), asserts power over the student (schemata-domination), and continues to produce Schemata-Legitimation (to hold exams). But this requires assistance in the form of tools, namely Interpretation Frames (that teachers have more knowledge than students, teachers have more kindness than students, and so on). The facilities they have are (there is a school as a teaching facility, if students want to work, they have to pass an exam and get grades from the school, etc.).

Norms that are formed (students must respect the teacher, if they fight and do not obey them it will be a sin, their knowledge will not be useful, etc.). Means of communication (differences in the language used, to call *anak-anak* (children), *saudara* (brothers/sisters) and others for “students” who are taught, while those who teach are called *bapak* (fathers) or *ustaz* and so on to call the “teachers”). The Power (may punish students if they don’t comply), Sanctions (fail if they don’t comply, don’t get a job if they don’t have a certificate or grades, etc.).

This is where the schemata will eventually experience confirmation because of the various existing relations and means, forming something solid, namely the episteme (Foucault) as well as the paradigm (Khun). Where all of these are ultimately the dominant social constructs, so it is very difficult for them to think in another way, and their perspective changes or they don’t have the possibility of seeing it in another way. Can we change the episteme, paradigm, and structure above?

The answer is positive, yes, because we know that, even if we don’t realize it. Even though it takes a long time, because the changes must be permanent and gradual, that is, with the ability to see the nets of the process of formation extending to wider matters and presupposing the ability to act reflectively (as just an example of how ‘critical philosophy’, Habermas and friends, trying to dismantle the paradigm of modernism).

With the tendency of the above actions carried out by humans, the structure of behavior, structure of thoughts, and thoughts are formed. So, if it is too strong it will make something not only unconscious but enter the realm of the unthink and unthinkable (Arkoun 1984, 9 and 25).

### **The Effort of Searching for “Objective” History: The Problem of Subject-Object of Historical Epistemology**

Scientific and philosophical problems from the past to the present cannot be separated from the differences of opinion between the two great men Plato and Aristotle, between Realism, Empiricism, or between Idealism and Rationalism, until Edmund-Husserl and his students who tried to think through the classical contradictions of the two. Where he provides the additional argument that there is continuity between subject and object, the supposition of a subject without an object is impossible (Fajriudin 2018, 58).

A person's attitude towards something is usually based on that person's perception of something. A person's perception of something can be the result of his thoughts besides being a "spiritual" inheritance which is continued without comment. There is no result of thought, or science which does not presuppose human involvement because humans are the ones who know and want to know. Because of that, the element of "subject" and subjectivity must cover all the results of human thought.

George Berkeley (1685–1753) said, "*All reality is mental, esse est percipi*" (Berkeley 2002, 26). John Locke who agrees with Berkeley (Realism/Idealism) says: "Those who have objective reality are objects, namely quantified reality, which can be manipulated and measured, occupying a certain place in the spatiotemporal world. Or in other words; only the objective primary qualities of things (Shadr 1991, 32).

Is it possible for us to attain objective knowledge when all there is mental reality? But we need to be aware that because the historical sources we obtain are objects, meaning they have an independent existence outside the human mind. Such sources, for example, are buildings, currency, and so on. However, most historical sources originate from human testimonies and therefore do not have objective reality, but are only symbols of things that were real in the past. In other words, historical facts which later existed only in the mind of the observer or in the mind of the historian, and are therefore called subjective? Such sources, for example, are buildings, currency, and so on. However, most historical sources originate from human testimonies and therefore do not have objective reality, but are only symbols of things that were real in the past. In other words, historical facts mentioned later existed only in the mind of the observer or in the mind of the historian, and are therefore called subjective.

Phenomenology review says; "the dichotomy between "those who have an independent existence outside the human mind" has an objective reality, and "those that exist only in the human mind (historians)", therefore does not have an objective reality, violates the basic reality of humans as consciously existing in the world, as subjectivity-which embodied in the world (Bertens 1996, 124; Merleau-Ponty 1991, 21).

The question may arise here. Does this mean not to make this subjective, or relative? The answer is clear indeed "Truth is subjective and relative", but does not mean subjectivism and relativism, because in this last sense truth is subject to the arbitrary decision of the subject and there is no ahistorical truth at all. Truth certainly contains subjectivity and relativity but it does not mean subjectivism and relativism. Indeed, no truth has any relation (relationship) with humans. Truth is relational, as in Heidegger's words.

... since the kind that is essential to truth is a feature of human beings (design), then all truth is related to human existence. Does this connection mean that all truth is

“subjective”? This is not the case. The process of expression, in its unique meaning, is to get out of the environment of the subject to face the human being who is in the process of expressing the special entities or realities themselves (Heidegger 1960, 227; Heidegger 2002, 84; Poespoprodjo 1987, 28, Bertens 1990, 152).

So, if reality is no longer hidden from me, then I can be said to have attained objectivity. Objectivity isn't the hidden reality, so what is pointed out is the item itself. As a subjectivity that exists in the world, man opens the veil of reality, he opens the things that exist for him. And let these things exist as they are so that they are not bent according to their interests if they are a historian. But reality may be my delusion, my dream, driven by fear, worry, jealousy, etc. Indeed, but with the method above, I/we (the subject) are aware of that possibility, and if that happens then I realize it is not objectivity for me. We can distinguish what we perceive by our senses, or it is our dream. Based on this, it is objective, if what I “see”, where is the reality no longer hidden (Dhavamony 1995, 5–43, Bertens 1990, 101–4).

As an explanatory example, it could also be like this (it's just an analogy, from natural science). If scientist A says the reality of something is Y (“knife” for example). So, to check the truth of this we can say: try using your screwdriver to fix (strengthen) the screw, if you can then you are right, if not then he is wrong. If it is true, then Scientist B must respectfully acknowledge the truth of Scientist A. And vice versa or both are wrong (Dhavamony 1995; Poespoprodjo 1987, 35).

How the historian sees and directs his views, determines what he finally finds and produces, as Jacques Maritain's words in his book, *On the Philosophy of History* (Maritain 1973, 6):

...the way the historian directs his attention is the determining factor in the process. And this direction of attention itself depends on the whole “intellectual setting” of the subject. Thus, the whole intellectual disposition...the whole intellectual disposition of the subject (historian) plays an indispensable role in achieving historical truth: A situation different from scientific objectivity, in which everything related to subjective dispositions, human beings, except those required by science, is lost and should be lost. A historian claims that he has a sound philosophy about man, has a culture who are integrated, has a strong appreciation of various human activities and their comparative interests, and has the right scale of moral, political, religious, technical, and artistic values. The value I mean is truth, historical works will be in proportion to the richness of the humanity of historians.

Differences of opinion will be rife here, because the standpoint of a historian will greatly determine the results he achieves, also in reading his historical texts. That's why the exchange of findings (according to each horizon), will produce a boundary element of that reality. Every vision must only see one side, depending on which side we are on. If we look from above, it is the perspective above that is visible. Right, left, and so on. But even if we see from “above”, we still have a “shadow” (element, horizon) to see the whole (right-left, top-bottom). Thus, there are many

points of view (stand-points), and all have elements, horizons, parts, or sides of the other. With it all, we will find reality (and agreement about the limits of that reality). In Husserl's phenomenological theory, these are reductions and dentist variations (Hamersma 1983, 30; Bertens 1996, 99).

An interpretation (a text or findings) needs the following conditions: It must accord with the evidence, and it must show the connection between the event in interprets or at least their significance about the context. And it should not presuppose unlikely, implausible, or unacceptable assumptions. With this, we can arrive at reality itself, or in other words, reality opens itself (objectively).

To know the elements of sources of distortion, it is necessary: 1) Recognize that subjectivity is the entrance to objectivity. This is the claim of the early Edmund Husserl: the principal source of all principles is direct intuition, without intermediaries, *zurück zu den sachen selbst*, back to things themselves). 2) Depth of Independence (to accept or reject something, "am I bound by something, so that I can say something as it should be, as it is"). 3) Depth of Self-Criticism (am I not lying, twisting the existing facts, does he know what he is facing, whether reservations do not need to be made, and so on). 4) Adjustment on determining-determination of objects (certain objects can only be found properly when using certain methods).

Therefore, the truth of history is not because it is determined as history (for example national history, it is determined to be used as a school text, encyclopedia, and others), confirmed by certain community figures (either because of the quotation in speech or book texts), not because recorded in this book or that or not because it has become a seminar decision. But the truth of a history is because it has "objective evidence", the inevitability of the truth is "manifest" (obvious or can be grasped immediately, easily, even if it doesn't look real even though it requires certain efforts) in the mind.

If history is not corrected, or left as it is, falsification may even arise; with certain reasons (for example: if it is detailed, explained in full it will disrupt the order, it is not necessary, it is not useful, for education and others), then all of this is unacceptable, whatever the reason is, then the values that underlie it (namely truth) in the order or education, it is weakened and destroyed. "Truth is that no action is worthy except by it."

### **"Objective" Islam (An Ideal)**

Islam (meaning understanding of Islam) is *rahmatan lil ālamīn*, meaning that Islam will be voluntarily accepted and liked by people in this world. This shows that Islam is an "objective religion", in the sense that it has overall acceptability. But this is at the theoretical level, at the practical level, Islam is not uncommon as a "Pragmatic Religion", that is,

a religion that appears as a reaction and response to emerging realities or events, or a religion that responds to the challenges of the times. This is the dual face of Islam, between normative and pragmatic. Islam is a normative religion (like the “idealism” group, claiming its truth is absolute and a-historical) and Positive/pragmatic (the “Realism” group, saying the truth is Relative and Historical). These two dimensions are closely intertwined in Islam. Therefore, we should be able to use these normative guidelines as a reference for “positivism” in the history of the humanity of Muslims. In this sense, it is a demand for Islam to reduce Islam from a normative level to a positive one (Kuntowijoyo 2006,15).

Islam at the normative level is a set of coherent values that occur from the teachings of revelation (which is the criterion for absolute and transcendental truth). To be able to operate in order or as an axiological reference, these normative concepts must be derived in two mediums, namely Ideology and Science.

Here the gradations of truth are distinguished in their classification, namely Science (systematic knowledge), philosophy (science that seeks its roots, as deeply as possible), and Ideology (philosophy/science that is believed, such as Marxism, capitalism, socialism, etc.), then religion (there is a belief in truth that is believed to come down from the heaven). Religion becomes an ideology because it not only reconstructs reality but also provides ethical and theological motivation to overhaul it.

Ideology is thus a normative derivation that is reduced to action. But on the other hand, religion can be reduced to science, by formulating and describing its normative concepts at an empirical and objective level (turning into a theory for application). With these two reductions, trying to “change” is not too difficult. In the sense that emotional claims are reduced. Islam becomes “objective”, ready voluntarily to have its truth checked, and studied with even the strictest methodology, without reducing its weight as eschatological news, or revelation.

Lots of studies, for example, history, hadith, law, and others, will collide in the exchange of opinions, discussions, methodological-historical studies, and so on, because what has been received is included at the normative-revelatory level so there is no bargaining and fixed price. Even though it should be in the sense of *rahmatan lil ālamīn*, the objective religion must be ready for all of this. Therefore, in our opinion, what is called Islamic Objectivation is needed, namely how the values, and truths contained in the Islamic religion are accepted, not in the sense of Islam (as a religion), but because it is genuine truth (objective). When it is asked, what is the standard for the truth? the answer is “reason”. Whose reason, is it? The answer is not subjective reason, but society/human reason. through intersubjective dialogue.

## Conclusion

The theory of the state of nature that describes the evolutionary development of human life, which then transforms into a civilized society through a social contract, shows how secularistic views, especially regarding humans and their lives, greatly color modern Western political thinkers. In Hobbes' view, humans were originally like wolves who did not recognize the rules when hunting for food. Meanwhile, in Locke's assumption, although humans are described as civilized beings, they live in the absence of common rules. Universal rules then appear as soon as humans make a social contract. There is nothing more noble than the values and norms that have been established through mutual agreement, even religious values and rules must be subdued to be in line with the consensus.

This is where Al-Attas draws the dividing line. According to him, the secularization trend that fills the political discourse in the West stems from the inability of Christianity, as a religion, to answer all human problems. In the history of Western civilization, theocracy in the Middle Ages, which was originally considered a form of government that represented God's ideals and was considered sacred, then changed along with the growth of ideas about people's government, which was based on the view of the *state of nature* and *social contract*, which gave rise to various secularistic interpretations of politics. Similar conditions were never found in the long history of Islamic civilization, so secularization became unrecognizable even though Islam also rejected absolute theocracy in the political sphere.

The basic assumption to be offered here is that Islam is a religion and a civilization, because the Qur'an, as the holy book of Islam, does not only teach theological doctrines and religious rituals but also projects a rational worldview that is rich with various seminal concepts (especially about science) which become the basis of both individual and social life so that it develops into a civilization. That is, Islam is a *dīn* that has developed into *tamaddun* or civilization. The following is an explanation of how Islam as *dīn* developed into *tamaddun* with its intellectual and political traditions.



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